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Abstract 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are a newly developed networking technology 
consisting of multifunctional sensor nodes that are small in size and communicate over 
short distances. Continuous growth in the use of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) in 
sensitive applications such as military or hostile environments and also generally has 
resulted in a requirement for effective security mechanisms in the system design. In order 
to protect the sensitive data and the sensor readings, shared keys should be used to 
encrypt the exchanged messages between communicating nodes. Many key management 
schemes have been developed recently and a serious threat highlighted in all of these 
schemes is that of node capture attacks, where an adversary gains full control over a 
sensor node through direct physical access. This can lead an adversary to compromise the 
communication of an entire WSN. Additionally ignoring security issues related to data 
aggregation can also bring large damage to WSNs. Furthermore, in case an aggregator 
node, group leader or cluster head node fails there should be a secure and efficient way of 
electing or selecting a new aggregator or group leader node in order to avoid adversary 
node to be selected as a new group leader. A key management protocol for mobile sensor 
nodes is needed to enable them to securely communicate and authenticate with the rest of 
the WSN. 
This thesis presents a new key management protocol stack - entitled the Structure and 
Density Independent Group-Based Key Management protocol (SADI-GKM) - to fulfil 
the pre-deployment security needs of WSNs. 'Ibis protocol stack combines four different 
novel layers with different algorithms. All these layers are integrated with each other to 
provide better secure solutions for multiple security issues. The first layer of this protocol 
stack provides structure and density independent key management for large scale WSNs. 
The second layer's responsibility is to provide secure data aggregation according to the 
need of the target application. The third layer provides facilities for the secure selection 
of a new aggregator or group leader sensor node. The fourth layer's main task is to 
provide key management services for mobile sensor nodes in a WSN. All the four layers 
of SADI-GKM have been evaluated and implemented using different topologies both 
with and without group structures and compared against existing solutions. Evaluation 
results show a significant improvement in ten-ns of resilience against node capture attacks, 
replication attacks, data confidentiality, secure group leader selection, authentication of 
mobile sensor node and memory overhead. This shows that our protocol can be used to 
improve security in WSNs. 
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Chapter one. - Introduction 
Chapter One: Introduction 
With the continuous growth and development of computer networks, the idea of Wireless 
Sensor Networks (WSNs) introduced by Mark Weiser [1] have received increasing 
attention. However, research in WSNs is currently in an early stage, so they face many 
barriers. An important issue is that WSNs must be secure in order to counter a number of 
security threats from malicious entities. Therefore secure communication is essential. 
One solution for this is to use a key management scheme to provide secure 
communication. This is the topic for this thesis. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, the topic of the thesis is presented with its 
aims. Second, the novel contribution of the new approach posited in the thesis is 
presented. Third, an overview of the chapters of the thesis is presented. Finally, the 
chapter is summarized. 
1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks 
Humans always invent new technologies according to their needs to bring more 
flexibility to their daily lives. The history of networking is a good example of how 
computer networking has become more efficient and flexible day by day, e. g. the 
evolution from wired networks to wireless networks to bring more amenities and 
flexibility to users. 
Correspondingly, WSNs are a newly developed networking technology consisting of 
multifunctional sensor nodes that are small in size and communicate over short distances. 
WSNs provide more and unique facilities to users, many of which would be impossible 
otherwise. Sensor nodes incorporate properties for sensing environments, data processing 
and communication with other sensors. 
WSNs are a new technology that provides facilities for users to monitor environments 
across a wide area using their laptops or PCs. The unique properties of WSNs increase 
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flexibility and reduce user involvement in operational tasks such as in battlefields. The 
role of WSNs in many applications can be very useful, but on the other hand there remain 
significant challenges for researchers in providing efficient communication and correct 
information from such networks using reduced resources. In the future WSNs will be an 
integral part of our lives [2]. They may be working in busy road intersections [7], in the 
interior of large machineries, at the bottom of an ocean, on the surface of an ocean during 
a tornado, in a biologically or chemically contaminated field, in a battlefield beyond 
enemy lines, in a home or large building, in a large warehouse, attached to animals, 
attached to fast moving vehicles, in a drain or river moving with current. 
WSNs are a type of wireless ad hoc network in which communication links are wireless 
and refer to network connections established for a single session. Such a network does 
not require a router because every node in the network provides a routing service for 
others. Minimal configuration and quick deployment make ad hoc networks particularly 
suitable for emergency situations. 
If we compare the basic functionalities of a sensor node with a computer, we find them to 
be similar. As a sensor node receives input data through sensing, it processes it and 
produces an output to send on to its destination. Similarly computers receive input from a 
user, process it and produce output. Consequently we can call them tiny computers with 
additional sensing capabilities. 
1.2 WSN Communication Architecture 
A WSN is composed of a large number of sensor nodes and a base station. A base station 
is typically a gateway to another network, a powerful data processing or storage centre, or 
an access point for human interfaces. It can be used as a connection to disseminate 
control information into the network or extract data from it. A base station is also referred 
to as a sink [116]. Sinks are often many orders of magnitude more powerful than sensor 
nodes. The sensor nodes are usually scattered in a sensor field and each of these scattered 
sensor nodes has the capabilities to collect data and route data back to a sink and end 
users as shown in Figure I-1. The sink may communicate with the task manager node via 
2 
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the Internet or via Satellite communications [7]. In a WSN every sensor node plays a role 
as a router. 
I- 
-1 
711 
c 711 
Sink 
111 
Figure 1-1: Wireless Sensor Network. 
WSNs might consist of different types of sensor node such as low sampling rate magnetic, 
thermal, visual, infrared, acoustic or radar sensors, which are able to monitor a wide 
variety of ambient conditions [23]. 
Sensor nodes are densely deployed either very closely or directly inside the phenomenon 
to be observed. Therefore, they usually work unattended in remote geographic areas. 
WSNs have different communication patterns for different applications according to their 
requirements. The categories of these patterns include: 
" Node to base station communication, e. g. sensor readings and specific alerts. 
" Base station to node communication, e. g. specific requests and key updates. 
" Base station to all nodes, e. g. routing beacons, queries or reprogramming of the 
entire network. 
Communication amongst a defined cluster of nodes (say, a node and all its 
neighbors) [116]. Clusters can reduce the total number of messages using data 
aggregation. 
Senyor nodes 
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1.2.1 Components of a Sensor node 
Sensor nodes are capable of gathering sensory information, performing processing and 
communicating with other connected nodes in the network [179]. The typical hardware 
architecture of a sensor node is shown in Figure 1-2. 
Figure 1-2: Sensor node architecture. 
Figure 1-3 (a) shows a crossbow sensor node called mote and Figure 1-3 (b) shows Sun 
Microsystems' new sensor node called a Sun SPOT. 
410 
(a) : Crossbow mote (b): Sun SPOT 
Figure 1-3: Sensor node devices. 
The main components of a sensor node are a Microcontroller, Transceiver, External 
memory, Analogue to Digital Converter (ADC) and power source. We explain the 
functionality of the most important elements below. 
4 
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(a) Nficrocontroller: A microcontroller (or MCU) is a computer-on-a-chip. It is a type of 
microprocessor emphasizing self-sufficiency and cost-effectiveness, in contrast to a 
general-purpose microprocessor (such as the kind used in a PC). The only difference 
between a microcontroller and a microprocessor is that a microprocessor has three parts - 
an ALU, a Control Unit and registers (like memory), while the microcontroller has 
additional elements such as ROM and RAM [179]. The microcontrolier performs tasks, 
processes data and controls the functionality of other components in the sensor node. 
(b) Transceiver: A transceiver unit connects the node to the network via wireless radio 
communication. Sensor nodes make use of the ISM (industrial, scientific and medical) 
radio band which gives free radio, huge spectrum allocation and global availability [4]. 
Radio Frequency (RF) based communication is compatible with the majority of WSN 
applications. WSNs use the communication frequencies between about 433 MHz and 2.4 
GHz. Radios used in transceivers operate in four different modes: Transmit, Receive, Idle, 
and Sleep. Radios operating in the Idle mode result in power consumption almost equal 
to the power consumed in the Receive mode [5]. Thus it is better to completely shutdown 
the radios rather than leave them in the Idle mode when not transmitting and receiving. A 
significant amount of power is also consumed when switching from the Sleep mode to 
the Transmit mode to transmit a data packet. 
(d) Power Source: Sensor node power is consumed by sensing, communication and data 
processing actions. Communications between sensor nodes consume higher energy as 
compared to sensing and processing. Sending one bit requires the same amount of energy 
as executing 50 to 150 instructions on a sensor node [6]. Batteries are the main source of 
power supply for sensor nodes. Two types of batteries can be used, namely chargeable 
and non-rechargeable. They are also classified according to the electrochemical material 
used for the electrodes such as NiCd (nickel-cadmium), NiZn (nickel-zinc), Nimh (nickel 
metal hydride) or Lithium-Ion [179]. 
5 
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(e) External Memory: A sensor node may make use of memory for two purposes: 
storing application related or personal data and programming the device. Flash memory is 
used in sensor nodes due to its cost and storage capacity. The memory size of mica-2 
nodes is 128K Flash and 4K Ram. 
1.3 Applications of WSNs 
WSNs are different from traditional networks and present a new set of properties. 
Typically the communication structure of a traditional network will remain the same in 
all its applications while a WSN's structure will change according to its application. 
WNSs can be classified into two categories according to applications. The first category 
is that of indoor WSNs and the second is that of outdoor WSNs. Indoor WSNs can be 
implemented in buildings, houses, hospitals, factories etc [ 17,21-23]. Outdoor WSNs can 
be implemented for battlefield, marine, soil, and atmospheric monitoring; forest fire 
detection; meteorological or geophysical research; flood detection; bio-complexity 
mapping of environments; pollution studies; etc [6,7,11,12] [118]. Other applications of 
sensor nodes can be found in smart environments, interactive museums [21], car theft 
monitoring [22], inventory control, vehicle tracking and detection [23], soil moisture 
monitoring, pH and salinity level measurement, traffic control and road detection, aircraft 
and space vehicles to report excessive temperatures, tire temperature and pressure 
monitors on automobiles, aircraft to provide early warnings of impending tread 
separation [7], and many others. We now present some WSN projects for different 
applications, including: 
1. PODS-A Remote Ecological Micro-Sensor Network: PODS is a research project 
conducted at the University of Hawaii, which involved building a wireless 
network of environmental sensors to investigate why endangered species of plants 
grow in one area but not in neighbouring areas [13]. 
2. Flood detection: ALERT (Automated Local Evaluation in Real-Time) was 
probably the first well-known WSN deployed in the real world. It was developed 
by the National Weather Service in the 1970's. ALERT provides important real- 
time rainfall and water level information to evaluate the possibility of potential 
6 
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flooding. Currently ALERT is deployed across most of the western United States. 
It is heavily used for flooding alarming in California and Arizona [14]. 
3. ZebraNet: ZebraNet is studying power-aware, position-aware 
computing/communication systems. On the biology side, the goal is to use the 
systems to perform novel studies of animal migrations and inter-species 
interactions [95,96]. 
4. Monitoring Volcanic Eruptions with a WSN. - Two WSNs on active volcanoes 
were deployed by this project [90,91]. Their initial deployment at Tungurahua 
volcano, Ecuador, in July 2004 served as a proof-of-concept and consisted of a 
small array of wireless nodes capturing continuous infrasound data. Their second 
deployment at Reventador volcano, Ecuador, in July/August 2005 consisted of 16 
nodes deployed over a3 krn aperture on the upper flanks of the volcano to 
measure both seismic and infrasonic signals with a high resolution (24 bits per 
channel at 100 Hz) [89]. 
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Figure 1-4: Volcano monitoring sensor network architecture [89]. 
5. FireWxNet: FireWxNet is a multi-tiered portable wireless system for monitoring 
weather conditions in rugged wild land fire environments. FireWxNet provides 
the fire fighting community with the ability to safely and easily measure and view 
fire and weather conditions over a wide range of locations and elevations within 
7 
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forest fires [108]. FireWxNet was deployed in summer 2005 at Montana in 
Colorado. 
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Figure 1-5: System overview: Radios with directional antennas were used at each 
peak and at the base camp to relay data from the sensor network and webcam [1081. 
6. Code Blue: The Code Blue project research is to apply WSN technology to a 
range of medical applications, including pre-hospital and in-hospital emergency 
care, disaster response and stroke patient rehabilitation [15-19,20]. The Code 
Blue software platfon-n is shown in Figures 1-6 and 1-7. 
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Figure 1-6: Code Blue architecture for emergency response 1181. 
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Figure 1-7: Monitoring limb movement in stroke patient rehabilitation [201. 
7. WBAN (Wearable Wireless Body Area Network): The WBAN [24] 
implementation consists of inexpensive, lightweight, and miniature sensors that 
can allow long-term, unobtrusive, ambulatory health monitoring with 
instantaneous feedback to the user about the current health status and real-time or 
near real-time updates of the user's medical records. Such a system can be used 
where intelligent heart monitors can warn users about impeding medical 
conditions [25] or provide information for a specialized service in the case of 
catastrophic events [ 19] [26]. 
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Figure 1-8: Wireless body area network of intelligent sensors for patient monitoring. 
[241. 
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8. AlarmNet. - The AlarmNet system integrates heterogeneous devices: some 
wearable on the patient and some placed inside the living space. Together they 
perform a health-mission specified by a healthcare provider. Data is collected, 
aggregated, pre-processed, stored, and acted upon, according to a set of system 
requirements identified [92-941. 
9. VigilNet: The VigilNet system is a real-time WSN for military surveillance. The 
general objective of VigilNet is to alert military command and control units of the 
occurrence of events of interest in hostile regions [8-10]. 
The above projects showed us the important involvement of WSNs in our daily life. It 
will not only help us in emergency services to save lives but also benefit us to monitor 
forest fire, flood detection and many other sectors. We believe in future, we will see 
WSNs in many new applications to play an integral part of our life. 
1.4 Security in WSNs 
The main focus of the work presented here is on the development of security mechanisms 
for WSNs. Before considering such issues in greater detail, it will be useful to first 
consider security in a wider context. 
The term computer security generally refers to methods of protecting information, 
computer programs, and other computer system from unauthorized access, whereas the 
term information security applies to protecting information and information systems from 
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction. The core 
principles of information security are confidentiality, possession, integrity, authenticity, 
availability and utility [174]. In WSNs information security related issues and 
requirements have gained the attention of many researchers due to their importance in 
many applications. 
Cryptography - the process by which a raw message (plaintext) is mapped or encrypted 
to a scrambled form (ciphertext) before transmission or storage, then mapped back to its 
original form again (decrypted) when an authorized party wishes to read it - this is the de 
facto mechanism used for information security [174]. Encryption and decryption 
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generally require the use of some secret information, referred to as a ke . In some y 
encryption mechanisms, the same key is used for both encryption and decryption; 
whereas for other mechanisms different keys are used. Moreover key management deals 
with the secure generation, distribution, and storage of keys. Secure methods of key 
management are extremely important. Once a key has been generated, it must remain 
secret to avoid serious security mishaps [115]. Security is always an issue in traditional 
networks and brings increasing challenges over time. WSNs have similar and additional 
issues as compared to traditional networks. Below we provide a brief description of some 
of the security issues and goals in WSNs that are addressed in this thesis [41]: 
Data Confidentiality: Data confidentiality is an issue in network security. In WSNs 
confidentiality relates that it should not leak sensor readings to its neighbours, build a 
secure channel for secure communication and public sensor information should be 
encrypted, such as sensor identities and public keys. Generally key establishment is used 
to achieve data confidentiality. For example Jun et al. [175] has proposed a solution using 
symmetric key establishment to protect confidentiality against a parasitic adversary. 
Many current proposed solutions for data confidentiality suffer from a number of 
problems which we discuss and address in this thesis. 
Data Integrity: This is defined as the quality of correctness, completeness, wholeness, 
soundness and compliance with the intention of the creators of the data. In WSNs secure 
data aggregation techniques are used to achieve data integrity and data confidentiality 
[148,149]. However in applications where sensitive data are collected, some systems 
have also been proposed to check data integrity using Intrusion Detection Systems [ 176]. 
This thesis also focuses on issues related to secure data aggregation, describe these 
limitations and discusses how they can be mitigated using our novel protocol. 
Availability The accessibility of a system resource in a timely manner; Availability is 
one of the six ftindamental components of information security. The requirement of 
security not only affects the operation of the network, but also is highly important in 
maintaining the availability of the whole network. For better availability in WSNs good 
network management, monitoring and a reliable transport layer solution are needed [177]. 
Authenticity: Defined as the verification and integrity of a transmitted message. In WSNs 
an adversary is not just limited to modifying the data packet. It can change the whole 
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packet stream by injecting additional packets. So the receiver needs to ensure that the 
data used in any decision-making process originates from the correct source. Many 
schemes have been proposed and in this thesis we draw on the benefits they provide to 
provide an authentication scheme to provide increased information security. 
These general issues directly affect the functionality of our proposed protocol and are 
addressed in later subsections. 
The limited resources of a sensor node and its different characteristics from those of a 
traditional computer make it difficult to use traditional security techniques for WSNs. 
As described earlier, a sensor node is a tiny device, with only a small amount of memory 
and storage space for the code. In order to build an effective security mechanism, it is 
necessary to limit the code size of security algorithms. For example, one common sensor 
type (TelosB) has a 16-bit, 8 MHz RISC CPU with only 4-10K RAM, 48K program 
memory, and 1024K flash storage [110]. With such a limitation, the software built for the 
sensor node must also be quite small. Therefore, the size for all security related code 
must be small. Security also gets more challenging when we talk about scalable WSNs or 
add considerations of mobility to the WSNs. During our research we have identified that 
even topologies directly affect security as well [33]. All these issues are inter-linked with 
each other, making them even more challenging. In the following subsection we formally 
define the problem domain. 
1.5 Problem Definition 
A WSN is vulnerable to several security threats/attacks similar to those of traditional 
networks. One such possible attack on WSNs is called a node capture attack (NCA): 
where an adversary gains full control over a sensor node (or nodes) through direct 
physical access. This can lead to compromise of the communication of an entire WSN. 
Such an attack could allow an adversary to launch many other attacks, e. g. Replay, 
Blackhole and Denial of Service attacks. The compromised sensor node can be an 
aggregator node, a cluster head node or a normal sensor node. Therefore data 
confidentiality and data integrity are at high risk. Many key management solutions have 
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been proposed recently to provide secure communication and reduce the impact of 
adversaries damaging WSNs using node capture attacks, but these solutions still suffer 
from its effects. However there is also the possibility of replay attacks without physically 
compromising a sensor node, where an adversary node will eavesdrop on packets and 
resend old packets in an attempt to constantly waste other sensor nodes' energy or obtain 
secret keys. 
In WSN many applications are carrying sensitive data and information and thus we 
should consider threat like node capture attack as high risk for communication and data 
con fidentiality/security. Furthermore, ignoring security issues relating to data aggregation 
can result in significant damage of data confidentiality to a WSN. Although data 
aggregation in WSNs is helpful in reducing the amount of data to be transmitted between 
sources and destinations - thereby conserving energy, it is important to balance this 
against the security implications. Current data aggregation schemes are designed without 
considering possible security issues related to data confidentiality. Therefore data 
aggregation needs to be enhanced to maintain the privacy/security of sensor nodes and 
their data. Additionally in case of aggregator node, group leader or cluster head node fails 
due to fewer resources or physical compromise there should be a secure and efficient way 
of electing or selecting a new aggregator or group leader node. For example a new 
selected group leader node can be an adversary node. There are different proposed 
schemes which are only providing election of a new group leader node but they didn't 
consider related security issues. Therefore an efficient secure group leader/cluster 
head/aggregator node selection solution is one of the important requirements of WSNs 
The sensor nodes' mobility poses far more challenges in Mobile Sensor Networks 
(MSNs) compared to Static Sensor Networks. The network topology is highly dynamic as 
sensor nodes frequently join or leave the WSN, and roam throughout the WSN. The 
wireless channel is also subject to greater interferences and errors, revealing volatile 
characteristics in terrns of bandwidth and delay. With such dynamics, mobile nodes may 
request for anytime, anywhere security services as they move from one place to another. 
In terms of solutions to these security challenges in Mobile and Static WSNs, researchers 
have proposed different key management schemes [2-9,14] for secure communication 
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and resilience against possible attacks. These schemes try to provide better resilience 
against node capture attacks, but there is still a chance of the entire WSN being 
compromised. For example, in probabilistic key pre-distribution schemes [2,5], 
compromising a few nodes can lead to the entire WSN communications being 
compromised. 
One of the important concerns in terms of security solutions for WSNs is that all these 
proposed solutions are specifically designed for single application or security problems, 
explicitly with certain attack models in mind. They work well in the presence of a 
designated network model, application or attack but may collapse under unanticipated 
attacks, different application or changes to the WSN model. Therefore we are unaware of 
the consequences when multiple security problems occur together in a WSN. To achieve 
this goal, a new application independent and integrated approach is needed. 
A challenge remains therefore to create an application independent, scalable and 
integrated key management solution for WSNs which can provide better secure 
communication, secure data aggregation, data confidentiality, and resilience against node 
capture and replication attacks for different applications. Furthermore such a proposed 
key management solution should also support applications with mobility. Giving this 
challenge, our intention is to develop a secure communication solution for large scale 
WSNs, which will be elaborated in the next section. 
1.6 Project Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this project has been to design a structure and density independent key 
management solution for large scale WSNs, which can provide secure communication 
between sources and destinations, resilience against node capture and replication attacks, 
secure data aggregation, secure group leader selection, and key management in different 
applications including for MSNs. 
Specifically, the objectives of this project are: 
To establish the background related to security issues and security requirements 
for WSNs, for which existing key management techniques offer appropriate 
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solutions. This literature research presents current efforts and contributions 
towards WSN security, and also magnifies the core problems and difficulties 
faced by the existing key management solutions. This objective has been fulfilled 
using an extensive literature survey in Chapters two and three. 
To design an application independent, scalable and integrated group-based key 
management protocol for large scale WSNs, providing secure communication 
between source and destination nodes. The protocol should be able to: 
o Provide high resilience against node capture attacks to minimize their 
impact so that compromised sensor nodes should not help an adversary to 
compromise the communication among other sensor nodes. 
o Provide resilience against replay attacks to ensure data freshness. 
Minimize memory usage and communication overhead, and increase key 
connectivity. 
We present the protocol that we have developed to fulfil these objectives in 
section 5.2 and evaluated in section 6.3 
To provide different levels of data confidentiality. Consequently the proposed 
protocol should provide a secure data aggregation service at the sensor node 
acting as a group leader. This service will help to ensure that sensitive data is not 
disclosed in case a sensor node or group leader node is compromised. The level of 
data confidentiality should be variable according to application requirements in 
respect of available resources. We have developed a secure data aggregation 
scheme which is the second layer of our proposed protocol, described in section 
5.2.1 and evaluated in section 6.3.3. 
To design a secure and efficient group leader selection algorithm in case a group 
leader battery life runs out or is physically compromised. This allows a selection 
process to be activated to establish a new group leader when certain parameters of 
the current group leader fall below a given threshold or it is detected to be 
compromised. We have achieved this by testing various selection parameters in 
section 5.1.2 that we used to propos an efficient group leader selection scheme 
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described in section 5.2.2. Finally the proposed scheme is evaluated in section 
6.3.8. 
To propose a key management algorithm able to provide a solution for 
applications where sensor nodes are mobile. We have achieved this by extended 
our protocol in section 5.2.3 and evaluated in section 6.3.9. 
1.7 Novel Research Contributions 
This thesis proposed a novel and distinct protocol stack Structure And Density 
Independent Group Based Key Management (SADI-GKM) for WSNs. This protocol 
comprises four layers, which we refer to as the protocol stack. Each layer contains its 
own set of algorithms to perform its own set of functions. Therefore the stack and its 
algorithms form the first layer provides a structure and density independent key 
management solution for large scale, the second deals with secure data aggregation, the 
third operates secure group leader selection services, and the fourth layer offers a key 
management solution for MSNs. Specifically our novel contributions can be summarized 
as follows: 
e Development of the structure and density independent key management 
protocol: Our proposed key management protocol is designed for large-scale 
WSNs. As this protocol is topology independent, it can work on different 
topologies. The protocol has been evaluated using different topologies both with 
and without group structures and compared against existing key management 
schemes. Our evaluation results show a significant improvement in terms of 
resilience against node capture attacks, data confidentiality, memory overhead 
and connectivity. There are a verity of key management protocols that are 
available but we have demonstrated using simulation that they are not structure 
and density independent in section 6.3.1. These protocols are limited to specific 
applications and a structure and density independent key management solution 
therefore provides benefits in ten-ns of universal applicability and helps to reduce 
computation costs in maintaining the network topology when new nodes join or 
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leave a group/network. Structure And Density Independent Group-Based Key 
Management (SADI-GKM) as presented in Chapter 5, is therefore a novel 
protocol. 
Design of a secure data aggregation algorithm: This provides secure data 
aggregation by using homomorphic encryption to aggregate encrypted data 
without the need for decryption at the group leader node. The algorithm helps to 
maintain better data confidentiality. Furthermore we have provided two different 
aggregation solutions according to the level of data confident ly/security required 
in a target application. Current secure data aggregation schemes do not provide 
different levels of confidentiality. However our secure data aggregation solution 
provides different levels of confidentiality using different encryption methods for 
different applications according to their requirements and available resources, 
therefore providing novel functionality as presented in section 5.2.1. 
Development of a secure group leader selection algorithm: This forms part of 
our key management protocol. This novel method allows a new group leader to be 
selected using four different weighting factors: available energy at each sensor 
node, its level of trust, its distance from the current group leader (position of new 
group leader sensor node) and the number of its neighbouring sensor nodes, 
presented in section 5.2.2. The sensor node with the highest combined factor 
value will be selected as the new group leader node. Moreover, the algorithm only 
involves a few sensor nodes in the new group leader selection process, which 
helps to reduce the overall cost. Furthermore we have analysed and found the 
impact of the group leader position on group lifetime in section 5.1.2. Current 
group leader election/selection schemes are based on simple selection factors such 
as energy and number of neighbouring sensor nodes. The inclusion of group 
leader position in our group leader selection protocol is therefore a useful and 
novel addition. 
Design of a key management algorithm for MSNs: There are many different 
application scenarios for MSNs, where all sensor nodes can be mobile or some of 
them are static and the others mobile. Furthermore there are different types of 
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roaming for mobile sensor nodes: free roaming (e. g. WSNs in water) and guided 
roaming. These properties of MSNs pose more security challenges than static 
sensor networks. If we link the issue of scalability to MSNs, security issues 
becomes more complicated. According to our literature survey there is no 
appropriate key management protocol for WSNs, which can consider all these 
issues together. Therefore we have proposed a novel key management algorithm 
for MSNs to provide better secure communication which is presented in section 
5.2.3. 
Discovery of the effect of node topology, density and level of key sharing on 
security: During our research we identified that sensor node topology, density 
(the number of neighbouring nodes) and level of key sharing with neighbouring 
sensor nodes have a direct effect on WSN security in particular in relation to node 
capture attacks. Currently the effect of node capture attacks on entire WSNs has 
not been analysed in the context of topology, density and level of key sharing. We 
evaluated these factors in section 5.1.1 and show them to have an impact on the 
security of entire WSN. Therefore we need to be careful in selecting an 
appropriate topology and density, and consider the number of keys shared 
between neighbouring nodes [33]. These findings are of significant benefits to the 
future development of WSN security technologies. 
Discovery of the effect of group leader position on performance of a sensors 
group: During our investigatory research we identified that group leader position 
in a group has direct effect on the performance of the sensor group. Especially in 
case of large group of sensor nodes or large packet size the wrong position can 
increase communication overhead dramatically. Currently group leader position 
has not been analysed in context of group or WSN lifetime. We evaluated this 
factor in section 5.1.2 and show group leader position impact on performance of 
entire group. 
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1.8 Thesis Structure 
Chapter one: In this chapter we discuss the wider context and outline the problem of 
secure communication in large scale WSNs. We include the definition of WSNs, their 
main application areas and a survey of current WSN projects. We describe the 
communication architecture and components of sensor nodes. We also briefly describe 
the importance of security in WSNs. Furthermore the chapter highlights the consequences 
of node capture attacks, other interlink attacks and security vulnerabilities. 
Chapter two: In this chapter we provide a general overview of challenges in WSNs, 
including: fault tolerance, sensor network topology, routing, mobility and scalability. 
Furthermore we present a survey of the security challenges and possible attacks in WSNs. 
The main security challenges include: data confidentiality, data integrity, authentication, 
key establishment, availability, privacy, secure routing, secure group management, 
intrusion detection and secure data aggregation. Possible attacks on WSNs include: node 
capture attacks, replay attacks, side channel attacks, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, 
software attacks, routing attacks, traffic analysis attacks, Sybil attacks and attacks on in- 
network processing. At the end of chapter we provide an overview of security in MSNs. 
Chapter three: This chapter presents a critical survey on literature and works relating to 
key management, secure data aggregation, group leader election/selection and key 
management for MSNs. It also includes discussions on the existing solutions of key 
management for static WSNs. These solutions are classified into five different types: key 
pool based key management, session based key management, hierarchical based key 
management, key management for heterogeneous sensor networks and group based key 
management. Limitations and drawbacks of the current key management schemes are 
assessed. In particular, all the existing solutions are structure dependent, and any change 
to the structure of a WSN directly affects its security. 
Chapter four: This chapter presents the basic design of our novel Structure And Density 
Independent Group-Based Key Management (SADI-GKM) protocol stack with a 
description of its four layers. The chapter starts with the background of current security 
issues, their relationships and current requirements of secure WSNs. It then highlights the 
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importance of providing an integrated proactive security solution and explains how our 
four protocol layers are integrated with each other in order to achieve our goals. 
Chapter five: This chapter describes the design and different operation steps of our 
protocol in details. The important part of this chapter is our pre-design research 
investigations which help us in developing efficient protocol SADI-GKM- The chapter 
also describes each layer of our protocol. We begin by looking at the first and second 
layers, key management and secure data aggregation, where we describe the basic key 
management and secure data algorithms together. Then we explain the third layer, secure 
group leader selection. In the fourth layer we present a key management solution for 
MSNs. 
Chapter six: This chapter presents the implementation phases, simulation environments, 
analysis, results and performance evaluation of our protocol. We start this chapter by 
describing the implementation phases including a radio model, topology implementations, 
routing algorithms and security. We evaluate SADI-GKM performance against node 
capture attacks using various topologies both with and without the use of groups. We 
then describe our implementation of secure data aggregation using homomorphic 
encryption, and secure group leader selection. Finally we evaluate key management for 
MSNs. 
Chapter seven: We conclude our dissertation by summarizing the findings that we have 
achieved so far, and discuss major issues and future work in the area of WSN security. 
1.9 Summary 
This chapter has presented an overview of this thesis. WSNs consist of a large number of 
low-cost, low-power, and multifunctional sensor nodes that communicate over short 
distances through wireless links. Continuous growth in the use of WSNs in sensitive 
applications such as military or hostile environments has resulted in a requirement for 
effective security mechanisms in the WSN design. Achieving security in resource- 
constrained WSNs is a challenging research task. Many key management schemes have 
been developed recently to provide secure communication between sources and 
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destinations in WSNs. A serious threat highlighted in all these schemes is that of node 
capture attacks, where an adversary gains full control over a sensor node through direct 
physical access. The compromised sensor node can be an aggregator node, a cluster head 
node or a normal sensor node. This could allow the adversary to compromise the 
communication of an entire sensor network, which causes a high risk for data privacy. 
Furthermore ignoring security issues related to data aggregation and aggregator node 
election can bring large damage to WSNs. To deal with these issues we have therefore 
proposed the novel protocol SADI-GKM to provide better secure communication, secure 
data aggregation, privacy, and resilience against node capture and replication attacks. 
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Chapter Two: Security in Wireless Sensor 
Networks 
WSNs are a new research area that has a large number of complicated research 
challenges in security, routing, topology management, mobility and many others. In this 
chapter we will first describe some general research challenges and later concentrate on 
the security challenges and security threats that exist for WSNs. 
2.1 Challenges in WSNs 
In this section we will briefly describe general research issues and challenges in WSNs. 
These include fault tolerance; scalability; production costs; operating environiment; 
topology maintenance; hardware constraints; power consumption; security and so on. 
2.1.1 Fault Tolerance 
As described in section 1.3, WSNs are often deployed in inhospitable environments. 
Furthermore sensor nodes need to be inexpensive to achieve target benefits anticipated 
from their future use. Consequently they are liable to faults and resource depletion. 
Fault-tolerance is the ability of a system to deliver a desired level of functionality in the 
presence of faults. Fault-tolerance is crucial for many systems and is becoming vitally 
important for computing and communication based systems. Since WSNs are inherently 
fault-prone and their on-site maintenance is infeasible, scalable self-healing is crucial for 
enabling the deployment of large-scale WSNs applications [27]. The level of fault 
tolerance can be higher and lower depending on the different applications of particular 
WSNs, and relevant schemes must be developed with this in mind. Fault tolerance can be 
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addressed at the physical layer, hardware, system software, middleware, or application 
level [28]. 
2.1.2 WSNs Topology 
WSNs might contain a large number of sensor nodes in applications where networking 
would otherwise be inaccessible. They are also prone to frequent failures and thus make 
topology maintenance a challenging task. There are generally three main topologies in 
WSNs. These are grid, tree and random mesh topologies. WSN applications are generally 
topology dependent. Therefore it can be difficult to make use of any proposed solution 
related to routing, security and so on across multiple applications. Use of these topologies 
2 
varies according to applications [33]. The node density may be as high as 20 nodes/m , or 
in some circumstances even higher [32]. Deploying a large number of sensor nodes 
densely requires careful handling of topology maintenance. Therefore topology 
maintenance schemes are required. Topology maintenance can be split into several 
phases: Pre-deployment, deployment, Post-deployment and Re-deployment phases. 
2.1.3 Routing 
Routing in WSNs is very challenging due to the inherent characteristics that distinguish 
these networks from other wireless networks like mobile ad hoc networks or cellular 
networks. First, due to the relatively large number of sensor nodes, it is not possible to 
build a global addressing scheme for the deployment of a large number of sensor nodes 
as the overhead of identification (ID) maintenance is high. Thus, traditional IP-based 
protocols may not be applied to WSNs [35]. Furthermore, sensor nodes are deployed in 
an ad hoc manner. According to Al-Karaki and Kamal [35] the design of routing 
protocols is influenced by many design factors. The following factors must be considered 
to achieve efficient communication in WSNs: node deployment, energy consumption 
without loss of accuracy, data reporting model and nodel7ink heterogeneity. Fault 
tolerance, scalability and connectivity are other factors which have a direct influence on 
routing as described in earlier sections. 
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2.1.4 Mobility 
Mobility is generally viewed as a major hurdle in the control and management of large- 
scale wireless networks. In fact without mobility (i. e. stationary nodes only), a 
hierarchical clustering and addressing scheme (of the type used in the Internet) could be 
easily applied to manage routing. However, as nodes move, the hierarchical partitioning 
structure also changes, forcing frequent hierarchical address changes followed by update 
broadcasts to the entire network. This is a very resource consuming proposition that can 
easily congest the entire network. Most of the network architectures assume that sensor 
nodes are stationary. However, the mobility of either base stations or sensor nodes is 
sometimes necessary in many applications [37]. 
Furthermore mobility in WSNs brings similar (like other wireless networks) and more 
complicated challenges (related to security, scalability, routing, network management and 
so on) due to limited available resources and structure dependent applications. Since we 
are unable to use traditional wireless networks solutions in WSNs due to limited 
resources and the dense nature of the networks, similar conditions apply to MSNs [36]. 
2.1.5 Scalability 
Generally WSNs are assumed to contain hundreds or thousands of sensor nodes. 
However the number of sensor nodes depends on applications, and in some 
circumstances it might reach to millions. Consequently WSNs must be highly scaleable 
networks and any new scheme must also be able to work in such large-scale WSNs. 
Scalability is one of the core challenges in WSNs because we need to pay particular 
attention to the provision of a solution for scaleable routing, security and management 
when networks are scaleable. Providing these solutions in the limited resource 
environment of WSNs is a considerable research challenges. 
In the management of such large scale networks with high density of neighbouring nodes, 
every single node plays an important role. This can cause the overloading of individual 
sensor nodes, which can directly affect the performance of the entire WSNs. The right 
selection of density can help to balance energy consumption in the network. The density 
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can range from a few sensor nodes to several hundred sensor nodes in a region [34]. The 
node density depends on the application in which the sensor nodes are deployed. For 
example, for machine diagnosis applications, the node density can be around 300 sensor 
nodes in a5x5m2 region, and the density for vehicle tracking applications can be 
around 10 sensor nodes per 5x5m2 region [32,7]. 
2.1.6 Other Issues 
There are many other issues such as production costs [23,30,3 1 ], time synchronization 
[I 11,112], group management [113], boundary recognition [114] and security, along 
with various other issues related to specific applications. In the next section we will 
discuss security issues and challenges in WSNs. 
2.2 Security Challenges in WSNs 
In this section we describe generally and briefly about challenges in WSNs, including 
data confidentiality, data integrity, authentication, key establishment, availability, privacy, 
secure routing, secure group management, intrusion detection and secure data 
aggregation. 
2.2.1 Data Confidentiality 
In order to secure data from eavesdroppers it is necessary to ensure the confidentiality of 
sensed data. To achieve data confidentiality, encryption functions are normally used, 
which are a standard method and rely on a shared secret key existing between 
communicating parties. To protect the confidentiality of data, encryption itself is not 
sufficient; as an eavesdropper can perform traffic analysis on the overheard ciphertext, 
which could release sensitive information about the data. Furthermore, to avoid misuse of 
information, confidentiality of sensed data also needs to be enforced via access control 
policies at base stations [40]. To maintain better confidentiality we should follow some of 
the following rules [38,39]: 
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A WSN should not leak sensor readings to its neighbours. In some applications, 
the data stored in a sensor node may be highly sensitive. To avoid leakage of 
sensitive data a sensor node should therefore avoid sharing keys used for 
encryption and decryption with neighbouring nodes [33]. 
* Secure channels should be built into WSNs. 
* Public sensor information such as sensors' identities should also be encrypted to 
some extent to protect against traffic analysis attacks. 
Physical node compromise makes the problem of confidentiality complex. When an 
adversary physically captures a sensor node, it is generally assumed that the adversary 
can extract all information or data from that sensor node. To minimize the risk of 
disclosing sensitive data after physical attacks on sensor nodes, it is better to use rules 
described earlier in this section. Further details about node capture attacks will be 
provided in Section 2.3.1. 
In MSNs,, higher risk levels are associated with data confidentiality than in static sensor 
networks due to their roaming and the sharing of information with sensor nodes. 
Therefore it is particularly important that mobile sensor nodes should not leak sensor 
readings to neighbouring nodes without proper security. We do not recommend to share 
keys with neighbouring sensor nodes which are used for data encryption and decryption 
[36]. 
2.2.2 Data Integrity 
Data integrity issues in wireless networks are similar to those in wired networks. Data 
integrity ensures that any received data has not been altered or deleted in transit. We 
should keep in mind that an adversary can launch modification attacks when 
cryptographic checking mechanisms such as message authentication codes and hashes are 
not used. For example, a malicious node may add some fragments or alter the data within 
a packet. This new packet can then be sent to the original receiver [41 ]. 
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We also need to ensure the freshness of each message. Informally, data freshness 
suggests that the data is recent, and it ensures that no old messages have been replayed. 
This requirement is especially important when there are shared-key strategies employed 
in the design. 
2.23 Authentication 
Authentication is a process which enables a node to verify the origin of a packet and 
ensure data integrity. In WSNs an adversary is not just limited to modifying data packets. 
It can change the whole packet stream by injecting additional packets. So the receiver 
node needs to ensure that the data used in any decision-making process originates from 
correct sources [41]. In many applications authentication is essential due to matters of 
sensitivity. 
However whilst authentication stops outsiders from inserting or spoofing packets, it does 
not solve the problem of physically compromised sensor nodes. As a compromised 
sensor node contains the same secret keys as a legitimate node, it can authenticate itself 
to the network and an adversary may also exploit the broadcast authentication capabilities 
of the compromised sensor nodes to attack the WSN itself (e. g. to consume sensors' 
battery power by instructing them to do unnecessary operations). We may be able to use 
intrusion detection techniques [40] to spot such compromised nodes, and revoke the 
broadcast authentication capabilities of the compromised senders [43]. There are many 
authentications schemes [39,41,43-48] that have been proposed for WSNs. 
Establishing efficient authentication in MSNs is a more challenging task than in static 
WSNs. In a static WSN every sensor node might have a fixed number of neighbours, and 
new sensor nodes are unlikely to be added after deployment. However in a MSN nodes 
easily roam from one place to another. Providing authentication in large scale MSNs is 
challenging due to resource limitations [36]. 
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2.2.4 Key Establishment 
Key management constitutes a set of techniques and procedures supporting the 
establishment and maintenance of keying relationships between authorized parties. There 
are two types of key algorithms. Symmetric key algorithms represent a system involving 
two transfon-nations: one for a source/sender and another for the receiver, both of which 
make use of either the same secret key (symmetric key) or two keys easily computed by 
each other. Asymmetric key algorithms represent a system comprised of two related 
transformations: one defined by a public key (the public transformation), and another 
defined by a private key (the private transformation). Finding the private key from the 
public key can be difficult. 
Confidentiality, entity authentication, data origin authentication, data integrity, and 
digital signatures are some of the cryptographic techniques for which key management 
perforins a very important role. 
In indoor and outdoor WSN applications, communications can be monitored and nodes 
are potentially subject to capture and surreptitious use by an adversary. For this reason 
cryptographically protected communications are required. A keying relationship can be 
used to facilitate cryptographic techniques, whereby communicating entities share 
common data (keying materiaý. This data may include public or secret keys, initialization 
values, or additional non-secret parameters [3]. 
Many researchers have proposed different key management schemes for secure 
communication between sensor nodes that try to provide better resilience against node 
capture attacks, but at some level of node capture attack there is a possibility that the 
entire sensor network may become compromised. For example, in probabilistic key pre- 
distribution schemes [2,5] the compromise ofjust a few nodes can lead to a compromise 
in the communications of the entire sensor network. 
In general, resource usage, scalability, key connectivity and resilience are conflicting 
requirements; therefore trade-offs among these requirements must be carefully observed 
[8]. In the next chapter we will describe various key management techniques and related 
work in detail. 
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2.2.5 Availability 
Providing availability requires that a sensor network should be functional throughout its 
lifetime. However, strict limitations and unnecessary overheads weaken the availability 
of sensors and sensor networks. The following factors have a particular impact on 
availability [41]: 
Additional computation consumes additional energy. If no more energy exists, the 
data will no longer be available. 
Additional communication also consumes more energy. What's more, as 
communication increases so too does the chance of incurring a communication 
conflict. 
Therefore by fulfilling the requirement of security we can help to maintain the 
availability of the whole network. Denials of service (DoS) attacks such as jamming 
usually result in a failure of availability. Jamming occurs when a malicious user 
deliberately derives a signal from a wireless device in order to overwhelm legitimate 
wireless signals. Jamming may also be inadvertently caused by cordless phones, 
microwave ovens or other electromagnetic emissions. Jamming results in a breakdown in 
communications because legitimate wireless signals are unable to communicate on the 
network [42]. 
Loss of availability may have serious impacts. In some applications, e. g. manufacturing 
monitoring applications, loss of availability may cause failures to detect a potential 
accident resulting in financial loss or even human harm. Loss of availability may also 
open a back door for enemy invasion in battlefield surveillance applications [40]. Lack of 
availability may affect the operation of many critical real time applications such as those 
in the healthcare sector that require a 24 hours operation, the failure of which could even 
result in loss of lives. 
2.2.6 Privacy 
The main purpose of privacy in WSNs is to ensure that sensed information stays within 
the WSNs and is only accessible by trusted parties. 
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Common approaches generally address concerns of data privacy and location privacy 
[50-52]. For example, privacy policies govem who can use an individual's data and for 
which purposes. Furthermore, confidential ity/secrecy mechanisms [53] provide access to 
data without disclosing private or sensitive information. However, data is difficult to 
protect once it is stored on a system [49]. 
An adversary could mount the following attacks to compromise privacy in a network 
[49]: 
The adversary could simply listen to control and data traffic. Control traffic 
conveys information about the sensor network configuration. Data traffic contains 
potentially more detailed information than that accessible through the location 
server. 
An increase in the number of transmitted packets between certain nodes could 
signal that a specific sensor has registered its activity. 
A malicious node could trick the system into reducing data distortion (privacy 
protection) through subject spoofing. 
An inserted or compromised node could drop packets, forward them incorrectly, 
or advertise itself as the best route to all nodes (black hole effect) in an attempt to 
gain information. 
Privacy can possibly be maintained using data encryption, access control, and restricting 
the network's ability to gather data at a sufficiently detailed level that could compromise 
privacy. 
2.2.7 Secure Routing 
The main challenge for secure routing is to ensure that each intermediate node cannot 
remove existing nodes or add extra nodes to the associated route. In the real world, a 
secure routing protocol guarantees the integrity, authenticity and availability of messages 
in the existence of adversaries. Every authorized receiver should receive all messages 
intended for it and should be capable of proving the integrity of these messages and also 
the identity of their sender. There are many routing protocols but they generally fail to 
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consider security in any serious manner. As discussed earlier, WSNs might be performing 
operations where they are dealing with sensitive data. Therefore given the insecure 
wireless communication medium, limited node capabilities, scalability, and possible 
insider threats, and that adversaries can use powerful laptops with high energy and long 
range communication capabilities to attack a network, designing a secure routing protocol 
is non-trivial [54]. 
Secure routing protocols for providing security from sources to destinations in WSNs 
must satisfy the following requirements [119]: 
" Isolation of unauthorized nodes during the route discovery protocol. 
" The network topology which depends on strong network bonds should not 
be revealed to an adversary. 
Security of the paths must be maintained. Otherwise an attacker is able to 
misdirect the network by advertising the false shortest path and possibly 
causing the formation of loops. 
Messages changed by an adversary and aberrant nodes can be identified. 
Unauthorised or aberrant nodes should not be able to change routing 
messages. 
We will discuss all possible routing attacks in the section 2.3.5. 
2.2.8 Secure Group Management 
To manage a large scale network researchers generally recommend splitting the network 
into groups, clusters or domains, and also distributing the workload in an equitable way 
across these groups. Group management or cluster management protocols are used to 
maintain the groups of different nodes (adding or removing sensor nodes from a group, 
selecting/electing a new group leader, etc). Other services of the group management 
protocols help to increase network performance and consume fewer resources. 
As we have described earlier, generally WSNs are assumed to be scalable. Therefore an 
energy efficient group management protocol is desirable. There exist different group 
management protocols. However these protocols have not considered security related 
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issues properly. For example, the in-network processing of raw data is performed in a 
WSN by dividing the network into small groups and analyzing the data aggregated at the 
group leaders. So a group leader has to authenticate the data it is receiving from other 
nodes in the group. This requires group key management. However, addition or deletion 
of nodes from the group leads to more problems. Moreover, these protocols need to be 
efficient in terms of energy, computation and communication to benefit WSNs. This 
means that traditional group management approaches are not directly implementable in 
WSNs due to their excessive memory and communication overheads [63]. Consequently, 
more cost-effective secure protocols for group management are needed. 
2.2.9 Intrusion Detection 
Intrusion detection is a type of security management system for computers and networks. 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) gathers and analyzes information from various areas 
within a computer or a network to identify possible security breaches, which include both 
intrusions (attacks from outside the organization) and misuse (attacks from within the 
organization). Intrusion detection functions include [64]: 
Monitoring and analysis of both user and system activities. 
Analysis of system configurations and vulnerabilities. 
Assessment of system and file integrity. 
Ability to recognize typical patterns of attacks. 
Analysis of abnormal activity patterns. 
Tracking of user policy violations. 
According to Freiling et al. [65] an IDS for WSNs should satisfy the following 
properties: 
* It must work with localized and partial audit data, as in WSNs there are no 
centralized points (apart from base stations and group leaders or cluster heads) 
that can collect global audit data. Thus this approach fits the WSN paradigm. 
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* It should utilize only a small amount of resources. A wireless network does not 
have stable connections, and physical resources of the network and devices, such 
as bandwidth and power, are limited. Disconnection can happen at any time. In 
addition, communication between nodes for intrusion detection purposes should 
not take too much of the available bandwidth. 
9 It cannot assume that any single node is secure. Unlike wired networks, sensor 
nodes can be very easily compromised. Therefore, in cooperative algorithms, the 
IDS must assume that no node can be fully trusted. 
0 It should be able to resist a hostile attack against itself Compromising a 
monitoring node and controlling the behaviour of an embedded IDS agent should 
not enable an adversary to revoke a legitimate node from the network, or keep 
another intruder node undetected. 
e The data collection and analysis should be performed at a number of locations and 
be truly distributed. The distributed approach also applies to the execution of 
detection algorithms and alert correlations. 
We believe these requirements are reasonable in the context of WSNs IDS. However IDS 
is not the main focus of our research and we developed our own set of requirements 
mentioned in Chapter 4 that are more suitable for secure communication between source 
and destination. 
2.2.10 Secure Data Aggregation 
Most of a sensor node's energy is consumed during computation as well as sending and 
receiving of data packets. Sending one bit requires the same amount of energy as 
executing 50 to 150 instructions on sensor nodes [6]. Therefore reducing network traffic 
is important to save sensors' battery power in any WSN communication protocol. 
To minimize the number of transmissions from thousands of sensor nodes towards a sink, 
a well known approach is to use in-network aggregation. The energy savings of 
performing in-network aggregation have been shown to be significant and are crucial for 
energy-constrained WSNs [57-59]. In a WSN sensed values should be transmitted to a 
sink but in many scenarios the sink does not need exact values from all sensors but rather 
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a derivative such as a sum, average or deviation. The idea of in-network aggregation is to 
aggregate the data required for the determination of the derivatives as closely to the data 
sources as possible instead of transmitting all sensed individual values through the entire 
network [56]. 
A serious issue connected with in-network data aggregation is data security [2]. Although 
previous works [57-60] do provide in-network data aggregation to reduce energy costs, 
these schemes assume that every node is honest which may not be suitable in terrns of 
security. There are different types of attacks which can be harmful for in-network data 
aggregation, e. g., a compromised aggregator node or several compromised sensor nodes 
due to physical tempering could inject faulty data into the network. This will result in a 
corrupted aggregate. In many applications, nodes are communicating highly sensitive 
data, and due to such threats data privacy/security is vital. Aggregation becomes more 
challenging if end-to-end privacy between sensors and their associated sink is required 
[61-62]. 
2.3 Attacks on WSNs 
Computer viruses, bugs and attacks have a history as long as computer networking itself 
The first bug was identified in 1945. In 1960 the first threat to network security was 
identified; a white-collar crime performed by a programmer for the financial division of a 
large corporation. In 1983 Fred Cohen coined the term computer virus. One of the first 
PC viruses was created in 1986, called "The Brain". The history about computer and 
network security has been well documented [66-68]. Accordingly with improvements in 
the security of networks and computers we are now facing increasingly sophisticated 
attacks and threats. 
In this section we will describe and discuss attacks and threats related to WSNs. Most of 
these attacks are similar to those that apply to traditional networks. However node 
captures are totally new and distinct attacks which do not apply to traditional networks. 
Further in this section we will describe attacks which are noxious and possibly lead 
towards a big damage in a network. 
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2.3.1 Node Capture Attacks 
A node capture is one possible distinct attack on WSNs, where an adversary gains full 
control over a sensor node through direct physical access. The adversary can then easily 
extract cryptographic primitives and get unlimited access to the information stored on the 
node's memory chip, and can cause substantial damage to the entire system. This process 
can be done using reverse engineering followed by probing techniques that require access 
to the chip level components of the device [81 ]. It is usually assumed that node capture is 
easy, due to no physical restriction, to prevent access to sensor nodes in an outdoor 
environment [69]. 
Many researchers have proposed different key management schemes [72-80] for secure 
communication between sensor nodes. These schemes try to provide better resilience 
against node capture attacks, but still there is a chance of the entire network being 
compromised. For example in probabilistic key pre-distribution schemes [72,75] 
compromising a few nodes can lead to the entire network communications being 
compromised. 
One of our novel research contributions to provide high resilience against node capture 
attack has mentioned in section 1.7 and described in detail in section 5.5-1. Where we 
have discovered three main factors which can help adversaries during node capture 
attacks to compromise the communication of an entire sensor network [33,71 ]: 
o Node capture attacks can be a large threat if sensor nodes within the network 
share a key or keys with neighbouring nodes used to encrypt or decrypt data. 
Consequently the greater the level of key-sharing between neighbouring nodes the 
greater threat there is to communication privacy being compromised. Most 
existing solutions suffer from this drawback. 
The structure (topology) of a WSN affects the impact of node capture attacks. In 
general, the fewer the communication links between sensor nodes, the greater the 
possibility that an attacker can entirely block the communication paths between a 
source and a destination. For example, node capture attacks are generally more 
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effective in tree topologies than mesh topologies because in the former there is 
only one route from a child to its parent. If the parent node is compromised, the 
entire communication from its child nodes downward will potentially be 
compromised. 
* The density of the WSN has a direct influence on node capture attacks, having a 
similar affect to the network structure. Consequently the optimum number of 
neighbouring nodes needs to be identified for specific applications after analysis. 
This has an effect on energy consumption, but more importantly when a sensor 
node with high density is physically captured this can lead towards compromise 
of larger sections of the WSN compared to a lower density sensor node. 
By considering these three parameters we can improve resilience against node capture 
attacks. Key management schemes, which provide resilience against node capture attacks 
at the first level (i. e. pre-security), is not sufficient. Therefore post-security (i. e. second 
level security) solutions are also required to identify malicious or compromised sensor 
nodes, so that these compromised nodes can be excluded. 
2.3.2 Side Channel Affacks 
Side channel attacks are not part of this work (thesis). However we are discussing them in 
this section for the purposes of completeness. 
Side channel attacks also fall into the category of physical tampering in the same way as 
node capture attacks. However this type of attack generally applies to all Wireless 
Networks. A side channel attack refers to any attack that is based on information gathered 
from the physical implementation of a cryptosystem, in contrast to a vulnerability in the 
algorithm itself [81]. For example the attacker monitors the power consumption or the 
Electro Magnetic (EM) emanation from such cryptographic devices, and then analyzes 
the collected data to extract the associated crypto key. These side channel attacks aim at 
vulnerabilities of implementations rather than algorithms, which make them particularly 
powerful since adversaries are not required to know the design of the target system. 
Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Differential Power Analysis (DPA), Simple 
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Electromagnetic Analysis (SEMA), and Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) 
are side channel attacks that enable extraction of a secret key stored in cryptographic 
devices [83]. 
Simple power analysis [701 is a technique that involves directly interpreting power 
consumption measurements collected during cryptographic operations. No statistical 
analysis is required in such an attack. The analysis can yield information about a device's 
operation as well as key material. It can be used to break cryptographic implementations 
in which the execution path depends on the data being processed. 
Similarly, in simple electromagnetic analysis [84], an adversary is able to extract 
compromising information from a single electromagnetic sample. 
In differential power analysis [70], an adversary monitors the power consumed by 
cryptographic devices, and then statistically analyzes the collected data to extract a key in 
contrast to the simple power analysis. 
In differential electromagnetic analysis [84], instead of monitoring the power 
consumption, an attacker monitors electromagnetic emanations from cryptographic 
devices, and then the same statistical analysis as that for the differential power analysis is 
performed on the collected electromagnetic data to extract secret parameters [81 ]. 
Side channel attacks are also possible in WSNs. Okeya et al. describes the fact that a 
side-channel attack on Message Authentication Codes (MAC), using simple Power 
Analysis as well as Differential Power Analysis, is possible in WSNs [82]. Their results 
suggest that several key bits can be extracted through the power analysis attack. This 
leads to the conclusion that protecting block ciphers against side channel attacks is not 
sufficient. Further research is required to explore all possible security measures for 
Message Authentication Codes as well. 
TinySec is link layer security architecture for WSNs, and it uses a block cipher 
encryption scheme for its implementation. According to the previous discussion, such an 
encryption scheme shows a weakness of the TinySec protocol [85]. 
Additionally, timing attacks come under the category of side-channel attacks. They have 
not yet been explored in the context of WSNs. A timing attack makes use of algorithms 
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which have non-constant execution times and can potentially leak secret information. 
Non-constant execution times can be caused by conditional branching and various 
optimization techniques. The operating system running on sensor nodes is event-driven 
and extremely optimized in terms of memory consumption. This suggests that a timing 
side-channel attack is possible. A solution to this type of attack is to use constant 
execution time software. However, it is not clear if this is easily achievable in WSNs. 
Therefore, searching for countermeasures for timing attacks in WSNs is an important 
area for future research. 
Some countermeasures for side-channei attacks used in traditional and embedded systems 
are [8 1 ]: 
power consumption randomization, 
randomization of the execution of the instruction set, 
randomization of the usage of register memory, 
CPU clock randomization, 
using fake instructions, 
using bit splitting. 
2.3.3 Denial of Service (DoS) 
A denial of service attack is any event that diminishes or eliminates a network's capacity 
to perform its expected function through hardware failures, software bugs, resource 
exhaustion, malicious broadcasting of high energy signals, environmental conditions, or 
any complicated interaction between these factors. Communication systems could be 
jammed completely if such attacks succeed. Other denial of service attacks are also 
possible, e. g. inhibiting communication by violating the MAC protocol. 
One of the standard protections againstjamming utilizes spread spectrum communication. 
However, cryptographically secure spread spectrum radios are not available 
commercially. Also, this protection is not secure against adversaries who can capture 
nodes and remove their cryptographic keys [86]. 
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Each protocol layer in a WSN is defenceless to different DoS attacks and has different 
options available for its defence. Some of the attacks crosscut multiple layers or exploit 
interactions between them. For example, at the network layer in a homing attack, the 
attacker looks at network traffic to deduce the geographic location of critical nodes, such 
as cluster heads or neighbours of a base station [29]. Furthermore in the routing and 
network layer, due to a "misdirection" attack, messages could flood the network. This 
could also happen by looking at the routing table or negative advertising by the adversary 
to flood either a sender, receiver or an arbitrary node [120]. Table 2-1 shows a typical 
sensor9s network layers and describes each layer's vulnerabilities and defences [87]. 
Sensor network layers and denial-of-services defence 
Protocol layer Attacks Defences 
Physical Jamming Spread-spectrum, priority message, lower 
duty cycle, region mapping, mode change 
Tampering Tamper-proofing, hiding 
Link Collision Error-correction code 
Exhaustion Rate limitation 
Unfairness Small frames 
Network and Neglect and greed Redundancy, probing 
i 
Homing Encryption 
Rout ng Misdirection Egress filtering, authentication, monitoring 
Black holes Authorization, monitoring, redundancy 
Transport Flooding Client puzzles 
De-synchronization Authentication 
Table 2-1: Sensor protocol layers and DoS defences. 
According to Wood et al., every DoS attack is perpetrated by someone [88]. The attacker 
has an identity and a motive, and is able to do certain things in or to a WSN. An attack 
targets some service or layer by exploiting some vulnerability. An attack may be 
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thwarted, or it may succeed with varying results. Each of these elements is necessary for 
understanding the whole process of a DoS attack. Any useful and intuitive DoS taxonomy 
should answer the following questions: 
o Who is the attacker? 
0 What is she/he capable oV 
0 What is the target? 
0 How is it attacked? 
0 What are the results? 
Wood et al. [88] also answer each question listed above in turn. Taken together the 
attacker, capability, target, vulnerability, and results describe a DoS attack against a 
WSN. 
2.3.4 Software Attacks 
Software-based attacks in WSNs can also be dangerous. For this type of attack, an 
adversary may try to modify the code in memory or exploit known vulnerabilities in the 
code. A well-known example of such an attack is a buffer overflow attack. Buffer 
overflow refers to the scenario where a process attempts to store data beyond the 
boundaries of a fixed length buffer. This results in the extra data overwriting the adjacent 
memory locations [8 1 ]. 
Such attacks can easily apply to TinyOS - an operating system developed for sensor 
nodes with limited resources. The current implementation of TinyOS does not provide 
any memory access control, i. e. there is no function to control which users/processes 
access which resources on the system, and what type of execution rights they have. In 
TinyOS the assumption is largely that a single application or user controls the system 
[81]. However in traditional operating systems, access control involves authenticating 
processes, and then mediating their access to different system resources. 
Regehr et al. have presented the concept of drawing a red line, which refers to having a 
boundary between trusted and un-trusted code. Their solution, called Un-trusted 
Extension for TinyOS (UTOS), uses a concept similar to sandboxing. This solution 
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provides an environment in which un-trusted, and possibly malicious, code could be run 
without affecting the kernel [97,98]. 
Similarly TinyOS uses the concept of Active Messaging (AM). AM is an environment 
that facilitates message-based communication in distributed computer systems. Each AM 
message consists of the name of a user-level handler on the target node that needs to be 
invoked as well as the data that needs to be passed on [99]. This approach enables the 
implementation of a TCPAP-like network stack on the sensor node that fits the hardware 
limitations of the sensor nodes. Roosta et al. have pointed out another weakness in 
TinyOS, resulting from port operations. It is possible to open a port to a remote sensor 
node using a USB port and a PC. The serial forwarder, which is one of the most 
fundamental components of TinyOS software, can be called to open a port to a node. 
There is no security check to authenticate the user who is attempting to open the port. 
This could lead to an attack on the software whereby an adversary opens a port to the 
node and uploads software, or downioads information from the node [81]. 
The following countermeasure can be considered to secure the TinyOS software and 
protect the software from being exploited by malicious users: 
o Software authentication and validation, e. g. remote software-based attestation for 
sensor networks [100]. 
Defining accurate trust boundaries for different components and users. 
Using a restricted environment such as the Java Virtual Machine. 
9 Dynamic run-time encryption. /decryption for software: this is similar to the 
encryption/decryPtion of data except that the code running on the device is 
encrypted. This can prevent a malicious user from exploiting the software [8 1 ]. 
* Hardware attestation. The trusted computing group platform and next generation 
secure computing base provide this type of attestation [101]. A similar model 
could be used in sensor networks. 
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2.3.5 Routing Attacks 
As described earlier in WSNs, every node acts as a router. Routing and data forwarding is 
an important task for sensor nodes. Routing protocols have to be energy and memory 
efficient but at the same time they have to be robust against attacks and node failures. 
There have been many power-efficient routing protocols proposed for WSNs. However, 
most of them suffer from different security vulnerabilities. In the real world, a secure 
routing protocol should guarantee the integrity, authenticity and availability of messages 
in the existence of adversaries of arbitrary power. Every authorized receiver should 
receive all messages proposed for it and would be capable of proving the integrity of 
every message and also the identity of the sender [54]. We briefly describe a few attacks 
on routing protocols: 
Black hole attack or packet drop attack: An attacker can drop received routing 
messages, instead of relaying them as the protocol requires, in order to reduce the 
quantity of routing infon-nation available to other nodes. This is called a black hole 
attack [102]. This attack can be launched selectively (dropping routing packets for 
a specified destination, a packet every t seconds, or a randomly selected portion of 
each packet) or in bulk (drop all packets), and may have the effect of making the 
destination node unreachable or downgrade communications in the network [ 103]. 
Spoofed, altered, or replayed attack: In this attack an adversary can record old 
valid control messages and re-send them, causing the receiver node to lose energy 
quickly. As the topology changes, old control messages, though valid in the past, 
may describe a topology configuration that no longer exists. An attacker can 
perform a replay attack to make other nodes update their routing tables with stale 
routes. This attack can be successful even if control messages bear a digest or a 
digital signature that does not include a timestamp [ 102]. 
Wormholes attack: This attack [1041 is quite severe, and consists in recording 
traffic from one region of the network and replaying it in a different region. This 
attack is particularly challenging to deal with since the adversary does not need to 
compromise any nodes and can use laptops or other wireless devices to send 
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packets on a low latency channel. Hu et al. [104] proposed the concept of packet 
leashes where additional information is added to a packet, the purpose of which is 
to restrict the maximum distance the packet can travel in a given amount of time 
[81]. 
9 Selective forwarding attack: In this attack, a malicious node selectively drops 
sensitive packets. Selective forwarding attacks are typically most effective when 
the attacking nodes are explicitly included on the path of a data flow. Yu et. al. 
[105] proposed a light weight detection scheme which uses a multi-hop 
acknowledgement technique to launch alarms by obtaining responses from 
intermediate nodes. 
e Sinkhole attack. - In this attack, an adversary tries to attract as much traff ic as 
possible toward compromised nodes. The impact of the sinkhole is that it can be 
used to launch further active attacks on the traffic that is routed through it. The 
severity of active attacks increases multi-fold especially when these are carried 
out in collusion [106]. Sinkhole attacks typically work by making a compromised 
node look especially attractive to surrounding nodes with respect to the routing 
algorithm. For instance, an adversary could spoof or replay an advertisement for 
an extremely high quality route to a sink [41 ]. 
* HELLO flood attack: The preference for the shortest communication route can 
usually be exploited by a HELLO flood. In the case of multi-hops, this means 
broadcasting a message with a long-range radio-antenna to all nodes in the 
network, stating the node performing the HELLO flood is the base station. The 
receiving nodes should then conclude that the route through the node sending the 
HELLO flood is the shortest. They will try to send all their succeeding messages 
through this node, which most probably is not even within radio range. In the 
worst case, all nodes in the network will keep sending their messages into 
oblivion. An attack such as the HELLO flood is meant to completely disable the 
WSN and prevent it from performing its tasks [107]. 
Acknowledgement spoofing. - The goal of an adversary in this attack is to spoof a 
bad link or a dead node using the link layer acknowledgement for the packets it 
overhears for those nodes. 
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2.3.6 Traffic Analysis Attacks 
In WSNs all communication is moving toward a sink or base station in many-to-one or 
many-to-few patterns. An adversary is able to gather a lot of information on the topology 
of the network as well as the location of the base station and other strategic nodes by 
observing the traffic volume and pattern [81 ]. 
Deng et al. have defined two types of traffic analysis attacks in WSNs: a rate monitoring 
attack and a time correlation attack. In a rate monitoring attack, an adversary monitors 
the packet sending rate of nodes near the adversary, and moves closer to the nodes that 
have a higher packet sending rate. In a time correlation attack, an adversary observes the 
correlation in sending time between a node and its neighbour node that is assumed to be 
forwarding the same packet, and deduces the path by following the "sound" of each 
forwarding operation as the packet propagates towards the base station [109]. 
The possible solutions to the traffic analysis attacks are to use randomness and multiple 
paths in routing, using probabilistic routing and the introduction of fake messages in the 
network. In the case of fake messages it can increase the communication overhead. 
Therefore it might not be a cost effective solution. 
2.3.7 Sybil Attack 
The Sybil attack is defined as a "malicious device illegitimately taking on multiple 
identities" [101]. For example, a malicious node can claim false identities, or impersonate 
other legitimate nodes in the network [81]. Perrig et al. have pointed out that the Sybil 
attack can affect a number of different protocols [10 11: 
Distributed Storage Protocols. 
Routing Protocols. 
Data Aggregation (used in query protocols). 
Voting (used in many trust schemes). 
Fair Resource Allocation Protocols. 
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* Misbehaviour Detection Protocols. 
To attack the routing protocols, the Sybil attack would rely on a malicious node taking on 
the identity of multiple nodes, and thus routing multiple paths through a single malicious 
node [41 ]. However the Sybil attack can operate in different orders to attack the protocols 
listed above. 
The proposed solutions to the Sybil attack include: 1) radio resource testing which relies 
on the assumption that each physical device has only one radio, 2) random key 
predistribution which associates the identity of each node to the keys assigned to it and 
validates the keys to establish whether the node is really who it claims to be, 3) 
registration of the node identities at a central base station, and 4) position verification 
which makes the assumption that the WSN topology is static. 
2.3.8 Attacks on In-network Processing 
In-network processing, also called data aggregation, was discussed in terms of secure 
data aggregation in section 2.2.10. Data aggregation is very useful in terms of reducing 
the communication overhead. However there can be different types of attack on in- 
network processing: 
" Compromise anode physically to affect aggregated results [117]. 
" Attack aggregator nodes using different attacks. 
" Send false information to affect the aggregation results [164]. 
To handle these possible attacks, there should be an efficient security solution to stop the 
adversary from affecting aggregated results. Furthermore this security solution should be 
capable of providing resilience against attacks (routing attacks etc. ) on aggregator nodes. 
It is necessary to have mechanisms to provide accurate information to end users after 
successful attacks on aggregator nodes or results. 
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2.3.9 Attacks on Time Synchronization Protocols 
Time synchronization protocols provide a mechanism for synchronizing the local clocks 
of nodes in a WSN. There are various different protocols proposed for time 
synchronization. Three of the most prominent protocols are the Reference Broadcast 
Synchronization (RBS) [6], Timing-sync Protocol for Sensor Networks (TPSN) [9], and 
Flooding Time Synchronization Protocol (FTSP) [20]. 
Most of the time synchronization protocols don't consider security. An adversary can 
easily attack any of these time synchronization protocols by physically capturing a 
fraction of the nodes and injecting them with faulty time synchronization message 
updates. In effect, this makes the nodes in the entire network out-of-sync with each other. 
Time-synchronization attacks can have a significant effect on a set of WSN applications 
and services since they heavily rely on accurate time synchronization to perform their 
respective functions [81]. 
2.4 Security in Mobile Sensor Networks 
Secure communication between network components is always an issue, and researchers 
are continually inventing new security protocols to provide more and more secure 
communications. Although security has long been an active research topic in traditional 
networks, the unique characteristics of MSNs present a new set of nontrivial challenges, 
to security design. These challenges include the open network architecture, shared 
wireless medium, resource constraints, scalability, and highly dynamic network 
topologies of MSNs. Consequently, the existing security solutions for traditional 
networks, mobile ad hoc networks and static sensor networks do not directly apply to 
MSNs [361. 
The ultimate goal of security solutions for MSNs is to provide security services, such as 
authentication, confidentiality, integrity, anonymity and availability, to mobile nodes. 
Node mobility poses far more dynamics in MSNs compared to SSNs (Static Sensor 
Networks). The network topology is highly dynamic as nodes frequently join and leave 
the network, and roam in the network. The wireless channel is also subject to 
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interferences and errors, revealing volatile characteristics in terms of bandwidth and 
delay. The dynamics nature of MSNs increases security challenges, as mobile nodes may 
request for anytime, anywhere security services as they move from one place to another. 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter starts with general (non-security) challenges in WSNs, which include fault 
tolerance, topologies, routing, mobility and scalability. We have then discussed in detail 
about security challenges in WSNs, including data confidentiality, data integrity, 
authentication, key establishment, availability, privacy, secure routing, secure group 
management, intrusion detection and secure data aggregation. Finally we have described 
possible attacks on WSNs, which include node capture attacks, side channel attacks, 
denial of service attacks, software attacks, routing attacks, traffic analysis attacks, Sybil 
attacks and attacks on in-network processing. Some of these attacks are similar to those 
in traditional networks, e. g. routing attacks and DoS attacks, while the others only exist in 
WSNs. In particular, node capture attacks may allow an adversary to compromise the 
security of an entire WSN. Therefore this attack is the centre of attention of many 
researchers. The uniqueness of the node capture attack and its after attack effects on 
WSN is more challenging. The current work is using different key establishment 
techniques to reduce the after damage in case some sensor nodes are physically 
compromised. However due to the possibility of physically compromising sensor nodes 
data confidentiality is at high risk. The compromised sensor node could be an aggregator 
or group leader sensor node. All these issues are interlinked with each other. Therefore 
we require that key management solution should provide high resilience against node 
capture attack using less resource, efficient secure data aggregation to achieve better 
confidentiality for different applications, secure and efficient group leader/aggregator 
selection scheme and key management for mobile sensor node in case nodes roam from 
one place to another. 
In the next chapter, we will present a critical survey on current key management, secure 
data aggregations, secure group leader election and key management for MSN protocols, 
and also discuss their specific limitations against the requirements of WSNs. 
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Chapter Three: Key Management in WSNs 
Key establishment/management is the basic technique to achieve data confidentiality, 
data integrity, authenticity, secure data routing and secure data aggregation. Due to the 
importance of key establishment/management in order to achieve information security we 
therefore describe existing WSNs key management solutions in the start of this chapter. 
For a better understanding we have divided these existing key management solutions into 
five different categories; key pool based key management, session based key 
management, hierarchical based key management, group based key management and key 
management for heterogeneous sensor networks. Furthermore secure data aggregation is 
presented in section 3.2, replication attacks described in section 3.3, secure group leader 
election/selection discussed in section 3.4 and key management for MSNs is presented in 
section 3.5. 
3.1 Key Management in WSNs 
When setting up a WSN, one of the initial requirements is to establish cryptographic keys 
for later use. In indoor and outdoor WSN applications, communications can be monitored 
and nodes are potentially subject to capture and surreptitious use by an adversary [72]. 
For this reason cryptographically protected communications are required. A keying 
relationship can be used to facilitate cryptographic techniques. Cryptographic techniques 
are categorized as either symmetric or asymmetric forms of cryptography. Symmetric 
cryptography relies on a shared secret key between two parties to enable secure 
communication. Asymmetric cryptography, on the other hand, employs two different 
keys, a private one and a public one. The public key is used for encryption and can be 
published. The private key is used for decryption. From a computational point of view, 
asymmetric cryptography requires orders of magnitude more resources than symmetric 
cryptography and similarly a public key infrastructure (PKI) would be required, which 
may be difficult to achieve in the ad-hoc environment of a WSN. Therefore, recently only 
symmetric cryptosystems have been proposed and recommended for WSNs. 
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An ideal key management solution for WSN would satisfy the design criteria of 
providing secure communication between source and destination, scalability and resource 
efficiency. There are two simple strategies for symmetric key management schemes for 
WSNs. One is to use a single secret key over the entire WSN- This scheme is obviously 
efficient in terms of the cost of computation and memory. However the compromise of 
only a single sensor node exposes all communications over the entire WSN, which is a 
serious deficiency. The other approach is to use distinct keys for all possible pairs of 
sensor nodes. Then every sensor node is preloaded with n-I keys, where n is the WSN 
size. This scheme guarantees perfect resilience in that links between non-compromised 
sensor nodes are secure against any coalition of compromised sensor nodes. However this 
scheme is not suitable for large-scale WSNs since the key storage required per sensor 
node increases linearly with the WSN size [781. If there is a network of 10,000 sensor 
nodes, then each node must store 9999 keys in their memory. Since sensor nodes are 
resource-constrained, this significant overhead limits the scheme's applicability, but it 
can be effectively used for smaller WSNs. Consequently, in the first strategy the sharing 
of keys between sensor nodes is high whilst in the second strategy sharing between the 
sensor nodes is low. Due to the need for secure communication with only limited 
resources, researchers are proposing solutions that fall between these two strategies. 
3.1.1 Key pool Based Key Management 
3.1.1.1 Random key predistribution scheme (Basic Scheme) 
Eschenacuer and Gilger [72] proposed a probabilistic key pre-distribution scheme. This 
scheme is also known as the Basic Scheme. This scheme is divided into three parts: key 
pre-distribution, shared-key discovery, and path key establishment [ 144]. 
(a) Key predistribution phase: There is a large key pool S of [S] keys with unique 
identifiers. Every sensor node is equipped with a fixed number of keys randomly selected 
from this key pool with their key identifiers. Once keys and their identifiers are assigned 
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to every sensor node in the WSN, trusted nodes will be selected as controller nodes, and 
all the key identifiers and their associated sensor identifiers will be saved on the 
controller nodes. These few keys are enough to ensure that any two nodes share a 
common key, possibly through the assistance of other nodes, based on a selected 
probability. 
(b) Shared-key discovery phase: Once nodes are successfully deployed in a target 
application, every pair of nodes within their wireless communication range establishes a 
common keys. If they share any common key(s) among their assigned keys, they can pick 
one of them as their shared secret key. There are many ways for finding out whether two 
nodes share common keys or not. The simplest way is to make the nodes broadcast their 
key identifier lists to other nodes. If a node finds out that it shares a common key with a 
particular node, it can use this key for secure communication. This approach does not 
give an adversary any new attack opportunities and only leaves some room for launching 
a traffic analysis attack in the absence of key identifiers. 
(c) Path key establishment phase: As discussed earlier communication can be 
established between two sensor nodes only if they share a key, but the path key 
establishment stage facilitates provision of a link between two sensor nodes when they do 
not share a common key. Let us assume that a sensor node x wants to communicate with 
another sensor node y, but they do not share a common key between them. x can send a 
message to a sensor node u, saying that it wants to communicate with y, where the 
message is encrypted using the common key shared between x and u. If u has a key in 
common with y, it can generate a pair-wise key K,, y for x and y, thereby acting like a key 
distribution centre or a mediator between x and y. All the communications are in an 
encrypted form using their respective shared keys. 
The advantages of this scheme include the fact that it is flexible, efficient, and fairly 
simple to employ. The disadvantages of this scheme include that it cannot be used in 
circumstances demanding heightened security or node to node authentication, and it 
provides only limited scalability. Compromise of a controller sensor node and certain 
number of other sensor nodes can lead the adversary to compromise the entire WSN 
[144]. 
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3.1.1.2 Q-composite random key predistribution scheme 
Chan et al. [75] extended the previous idea of the Basic Scheme [72] to overcome the 
difficulties that occur when a pair of sensor nodes share no common key. Chan et al. 
proposed two different variations of the Basic scheme: Q-Composite Random Key 
Predistribution and Multipath Key Reinforcement, and a variation of the commonly 
known Pairwise Scheme, called the Random Pairwise Scheme. In the Basic Scheme [72], 
two nodes share a unique key for establishing secure communications. A given network's 
resilience to node capture can be improved by increasing the number of common keys 
that are needed for link establishment. The Q-Composite Random Key Predistribution 
Scheme does this by requiring that two nodes have at least q common keys to set up a 
link [75]. As the amount of key overlap between two sensor nodes is increased, it 
becomes harder for an adversary to compromise their communication link. At the same 
time, to maintain the probability that two sensor nodes establish a link with q common 
keys, it is necessary to reduce the size [S] of the key pool S, which poses a possible 
security breach in the network as the adversary now has to compromise only a few nodes 
to gain a large part of S. So the challenge of the Q-Composite Scheme is to choose an 
optimal value for q wh i le ensuring that security is not sacrificed [ 144]. 
The first phase of the Basic and Q-composite schemes are the same but in the second 
phase these two schemes differ in that the Q-Composite Scheme requires each node to 
identify neighbouring sensor nodes with which they share at least q common keys, while 
the Basic scheme only requires one shared key. This restriction in the Q-Composite 
Scheme allows the number of keys shared to be more than q but not less. At this stage in 
the process, nodes will fail to establish a link if the number of keys shared is less than q; 
and otherwise they will form a new communication link using the hash of all the q keys 
as a shared key, denoted as K= hash(k, jk2l... IQ where I is used for concatenation. The 
size of the key pool S is an important parameter that needs to be calculated. The Q- 
composite scheme provides better resilience against node capture attacks. The amount of 
communications that are compromised in a given network with the Q-Composite Scheme 
applied is 4.74 percent when there are 50 compromised nodes, while the same network 
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with the Basic scheme applied will have 9.52 percent of communications compromised 
[144]. Though the Q-Composite Scheme performs badly when more sensor nodes are 
captured in a WSN, this may prove a reasonable concession as adversaries are more 
likely to commit a small-scale attack and preventing smaller attacks can push an 
adversary to launch a large-scale attack, which is far easier to detect. 
The advantages of the Q-Composite scheme include that it provides better security than 
the Basic Scheme by requiring more keys to share with neighbouring sensor nodes for 
communication, which makes it difficult for an adversary to compromise the 
communication of a sensor node. The disadvantages of this scheme include that it is 
vulnerable to breakdown under large-scale attacks, and does not satisfy scalability 
requirements. 
Furthermore, the multipath key reinforcement scheme [75] provides good security with 
additional communication overhead. In previous schemes there is an issue that the links 
formed between sensor nodes after the key discovery phase may not be totally secure due 
to the random selection of keys from the key pool, allowing some sensor nodes in a WSN 
to share the same keys. This could threaten the security of these sensor nodes when only 
one of them is compromised. 
To solve this problem, the communication keys must be updated when a sensor node is 
compromised. This should not be done using the old established links, as an adversary 
would then be able to decrypt the communications to obtain new keys. Instead it should 
be coordinated using multiple independent paths for greater security. 
The advantages of this scheme include that it offers better security than the Basic scheme 
or the Q-Composite Scheme. The disadvantages of this scheme include that it creates 
communication overhead that can lead to depleted node battery life and the chance for an 
adversary to launch a DoS attack. 
3.1.1.3 Polynomial pool-based key pre-distribution 
Liu et al. [128] designed two schemes for secure pair-wise communication in Wireless 
Sensor Networks: Polynomial-based and grid-based key distribution protocols. The 
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polynomial-based protocol further extends the idea of Eschenauer et al. works [72]. 
Instead of pre-distributing keys, they actually pre-distribute polynomials from a 
polynomial pool. This polynomial based key pre-distribution scheme offers several 
efficient features compared to other schemes: 
Any two sensor nodes can definitely establish a pair-wise key when there are no 
compromised sensors. 
* Even with some sensor nodes being compromised, the others in the WSN can still 
establish pair-wise keys. 
*A node can find the common keys to determine whether or not it can establish a 
pairwise key and thereby help reduce communication overhead [144]. 
The drawback of this scheme is that compromising more than t polynomials leads to 
sensor network compromise. Further to avoid such attacks each node must store 2 
bivariate t-degree polynomials and IDs of the compromised nodes, which is resulting in 
additional memory overhead. 
3.1.1.4 Hypercube key distribution scheme 
The Hypercube Key Distribution Scheme [125] guarantees that any two sensor nodes in 
the WSN can establish a pair-wise key if there are no compromised sensor nodes present 
as long as the two sensor nodes can communicate. Also, sensor nodes can still 
communicate with a high probability even if compromised sensor nodes are present. 
Sensor nodes can decide whether or not they can directly communicate with other sensor 
nodes and what polynomial they should use when transmitting messages. If two sensor 
nodes do not share a common polynomial, they have to use a path discovery method to 
compute an indirect key. 
The path discovery algorithm described by Ning et al. [1251 finds paths between a pair of 
sensor nodes a and b dynamically. In this method, the source and other sensor nodes 
communicate with a sensor node that is uncompromised and has a closer match to the 
destination sensor node compared to the Hamming distance of their IDs where the 
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Hamming distance is defined as a measure of the difference between two binary 
sequences of equal length. If there are no compromised sensor nodes in the WSN, this 
scheme will always work as long as any two sensor nodes can communicate. 
There are a number of attacks that can be applied to the current scheme. One attack is to 
attempt to compromise the polynomials used in key generation between sensor nodes a 
and b without compromising the sensor nodes themselves. To achieve this, the attacker 
must first compromise t+I other sensor nodes. If the sensor nodes a and b have 
computed an indirect key, the attacker must compromise the sensor nodes used in the 
path that established the key. In total, the attacker must compromise nx (t + 1) (where n 
is the number of polynomials and t is number of compromised node IDs) sensor nodes to 
effectively prevent sensor nodes a and b from communicating with each other. A second 
attack against the scheme is to damage the whole WSN. One way to do this is to 
compromise a number, b, of polynomials distributed to the sensor nodes in the WSN. 
This will affect the indirect keys computed. A further way to attack the WSN as a whole 
is to randomly compromise individual sensor nodes. This could compromise the path 
discovery process and make it more expensive to create pair-wise keys [ 125,144]. 
3.1.1.5 Key management schemes using deployment knowledge 
Du et al. [78] propose a scheme using deployment knowledge that is based on the Basic 
Scheme [721. Deployment knowledge in this scheme is modelled using probability 
density functions (PDFs). All the schemes discussed until now considered the PDF to be 
uniform, so knowledge about sensor nodes cannot be derived from it. Du et al. consider 
non-uniform PDFs, which means that they assume the positions of sensor nodes to 
be in 
certain areas. Their method first models sensor node deployment knowledge 
in a WSN 
and then develops a key pre-distribution scheme based on this model. 
As in the Basic Scheme, the key pre-distribution scheme also consists of three phases for 
the deployment model: key pre-distribution, shared key discovery, and path 
key 
establishment. This scheme differs only in the first stage while the other two stages are 
similar to those of the Basic Scheme. 
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Key pre-distribution: In this phase the scheme divides the key pool KP into txn key 
pools KPjj of size coij. The goal of dividing the key pool is to ensure that neighbouring 
key pools have more keys in common. The pool KPj is used for the nodes in the group 
Gij. Given coij and overlapping factors a and P, the key-pool is divided into subsets so 
that (i) two horizontally and vertically neighbouring key-pools have ax Wij keys in 
common, (ii) two diagonally neighbouring key-pools havefi x o)ij keys in common, and 
(iii) non-neighbouring key-pools do not share a key. Two key pools are neighbours if 
their deployment groups have nearby resident points (xi, yj) for I<i<1 and I<j<n, 
where the points are arranged in a two dimensional grid. After the key pool is divided, 
each node in a group Gij is selected and keys are installed from the corresponding subset 
key pools. As mentioned earlier, for the current scheme the Shared discovery phase and 
Path key establishment phase are exactly the same as for the Basic Scheme [72] 
described in section 3.1.1 - 1. 
According to Du et al. [78] an increase in the number of random keys chosen from the 
key pool for each sensor node will increase the connectivity, which is true. Moreover 
they show that if we can carry 100 keys in each sensor node using their method the 
probability of local connectivity with neighbouring nodes will be 0.687. Now, suppose G 
is the number of compromised nodes and m is the number of compromised keys. The 
compromise of more nodes will allow an adversary to get more keys. Suppose we have a 
network of 10,000 sensor nodes. If an adversary gets 10 keys then the probability that it 
can communicate with any other node will be 0.024. If the number of compromised keys 
increases to 120 through the compromise of C, nodes, the probability will increase to 
0.871. We represented this in the graph shown in Figure 3-1 below. This graph shows 
that the compromise of more nodes will help to compromise the complete network. 
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Figure 3-1: Compromise of a sensor network using node capture attacks on the 
scheme of Du et al. 178]. 
The advantages of this scheme include the fact that, by only considering deployment 
knowledge that can minimize the number of keys and help to reduce network overhead, it 
increases overall connectivity of the network graph, and offers the same benefits over the 
Basic Scheme on which it is based. The problem in this scheme is the difficulty and 
complexity in deciding the parameters wij, a and, 8 to provide adequate key connectivity. 
3.1.1.6 Location dependent key management scheme 
The location dependent key management scheme proposed by Anjum [126] decides 
which keys to put on each node depending on their locations in the environment. In this 
scherne, nodes are determined to be static. They communicate only through encrypted 
channels and nodes can be added at any time. Also nodes in this scheme are assumed to 
be capable of transmitting at different power levels and giving different transmission 
ranges. Also there exist special nodes called anchors. The only difference between the 
anchor nodes and the other nodes in the network is that the anchor nodes transmit at 
different power levels and are tamper proof There are also three phases in the scheme: a 
pre-distribution phase, an initialization phase, and a communication phase. In the pre- 
distribution phase, a key server computes a set of keys to be used by the nodes. It places 
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the keys into a key pool. Each sensor node is then loaded with a subset of these keys 
along with a single common key every node shares. The anchor nodes do not get keys 
r__ - 
from the key pool. 
All of the nodes and anchors are randomly distributed. During the initialization phase the 
anchor nodes help the other sensor nodes to change their existing keys by providing 
beacons. The sensor nodes receive these beacons and compute new keys based on their 
old keys and the beacons received from the anchor nodes. The original subset of keys is 
deleted from the memory of the sensor nodes after they compute their new keys. In the 
communication phase, the nodes compute pair-wise keys to establish secure 
communication among them. One of the significant advantages of this location-aware key 
management scheme is that compromised nodes do not affect nodes in a different 
location of the network. 
This scheme also performs worse than a random key distribution scheme with a key pool 
size of 5000 and 175 keys on each sensor node. As the numbers of compromised sensor 
nodes in the WSN are increased, the performance of the random key distribution scheme 
deteriorated faster than the location-dependent scheme [ 126]. Furthermore anchor nodes 
create an extra overhead on the WSN. 
In the location dependent key management scheme, an adversary can launch a denial of 
service attack if they jam the anchor nodes and transmit false beacons. This is fairly hard 
to accomplish since anchor nodes are randomly dispersed in the environment. There is no 
alternative when anchor nodes are physically compromised. 
According to Zhou et al., random key pre-distribution schemes suffer from two major 
problems, making them inappropriate for many applications. First these schemes require 
that the deployment density is high enough to ensure connectivity. Second the 
compromise of a set of keys or key spaces leads toward compromise of the entire WSN 
[80]. 
PIKE [76] addresses the problem of the high density requirement of random key pre- 
distribution schemes [122]. In PIKE, each sensor node is equipped with an ID of the form 
(ij), corresponding to a location on a In- x NFn grid, where n is the network size. Each 
sensor is also preloaded with a number of pair-wise keys, each of which 
is shared with a 
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sensor that corresponds to a location on the same row or the same column of the grid. 
Now any pair of sensors that does not share a preloaded pair-wise key can use one or 
more peer sensors as trusted intermediaries to establish a path key. PIKE requires 
network-wide communications to establish path keys, each of which requires 0(, R) 
communication overhead. This is a relatively high communication overhead, making it 
unsuitable for large WSNs. 
3.1.2 Session Based Key Management 
3.1. ZI SPINS 
A number of shared-session key negotiation protocols have been developed for WSNs- 
SPINS [39] is a security suite that includes two protocols: SNEP anduTESLA. SNEP is 
for confidentiality, two party data authentication, integrity and data freshness, whilst 
pTESLA provides authentication for data broadcasting. Suppose that a node x wants to 
establish a shared session key SKxy with another node y through a trusted third party sink 
S. The sink plays a role as the key distribution centre. x will send a request message to y. 
y receives this message and sends a message to S. S will perform the authentication and 
generate the shared session key and send this key back to x and y respectively. 
Liu et al., [441 quote in their paper that pTESLA [39] will not be efficient in large WSNs. 
For example, let uTESLA use 1OKbps bandwidth and support 30 byte messages. To 
bootstrap 2000 sensor nodes, the sink has to send or receive at least 4000 packets to 
distribute the initial parameters, which takes at least 4000 x 30 x8/ 10240 = 93.75 
seconds even if the channel utilization is perfect. Such a method certainly cannot scale up 
to very large WSNs, which may have tens of thousands of sensor nodes. 
Therefore multi-level uTESLA schemes have been proposed to extend the capability of 
the original pTESLA protocol [20,21]. An improved version of the PTESLA system 
uses broadcasting of the key chain commitments rather than pTESLA's unicasting 
technique. They present a series of schemes starting with a simple pre-determination of 
key chains and finally settling on a multi-level key chain technique. 
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Liu et al. [43] have found weaknesses in their own work [44,451 and suggest that these 
issues which are not properly addressed in their publications [44,451 need to be 
addressed. These are described below: 
DoS attacks: The multi-leveluTESLA schemes scale broadcast authentication up to large 
networks by constructing multi-level key chains and distributing initial parameters of 
lower-level pTESLA instances with higher-level ones. However, multi-level PTESLA 
schemes magnify the threat of DoS attacks. An attacker may launch DoS attacks on the 
messages carrying the initial pTESLA parameters [44,45]. Though several solutions 
have been proposed in Liu et al. [44], they either use substantial bandwidth or require 
significant resources to be available to senders [43]. 
3.1.2.2 BROSK 
The BROadcast Session Key (BROSK) [ 129] negotiation protocol stores a single master 
key in each sensor node for the entire WSN. A pair of sensor nodes (Si, Sj) exchange 
random nonce values Nj and Nj. The master key K, is used to establish a session key Kjj 
= MAC (K,, I Ni I Nj), where "I" is used for concatenation and MAC is a Message 
Authentication Code function [115]. There are a couple of issues which are not described 
by BROSK. If the master key is compromised after a node capture attack, an adversary 
can easily compromise the entire network communication and generate all other keys. 
The BROSK protocol also didn't present the effect of node capture attacks in their 
scheme, when few sensor nodes are physically compromised. 
3.1.23 Two phase session based key management 
Pietro et al., [1301 proposed a key management protocol for large scale WSNs. The 
protocol is composed of two main phases. In the first phase, a new session key is 
generated, while in the second phase the new session key is distributed to all sensor nodes 
in the WSN. In the first phase, each sensor node autonomously generates the session key. 
The algorithm driving such a generation makes sure that each sensor node generates the 
same key. The second phase focuses on ensuring that each sensor node holds an 
59 
Chapter three: Key Management in WSNs 
appropriate set of cryptographic keys. This second phase is needed for synchronization. 
Similarly like BROSK this scheme has not considered node capture attacks. 
3.1.3 Hierarchical Based Key Management 
3.1.3.1 LEAP 
LF, 4P is based on the theory that different types of messages exchanged between nodes 
need to satisfy different security requirements. All the packets transferred in a sensor 
network need to always be authenticated where a sensor node knows the sender of the 
data since an adversary may attack a WSN with false data at any time. On the other hand 
confidentiality, like encryption of packets carrying routing information, is not always 
needed. Different keying mechanisms are necessary to handle the different types of 
packets. For this Zhu et al., [121] establish LEAP with four types of keys that must be 
stored in each sensor: individual, pair-wise, cluster, and group. Each key has its own 
significance while transferring messages from one node to another in a WSN. By using 
these keys LEAP offers efficiency and security with resistance to copious attacks such as 
the wormhole and Sybil attacks. LEAP usesuTESLA for local broadcast authentication. 
The advantages of this scheme include that it offers efficient protocols for supporting 
four types of key schemes for different types of messages broadcast, it reduces battery 
usage and communication overhead through in-network processing, and it uses a variant 
of pTESLA to provide local broadcast authentication. The disadvantages of this scheme 
include that it requires excessive storage with each node storing four types of keys and a 
one-way key chain. In addition, the computation and communication overhead are 
dependent upon network density (the denser a network, the more overhead there is). 
3.1.3.2 Cluster based key managementfor WSN 
Jolly et al., [131] structure the WSN in clusters, and then assign one gateway (super 
node) to each cluster to be in charge of the cluster. Gateway nodes are equipped with 
more resources compared to the rest of the nodes. In their solution each sensor stores two 
keys. One key is shared with a gateway and the other with a sink. This scheme can also 
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be categorized under heterogeneous WSNs- The disadvantages of this scheme include 
that in case a gateway node is compromised, it means that the data confidentiality and 
communication of this cluster will be compromised.. 
3.1.3.3 Three tier key managementfor WSNs 
Bohge et al., [132] propose a new WSN structure for their key management idea. They 
use a three-tier ad hoc network topology. At the top level there are high-power access 
points that route packets received via radio links to the wired infrastructure. On the 
second level there are medium power forwarding sensor nodes and at the bottom level 
there are low power mobile sensor nodes with limited resources. The lower level nodes 
share keys with the level above them. For more security each sensor node should have a 
personal initial certificate. They split sensing data into two parts: normal and sensitive 
data. 
3.1.3.4 SHELL 
Younis et al. [ 127] propose a lightweight combinatorial construction of key management 
for clustered WSNs, called SHELL. In SHELL, collusion is reduced by using nodes' 
physical locations for computing their keys. This scheme uses a command sensor node to 
govern the entire WSN. The command sensor node directly communicates with the 
gateway nodes which are in charge of individual clusters. Sensor nodes can be added to 
this WSN at any time. The gateway nodes are powerful enough to communicate with the 
command sensor node and undertake required key management functions. 
Each gateway node can communicate with at least two other gateway nodes in the WSN, 
and has three types of key [127]. The first is a preloaded key that allows the gateway to 
directly communicate with the command node. The second type of key allows the various 
gateway nodes to communicate. The third allows the gateway to communicate with all 
the sensor nodes in its cluster. In the case of node capture attacks, it is assumed that the 
command node is unable to be compromised. If a single sensor in a cluster is 
compromised, the keys of all the sensor nodes in the cluster have to be replaced. If a 
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gateway node is compromised, the command node will do rekeying of the inter-gateway 
nodes. The application scenario is not clearly explained. The re-keying action in clusters 
or for gateway nodes in the case of a single node compromise is costly in terms of 
resources. 
3.1.4 Key Management for Heterogeneous Sensor Networks 
In the work [ 122,123], Du et al. considered key management in a Heterogeneous Sensor 
Network (HSN) that consists of a small number of powerful high-end sensors and a large 
number of low-end sensors. 
They have also presented an effective key management scheme - the asymmetric pre- 
distribution (AP) scheme for HSNs [122]. Powerful high-end sensors are utilized to 
provide simple, efficient and effective key set up schemes for low-end sensors. The basic 
idea of the AP key management scheme is to pre-load a large number of keys in each 
high-end sensor while only pre-loading a small number of keys in each low-end sensor. A 
high-end sensor has much larger storage space than a low-end sensor, and the keys pre- 
loaded in a high-end sensor are protected by tamper resistant hardware. 
However according to Hussain et al. [145] the AP scheme is not efficient in terms of 
memory overhead. For example, if there are 1000 low end-sensors and 10 high end- 
sensors in an HSN and each high end-sensor is loaded with 500 keys and each low end- 
sensor is loaded with 20 keys, the total memory requirement for storing these keys will be 
(10 x 500) + (1000 x 20) = 25,000 (in the unit of key length). 
Du et al. also propose a routing-driven key management scheme, which only establishes 
shared keys for neighbour sensors that communicate with each other [123]. They have 
used tree topology based routing; and also elliptic curve cryptography to further increase 
the efficiency of the key management scheme. 
There are a few issues in their current solution. The authors have presented an evaluation 
comparison with homogenous WSNs, whereas the current proposed solution is for 
heterogeneous WSNs. The authors have not considered the effect of node capture attacks 
when high-end sensor nodes are compromised. This is important since all 
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communications between clusters is through the high-end sensor nodes. According to 
Hussain et al. [145], asymmetric cryptography such as RSA or elliptic curve 
cryptography (ECC) is unsuitable for most sensor architectures due to its high energy 
consumption and increased code storage requirements. As target applications for the 
scheme have not been clearly described in the paper, it's therefore difficult to establish 
whether the current network model can achieve scalability. 
Hussain et al. [1451 have also proposed a key distribution scheme for heterogeneous 
WSNs. Similarly they have assumed high-end (H-end) and low-end (L-end) sensor nodes. 
H-sensor nodes will act as cluster heads. There is a key pool K consisting of M different 
key chains. These key chains will be used to preload keys in L-end sensor and H-end 
sensor nodes. After a successful cluster formation phase a shared key discovery phase 
begins. Every L-end sensor will establish a key with a H-end sensor and with its own 
neighbouring nodes. 
Similar to Du et al. in [122,123], Traynor et al. [124] also assume that there are sensor 
nodes in the WSN that are more powerful and more secure than others, and these more 
powerful sensor nodes are also in tamper proof boxes or well guarded. A sensor node that 
has limited memory and processing power is identified as L I, and a sensor node that has 
more memory and more processing power is identified as L2 [1241. L2 nodes act as head 
sensor nodes for the Ll sensor nodes and have the responsibility of routing packets 
throughout the WSN. These L2 sensor nodes have access to gateway servers which are 
connected to a wired network. 
3.1.5 Group Based Key Management 
Most proposed solutions for group key management use a session key concept. Here we 
will provide an overview of some of these solutions. 
EltoweissY et al. [77] propose a scheme for group key management in large-scale WSNs. 
Their proposed scheme is based on Exclusion Basic Systems (EBS). The use of EBS (n, k, 
m) is to assign and manage keys for a group, where n is the number of group members, k 
represents keys held by the nodes and m is the number of broadcast messages needed for 
63 
Chapter three: Key Management in PVSNs 
rekeying after a node is evicted. They assume that all sensor nodes are pre-initialized 
before deployment, with an identical state mainly consisting of a set of training 
parameters and a number of keys. A key server also has one or more session keys known 
to subsets of group members. All group members aware of a particular session key 
constitute a secure communication group. Members in a secure communication group use 
the session key corresponding to the group for the encryption of messages exchanged 
among group members. 
Pietro et al., [130] propose a key management solution for large scale WSN. Their 
protocol generates keys without requiring communication among sensors. They believe 
that direct communication between sensor nodes consumes more energy. They also prefer 
to use the session key concept. They propose two different methods for sensor nodes to 
agree on session keys: one for a base station scenario and the other for a completely 
distributed scenario. The base station has to interact with the WSN to invoke the 
command to generate new keys. In the distributed case each sensor node stores a 
parameter p that drives the generation of a new session. After a time out of P clock ticks 
has elapsed, the sensor node invokes the generation of a new session key. 
Group communication applications can use IP multicast to transmit data to all n group 
members using minimum resources. Efficiency is achieved because data packets need to 
be transmitted only once when they pass through any link between two nodes, hence 
saving bandwidth. This contrasts with unicast-based group communication where the 
sender has to transmit n copies of the same packet. Any multicast-enabled host can send 
messages to its neighbour router and request to join a multicast group [39]. There is no 
authentication or access control enforced in this operation [145]. The security challenge 
for multicast is in providing an effective method for controlling access to the group and 
its information that is as efficient as the underlying multicast. 
After explanation of all these key management solutions, we have concluded that the 
main objective of these solutions is the same: secure communication between pairs of 
sensor nodes or sources and destinations. However all these solutions are applications or 
structure dependent and limited to specific applications. These static WSN security 
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solutions do not support mobility, which results in significant limitations. Mobility 
generates more security challenges and attacks than in static WSNs. 
Furthermore these solutions only describe resilience against node capture attacks but fail 
to discuss the possible attacks that can occur after node capture, e. g. replication, black 
hole and Sybil attacks. Key management also has some inter-link issues related to 
network processing (such as data aggregation). Suppose that an aggregator, a cluster head, 
a master sensor node or any ordinary sensor node is compromised where data aggregation 
takes place. This would bring issues surrounding data confidentiality, data integrity and 
trust to the fore. 
In case a group leader, a cluster head or an aggregator sensor node becomes 
compromised, there should be a solution to allow election or selection of a new group 
leader, a cluster head or an aggregator sensor node, in order to provide better and 
continuous service and availability. 
All these issues (mobility, secure data aggregation, secure group leader election or 
selection and resilience against all other possible attacks) are related to key management 
directly, so we will present a brief literature related to these issues next. 
3.2 Secure Data Aggregation 
In the initial stages of sensor network research, many data aggregation protocols [58-59, 
147] were proposed, but none of them were designed with the consideration of possible 
security threats. Further research in this area highlighted the importance of security. 
Hu et al., [150] proposed a secure hop-by-hop data aggregation scheme. In this scheme 
individual packets are aggregated in such a way that a sink can detect non-authorized 
inputs. The proposed solution introduces a significant bandwidth overhead per packet. 
They also assume that only leaf nodes with a tree-like network topology sense 
data, 
whereas the intermediate nodes do not have their own data readings. Jadia et al., 
[148] 
extended the Hu et al. approach by integrating privacy, but considered only a single 
malicious node. 
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Several secure aggregation algorithms have also been proposed for the scenario of a 
single data aggregator for a group of sensor nodes. Przydatek et al. [149] proposed 
Secure Information Aggregation (SIA) to detect forged aggregation values from all 
sensor nodes in a network. The aggregator then computes an aggregation result over the 
raw data together with a commitment to the data based on a Merkle-hash tree and then 
sends them to a trustable remote user, who later challenges the aggregator to verify the 
aggregate. They assume that the bandwidth between a remote user and an aggregator is a 
bottleneck. Therefore their protocol is intended for reducing this bandwidth overhead 
while providing a means to detect with a high probability if the aggregator is 
compromised. Yang et al. [152] describe a probabilistic aggregation algorithm which 
subdivides an aggregation tree into sub trees, each of which reports its aggregates directly 
to the sink. Outliers among the sub trees are then probed for inconsistencies [56]. 
Moreover a number of aggregation algorithms have been proposed to ensure the data 
confidentiality of the data against intermediate aggregators. Such algorithms have been 
proposed by Girao et al. [ 15 1 ], Castelluccia et al. [61 ], and Cam et al. [ 147]. In the next 
section we will describe the relationship between data confidentiality and secure data 
aggregation. 
3.2.1 Confidentiality and Data Aggregation 
Confidentiality can be maintained between sources and destinations using different 
solutions according to requirements and available resources. In our further discussion we 
describe three possible solutions to achieve end-to-end (source to destination) 
confidentiality in large scale sensor networks. 
The first option is for each sensor to store a unique key shared only with the sink, and to 
send encrypted data through other sensors to the sink without decryption at any non-sink 
node. This end-to-end confidentiality can be achieved but there are some drawbacks. 
Because all packets are forwarded towards the sink, a lot of bandwidth is consumed. It's 
also very burdensome when a sensor network is busy to recover large amounts of data 
from every single node in the case of data loss. Finally, there is an extreme imbalance 
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between sensors in terms of the amount of data communicated. For example sensors 
closer to the sink will lose energy more quickly. 
The second option is hop-by-hop secure data aggregation. This type of scheme is only 
limited to specific topologies such as tree topologies, but it nonetheless achieves the goal. 
The third option which we recommend is where an aggregator node has an appropriate 
position, such as a group leader node, which can assist in securely aggregating the data 
within its group. This will also help to reduce the amount of data to be transferred to the 
sink and support network structure independence. It is possible that the group leader node 
is not in the best position to perform the role. The issue of how to optimally select a node 
in a group for the role of data aggregation in relation to several factors such as minimal 
energy consumptions and the number of neighbouring sensor nodes will be presented 
later in this thesis. 
3.2.2 Homomorphic Encryption 
Homomorphic encryption is a semantically-secure encryption which, in addition to 
providing the standard guarantees has additional properties. In particular the sum of any 
two encrypted values is equal to the encrypted sum of the values. There are several 
efficient homomorphic cryptosystems such as Unpadded RSA, El-Gamal, Golchvasser- 
Micali and Benaloh and Paillier [ 15 3]. 
Consider Unpadded RSA as an example, where we use the notation Ek(x) to denote the 
encryption of a message x with a key k using the method. Suppose that a public RSA key 
is expressed as pk = (e, m). Then the encryption of a message x with key pk is signified as 
Epk(x) = Xe mod m. In this case we have the homomorphic property: 
(Epk(xl) Epk(x2)) mod m= (xl'x2') mod m 
= (xlx2)' mod m 
= Epk(xiX2) 
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For addition and average calculations in WSNs, we can use the following homomorphic 
encryption algorithm. 
Encryption: 
1. Represent a message (sensed data) as an integer d with 0<d<Z, where Z is a large 
integer. 
2. Let s= (k, Z) be a shared secret key with 0<k<Z. 
3. Define c= EXd) = (d + k) mod Z. 
Decryption: 
1. Compute E, - I (c) = (c - k) mod Z= d. 
Addition of Ciphertexts: 
1. Let si = (ki, Z) andS2= (k2, Z) be two secret keys, and di and d2, where 0< (di + d2) < 
Z, be two messages. Compute cl = Ej(dj) = (d, + kl) mod Z andC2 = E, 2(d2) = (d2 + 
k2) mod Z This leads to (c, + c2) mod Z= ((d, + d2) + (k, + k2)) mod Z=E, 1,2(d, 
+d2), 
with key sl, 2 = (k, Z) and k= (k, + k2) mod Z. 
2. For decryption, we have: 
E, 
1,2-1 
(c I+ c2) = &I + c2)-k) mod Z=dl +d2. 
n 
Note that if n different ciphers ci are added, then Z must be larger than d, , and 
otherwise the correctness of recovered data is not provided. In practice, if p= max (di), 
then Z should be selected as Z=2 
[loo (p * n)] 
3.3 Replication Attacks 
Replication attacks can be launched in two different ways in WSNs. In the first type of 
replication attack an adversary can eavesdrop on communications and resend old packets 
again multiple times in order to waste its neighbouring sensor nodes' energy. In the 
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second type of replication attack an adversary can insert additional replicated hostile 
sensor nodes into the WSN after obtaining some secret information from captured sensor 
nodes or through infiltration [133,134]. 
Fu et al. evaluated the effect of replication attack on key pool based key management 
schemes [72,75,128,135,136]. They analyze, characterize and discuss the relationship 
among the replicated hostile sensor nodes, the WSN, and the resilience of various random 
key pre-distribution schemes against replication attacks using a combination of 
modelling, analysis, and experiments. Example findings include the following. 
(1) WSNs with random key pre-distribution schemes, even with one replicated sensor 
node, start to become almost 100% insecure when an adversary captures and stores key 
information equivalent to those carried by one good sensor node. 
(2) When the replicated sensor node has less memory to store key information than the 
original sensor node, among the proposed schemes, the q-composite scheme with larger q 
is most resilient against replication attacks while the Basic Scheme is least resilient [ 133, 
134]. In Parno et al. presented distributed methods of detecting replication attacks in 
WSNs [1371. According to Parno et al. an adversary can compromise a few sensor nodes 
in the network and can create more cloned sensor nodes to place them in different 
locations in the WSN to launch replications attacks. We conclude from our review of the 
literature that group based key management schemes are more resilient against 
replication attacks, even after some of the nodes have been compromised. This is due to 
the fact that group based key management schemes can minimize global key sharing in 
comparison to key pre-distribution schemes [ 13 7]. 
3.4 Secure Group Leader Election/Selection 
There are various different proposed solutions for group leader election or selection; 
some of these also consider security issues. First we will give an overview of non secure 
group leader or cluster head election related work, and then we will briefly describe 
related work on secure group leader election/selection. 
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In LEACH [139], initially when clusters are being created, each sensor node decides 
whether or not to become a cluster head for the current round. This decision is based on 
the suggested percentage of cluster heads for the WSN (determined a priori) and the 
number of times the sensor node has been a cluster head so far. 
Wen et al [140] define two different methods: centralized and distributed for cluster head 
election. In the centralized method, the current cluster head, sensor i, determines a new 
cluster head by aggregating energy and neighbour sensor nodes information from its 
cluster members. In the distributed method, once the energy in the current cluster head is 
below a given threshold, it transmits a message to start the reselection process. Each 
cluster member then checks its energy constraints. As long as the cluster member satisfies 
these constraints, it generates a random waiting time which depends on the number of 
neighbouring cluster members and the remaining energy level. 
Vasudevan et al. [ 146] define algorithms for the secure election of leaders in wireless ad- 
hoc networks, but these algorithms use public-key cryptography, which is unappealing 
for resource-constrained WSNs. As described earlier, security in WSNs is subject to 
different and increased constraints compared to traditional and ad-hoc networks. Keeping 
the limited resources of WSNs in mind, Liu et al., [128] present a hybrid public-key 
system for WSN security, where more capable gateway devices perform the bulk of the 
computation. This approach is appealing in group mobility situations, but again it may be 
limited to certain applications as it is still not as computationally lightweight as a 
symmetric-key algorithm would be. Symmetric-key authentication systems are a well- 
researched field. In order to use symmetric-key cryptography in a WSN, we must have a 
reliable method for the distribution of symmetric keys. There has been work in this area. 
As described in section 3.1.3.1, LEAP is a method for key management and 
authentication in WSNs. However, LEAP doesn't consider group leader election in the 
case of group leader compromise. As described in section 3.1.2.1, Perrig et al. present a 
number of security protocols for WSNs using a master key system, where each sensor 
node derives its private key from the master key. Furthermore as we have discussed in 
section 3.1.1.1, Eschenauer and Gligor present a probabilistic keying scheme that relies 
on sensor nodes being assured a certain probability of communication with other sensor 
nodes, rather than being assured with certainty, to reduce the number of keys a node must 
70 
Chapter three: Key Management in WSNs 
keep track of Traynor et al. [138] present LIGER, a hybrid system for symmetric-key 
distribution using both probabilistic keying and a KDC in MSNs, and an implementation 
and analysis of probabilistic keying schemes [124]. Using elements from LIGER and 
Traynor et al, we can ensure that sensor nodes have a computationally inexpensive means 
of communicating securely, and in turn, electing a leader securely. 
3.5 Key Management for MSNs 
Security issues can be more destructive in MSNs then static WSNs. For example, in key 
pool based schemes [72,75,78], if a single mobile sensor node is compromised it can 
listen to the communication of the entire WSN due to the global sharing of keys. 
Currently key management has only been considered in mobile ad hoc networks and most 
of these proposed solutions consider either hierarchal key management or group based 
key management. 
Wang et al. [143] propose a hierarchical key management scheme for secure group 
communication in mobile ad hoc networks. In this scheme the entire network is split in 
groups and further into sub-groups. Subgroups are further divided into two levels, Ll- 
subgroups and L2-subgroups. Different keys are used at each of these levels. For 
communication between groups, a communication key is used by bridge nodes referred to 
as communication nodes. There are certain issues when a new node joins a group. In 
particular, the L2-head has to regenerate a new subgroup key and send it to its entire set 
of members. 
Wu et al. [141] propose a secure and efficient key management scheme for mobile ad hoc 
networks. They also organise their network into server groups and use public key 
infrastructure. Along with key management they also explain about group maintenance 
and formation. Each server group creates a view of the certificate authority (CA) and 
provides a certificate update service for all nodes, including the servers themselves. A 
ticket scheme is introduced for efficient certificate service provision. As they use an 
asymmetric cryptographic method, it is not efficient to use such a method for WSNs. 
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Cho et al. [142] propose a region-based group key management scheme for mobile ad- 
hoc networks. In this scheme group members are broken into region-based subgroups. 
The leaders in a subgroup securely communicate with each other to agree on a group key 
in response to membership changes and member mobi I ity- induced events. They have 
assumed that every single node is equipped with GPS and knows their location when they 
move across regions. Such an assumption is not suited for WSNs due to its limitation. 
They have used a hierarchy of keys, e. g. regional keys, group keys and leader keys at 
different levels of the group. In their attack model they assume only external attacks can 
occur. However in WSNs node capture attack is totally different and unique to traditional 
network schemes. If we apply node capture attacks at different levels of a group on [ 142], 
or if a Leader node becomes compromised, data confidentiality and integrity can be 
compromised and there is no election or selection method for Leader nodes. 
We can see from existing key management solutions for mobile ad hoc networks that 
most of these solutions are hierarchical. There are some issues that relate to application of 
these solutions for WSNs. WSNs are scaleable networks, public key management and 
GPS are not ideal for WSNs due to the limited resources of nodes and regeneration of 
keys due to the joining and leaving of nodes in a group is an energy consuming task, 
especially when we consider sensor networks in water (such as the sea) where nodes may 
change position rapidly. Therefore it remains an open research issue, and many solid 
answers are needed in order to provide for future solutions. 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, we surveyed the literature and works relating to key management, secure 
data aggregation, group leader election/selection and key management for MSNs. We 
presented and discussed the existing solutions of key management for static WSNs. 
These solutions were classified into five different types including: key pool based key 
management, session based key management, hierarchical based key management, key 
management for heterogeneous sensor networks, and group based key management. All 
of these solutions place emphasis on the important issue of providing high resilience 
against node capture attacks and providing better secure communication between sources 
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and destinations. This chapter pointed out the main drawbacks of existing key 
management solutions. There are some common drawbacks in these schemes, for 
example all of these solutions are structure dependent and any change in the structure 
directly affects the security of the WSN. Each key management solution is particularly 
designed for one specific problem, and these solutions do not handle problems such as 
secure data aggregation or replication attacks. Furthermore we have listed some 
individual weaknesses of these schemes are summaries in table below: 
Key Management Scheme Drawbacks 
Key pool based 0 Probabilistic key sharing increases the probability of 
compromising the entire WSN. 
0 Extra communication overhead during key establishment 
phase. 
0 Memory overhead due to preloading more keys to increase the 
probability of key sharing between sensor nodes. 
0 Forward and backward secrecy requirements will increase 
communication overhead. 
Hierarchical 0 Minimum number of routes for child sensor nodes to 
communicate with their parent sensor nodes. Therefore in the 
case of a parent sensor node being compromised, all of the 
communication from its child sensor nodes will be blocked. 
0 These key management schemes can only be used in specific 
applications and they are not scalable. 
Session based 0 These solutions are limited to small WSNs. 
Sharing common values to produce different session keys for 
encryption increases vulnerability of communication 
compromise of the WSN in the case of compromise of a single 
sensor node. 
These solutions are more vulnerable to DoS attacks. 
Heterogeneous Physical compromise of a high end-sensor causes problems 
similar to the compromise of a parent sensor node in the 
hierarchical key management. 
Some of these schemes have used asymmetric cryptography 
which is unsuitable for most sensor architectures due to its high 
energy consumption and increased code storage requirements. 
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Forward and backward secrecy is another weakness of these 
schemes. 
Group based These solutions only describe resilience against node capture 
attacks but fail to discuss the possible attacks that can occur 
after node capture, e. g. replication, black hole and Sybil 
attacks. 
In case of aggregator, a cluster head, a master sensor node is 
compromised where data aggregation takes place. This would 
bring issues surrounding data confidentiality and integritý. 
There is no alternative in case a group leader, a cluster head or 
an aggregator sensor node becomes compromised, in order to 
provide better and continuous service and availability. 
Table 3-1: Drawbacks of current key management schemes 
Later in the chapter we have described related works concerning secure data aggregation 
and its importance. Secure data aggregation is vital in applications where very sensitive 
data are communicated through the sensor nodes. Compromise of an aggregator node can 
be a significant risk to data confidentiality. Therefore data aggregation should be 
performed on encrypted data without decryption to improve data confidentiality. 
Furthermore we have presented related works about secure group leader selection. Finally 
we described related work about key management for MSNs- 
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Chapter Four: Structure And Density Independent 
Group-Based Key Management (SADI-GKM) 
Protocol Design Overview 
The unique properties of WSNs increase their popularity and potential for future 
involvement in major applications of our daily life. All of these facilities are potentially 
hindered by a number of important issues. It is therefore important that these issues be 
resolved in order to fully benefit from WSNs. Some of these issues are general and basic, 
e. g. scalability and resource usage reduction, and have influence or inter-relations with 
other issues such as security, routing and fault tolerance. For example, security and 
routing protocols must also be scalable and energy efficient. 
In this chapter we will concentrate on the issue of security, presenting the requirements 
and design overview of a key management protocol that is intended to improve security 
while at the same time taking into account the more general issues of scalability and 
energy elfficiency as described above. Having described our requirement and protocol 
framework in this and detail design the next chapter, we will then go on to test it and 
evaluate it against other protocols in Chapter six. 
4.1 Background 
As described in earlier chapters, WSNs can contain hundreds and potentially thousands 
of small sensor nodes able to perform various different jobs. It is commonly assumed that 
the purpose of WSNs is to monitor large areas. Moreover the number of WSN 
applications is increasing quickly due to their unique characteristics. Future applications 
will be highly scalable, e. g. whole countries and cities will be monitored for various 
purposes using WSNs. Therefore scalability is a core issue and this can affect the 
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performance of any proposed security and non-security protocols especially when we 
also take into account resource limitations. To handle scalability issues using fewer 
resources, researchers spilt an entire network into zones, groups or clusters [31]. 
Furthermore, these groups are then organised into different topologies according to the 
application requirements. Clustering and group management are well known approaches 
used to provide efficient management of large scale networks of various types, including 
WSNs and ad hoc networks [3 1 ]. 
Our aim is to provide secure communication for scalable WSNs. We have therefore used 
group key management concepts in our protocol design. 
Furthermore in relation to security and scalability, a WSN is strictly structure and 
application dependent, i. e. if a protocol is designed for indoor applications it is unlikely 
to work in outdoor applications. If the size of a network increases or decreases these 
protocols often show appalling performance, e. g., pTESLA [39] shows good performance 
in small scale WSNs but its performance decreases in large scale WSNs [20]. 
Furthermore pTESLA is also topology dependent and especially designed for hierarchical 
WSNs. 
As described in section 2.3.1 about node capture attack, the sensor nodes and their 
operation in remote and hostile areas makes it easy for sensor nodes to be captured and 
increases the chance that a sensor node will be targeted. There can be many possible 
ways for an adversary to use a compromised sensor node. For example, after 
compromising a sensor node or nodes physically, an adversary can easily extract key 
information from the sensor node and replace it back into the WSN as an adversary- 
controlled sensor node. It will then behave as a normal sensor node and can establish 
communication with other non-compromised sensor nodes. Consequently data 
confidentiality and privacy will be at high risk. Therefore any solution to provide 
resilience against node capture should assure that the compromised sensor node should 
not leak sensitive data and should not compromise the confidentiality of other sensor 
nodes. 
To minimize the number of transmissions from thousands of sensor nodes towards a sink, 
a well known approach is to use in-network aggregation as discussed in section 2.2.10 
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and 3.2. A serious issue connected with in-network data aggregation is data 
security/integrity [154]. There are different types of attacks which can be harmfal for in- 
network data aggregation, e. g. a compromise of an aggregator sensor node due to 
physical tampering using node capture attack. In many applications nodes are 
communicating highly sensitive data (for example in military and rescue applications) 
and due to such threats data integrity/security is vital. Therefore a secure data aggregation 
method is required to provide better integrity and data confidentiality. 
Furthermore, in case of an aggregator, a group leader or a cluster head sensor node failure 
due to resource depletion; there should be a secure way of electing or selecting a new 
aggregator or group leader sensor node. There are various proposed schemes which 
provide election of a new group leader sensor node, but they generally fail to consider the 
issue of security. For example, a new elected group leader sensor node could turn out to 
be an adversary sensor node. We therefore need to make sure that any new group leader 
sensor node is a trusted node. 
Considering our previous discussion, it's clear that all of these issues - scalability, 
application or structure dependency, node capture attack, replay attack, secure data 
aggregation and secure group leader election - are inter-related with each other. By 
ignoring any one of these we are likely to end up weakening the overall security solution. 
Until now all of these problems have been addressed individually but separately, and 
while any good solution for a single problem might tackle this problem well, it will often 
have no integration with other solutions proposed for the other problems. In this case the 
problem will remain with the overall method. Therefore an integrated approach is 
required to combine all of these issues together and identify their relationships, allowing 
them to be handled efficiently. 
Following from our research into node capture attacks, various evolutionary results have 
highlighted three main factors which can aid adversaries during node capture attacks, in 
order to compromise the communication of the entire sensor network [33,71]. The first 
factor is that node capture attacks can be a threat only if sensor nodes within the WSN 
share a key or keys with neighbouring sensor nodes used to encrypt or decrypt data. 
Consequently the greater the level of key-sharing between neighbouring sensor nodes, the 
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greater the threat to data communication integrity and confidentiality. Most existing key 
management solutions suffer from this drawback. The second important factor is the 
structure (topology) of the WSN. In general, the fewer the communication links between 
sensor nodes, the greater the possibility that an attacker can entirely block the 
communication paths between a source and destination. For example, node capture 
attacks are generally more effective in tree topologies than mesh topologies because in 
the former there is only one route from child to parent. If the parent node is compromised, 
the entire communication from its child nodes downward will potentially be 
compromised [33,71]. The last factor which has a direct influence on node capture 
attacks is the density of the network, having a similar effect as the second factor. For 
example, physical compromise of sensor node with high density will be larger damage as 
compare to sensor node with low density. Therefore these three design factors were 
ascertained as being vital for a key management protocol to provide high resilience 
against node capture attacks. First, encryption should happen only at source sensor nodes 
and data should be decrypted at the corresponding destination sensor nodes (group 
leaders or sinks) to provide better confidentiality. The second factor is the selection of an 
appropriate topology, since this can help to provide resilience against node capture 
attacks. For example, DGKE has better performance results against attacks when a 
random mesh is used as compared to other topologies. Finally we need to select a suitable 
density according to the application in order to overcome the risk of serious damage to 
the WSN resulting from a node capture attack. In the next chapter we will describe the 
details and evaluation of DGKE. 
4.2 Aims and Objective 
In this section, we discuss the overall aims and specific objective of our work. In 
previous sections we have described relevant security threats and issues which are inter- 
linked with each other, and the need for an integrated security solution. We also provided 
background needed in order to support our main aims and objectives. Given this, the 
major research objectives that we address in the problem area are as follows: 
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9 To develop a novel key management protocol. This protocol should have different 
layers to tackle different security problems at the prevention level. All these 
layers must be integrated with each other to prevent an attacker from system 
penetration. The proposed key management protocol should support topology 
independency, scalability, node to node authentication, high resilience against 
node capture attacks and replay attacks, and be resource efficient. The protocol 
should be evaluated using different topologies and compared against existing key 
management protocols to show its performance. This can be carried out using 
simulations. 
* To design a secure data aggregation scheme to provide better data confidentiality 
and integrity inside groups. This secure data aggregation service will come under 
the second layer of the key management protocol, and should not increase 
resource usage. The second layer should provide different options in terms of data 
confidentiality according to user and application requirements. This mechanism 
can be evaluated using simulations by monitoring the aggregator sensor node 
energy consumption. 
* To develope novel techniques for secure selection of a new group leader sensor 
node using various selection parameters. The proposed techniques should avoid 
the selection of sensor nodes with low trust, low energy or which have long 
distances from the current group leader. The selection process should be quick 
and short to minimize energy consumption. The proposed schemes can be 
evaluated by comparing them to existing solutions using simulations. This scheme 
will come under the third layer of the proposed protocol. 
To design a key management scheme to support MSNs appropriately. The 
proposed scheme should support different mobility patterns (e. g. free and guided 
mobility) and different security levels according to different applications and 
resource availability. This scheme can also be evaluated using simulations. 
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4.3 Requirements 
1. Confidentially and Data integrity: In WSNs, confidentiality relates to the 
following: 
" Providing confidentiality of the wireless communications channels to 
prevent eavesdropping. A sensor node should not leak sensor readings to 
its neighbouring sensor nodes. In some applications, the data stored in the 
sensor node may be highly sensitive. To achieve this, a sensor node should 
avoid sharing keys with neighbouring sensor nodes, when these keys are 
used for encryption and decryption [33]. 
" The building of secure channels in the WSN. 
" Sensor information, such as sensor identities and public keys, is encrypted 
to some extent to protect against traffic analysis attacks. 
Data integrity issues in wireless networks are similar to those in wired networks. 
Data integrity ensures that any received data has not been altered or deleted in 
transit. We should keep in mind that an adversary can launch modification attacks 
when cryptographic checking mechanisms such as message authentication codes 
and hashes are not used. 
11. Authentication: In WSNs an adversary's attack is notjust limited to modifying data 
packets. An adversary can change the whole packet stream by injecting additional 
packets, so the receiver node needs to ensure that the data used in any decision- 
making process originates from the correct source [41]. Authentication of other 
sensor nodes, cluster heads, and sinks before revealing information is therefore 
crucial. 
111. Availability: Key management services must ensure that confidentially and group- 
level authentication services are available to authorized parties when needed. 
However strict limitations and unnecessary overheads weaken the availability of 
sensors and WSNs [41 ]. 
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IV. Scalability: Key distribution schemes must support large scale WSNs, and must be 
flexible during increases in the size of the WSN. 
V. Datafreshness: Proposed key management solution should have the ability to check 
data freshness that the data is recent, and it ensures that no old messages have been 
replayed. 
VI. Application independency: Due to disorder and the wide range of potential 
applications for WSNs, an application independent solution is required which can 
be used for more than one application. This is especially important in MSNs and ad 
hoc sensor networks where topologies change frequently due to nodes joining and 
leaving. A topology independent solution could significantly decrease energy 
consumption. 
VII. Survivability: Due to the unattended nature of WSNs, an attacker could launch 
various security attacks and even compromise sensor nodes without being detected. 
Therefore, a WSN should be robust against security attacks such as node capture 
attacks and replication attacks. Even if an attacker succeeds, its impact should be 
minimized. For example, the compromise of a single sensor node should not break 
the security of the entire WSN. 
VIII. Supporting secure in-network processing: Security mechanisms should permit in- 
network processing operations in a secure way such as through secure data 
aggregation. In-network processing significantly reduces energy consumption in 
WSNs. 
IX. Supporting secure group leader selection: In case a goup leader sensor node is 
compromised or dies, there should be a secure way of selecting another group 
leader sensor node. 
X. Forward and backward secrecy: The proposed key management scheme should 
provide forward and backward secrecy when nodes join or leave a group [ 178]. 
XI. Memory overhead: Propose key management should use few keys while supporting 
a high level of security. 
X11. Connectivity: With a smaller number of keys, the probability that two sensors 
sharing at least one common key during any given time-interval should be kept as 
high as possible, in order to increase connectivity. 
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4.4 The Importance of Integrated Security 
According to Yang et al. [156] there are basically two approaches toward security 
solutions in ad hoc networks (such as WSNs): proactive and reactive. The proactive 
approach tries to prevent an attacker from launching attacks in the first place, typically 
through various cryptographic techniques (such as key management). In contrast, the 
reactive approach seeks to detect security threats afterward and react accordingly. Due to 
the absence of a clear line of defence, a complete security solution for WSNs should 
integrate both approaches and include all three components: prevention, detection, and 
reaction. 
The prevention component prevents an attacker from penetrating the system. However, 
the history of security has clearly shown that a completely intrusion-free system is 
infeasible, no matter how carefully the prevention mechanisms are designed [156]. This 
is especially true in WSNs, since they consist of small sensor devices that are prone to 
compromise or physical capture. Therefore, the detection and reaction components that 
discover the occasional intrusions and take reactions to avoid persistent adverse effects 
are vital for security solutions to operate in the presence of limited intrusions. As argued 
by Nikopolitidis [3], security is a chain and is only as secure as the weakest link. Missing 
a single component may significantly degrade the strength of the overall security 
solution. Furthermore there are many threats at the prevention level. All these solutions 
aim to prevent adversaries from penetrating the system, and should be tightly integrated. 
However our proposed protocol falls into the category of a prevention component as 
shown in Figure 4-1. 
4.5 Protocol Design Overview 
We have designed our Structure And Density Independent Group-Based Key 
Management Protocol (SADI-GKM) [1171 as a stack of four different layers with 
different functional ities, which are integrated with each other as shown in Figure 4-1. The 
protocol includes: a novel group-based key management scheme, efficient secure data 
aggregation [62], a novel secure group leader selection scheme and key management 
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capabilities for MSNs [36]. We have described earlier the need for such a protocol, in 
order to address the possible threats and issues together. Our proposed protocol has 
flexibility allowing the addition of more security solutions through the addition of more 
layers. 
Key Management 
s Prevention 
tA 
Secure Data Aggregation D 
TII Detection 
Secure Group_Uader Selectionj 
iG Key Management for 
Mobile Sensor Neworks K Reaction 
M 
New Layer 
Figure 4-1: Structure and Density Independent Group-Based Key Management 
(SADI-GKM) protocol stack. 
Our protocol works on three different node types: a sink node, group leader nodes and 
group member nodes. These three different node types play different roles in our protocol 
design and we have therefore designed different algorithms for each of them. The job of 
the group member sensor nodes is to sense, encrypt and send their data toward a sink or 
group leader sensor nodes. The group leader sensor nodes have multiple responsibilities 
as compared to the normal group member sensor nodes. These group leader sensor nodes 
will play the role of aggregators and gateways. The sink works as a base station to collect 
all the information and data from the sensor field. In the following subsections we 
describe the functionalities and tasks of each layer. 
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4.5.1 Layer 1: Key Management 
This layer has responsibility to pre-establish keys between sensor nodes and provides 
basic rules and regulations which are further integrated with the other layers. We organise 
WSNs into multiple geographical groups as shown below in Figures 4-2 and 4-3. Every 
group of sensor nodes will be preloaded with a unique master key, authentication value 
and unique global network ID. All sensor nodes in every group will use this master key to 
generate their unique keys for encryption. 
flu 
i; 4 
I, 
1 1- I 
Figure 4-2: A2x2 km outdoor WSN. 
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Figure 4-3: A WSN in a five story building (indoor WSNs). 
The key management layer operates in two phases: a key pre-establishment phase and a 
data transmission phase. We try to avoid any communication between sensor nodes 
during the key establishment phase to reduce the risk of eavesdropping and store only a 
few keys in each sensor node in contrast to existing schemes [72-78][125,126,128,130, 
145]. which require every sensor node to be equipped with 50 to 100 keys and perform 
more communication during the key establishment phase. We believe that using our 
minimal pre-establishment approach will save considerable amounts of communication 
overhead and subsequently reduce the energy cost. The data transmission phase will 
begin after successful key establishment. 
4.5.2 Layer 2: Secure Data Aggregation 
As described in the previous chapter, aggregator sensor nodes receive data from member 
sensor nodes and calculate aggregated results to reduce the quantity of transmissions. In 
case of physical compromise of an aggregator sensor node, the data confidentiality and 
integrity of all other sensor nodes using the aggregator may also be compromised. We 
therefore propose two different cases for secure data aggregation. In the first case an 
aggregator sensor node (a group leader) authenticates incoming data, decrypts and 
aggregates it. Furthermore the aggregated result will be re-encrypted and sent toward the 
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sink. The sink will decrypt this incoming data in order to obtain the aggregated result. In 
the second case the aggregator sensor node will not be allowed to decrypt the data; 
aggregation will be performed on encrypted data. Moreover the sink will perform further 
calculations in order to obtain the aggregated results. In the second case we use 
homomorphic encryption. The secure data aggregation algorithms will be preloaded into 
all group leaders, group member sensor nodes and the sink. We have integrated this 
scheme with the first layer of our protocol. The implementation of second layer is 
described in section 6.3.3. 
4.5.3 Layer 3: Secure Group Leader Selection 
The current solutions for group leader election have only used energy as a major election 
criterion. In our proposed solution we consider four different criteria: available energy of 
a sensor node, the number of neighbouring sensor nodes, the communication distance 
from the current group leader node (based on the position of the new group leader node), 
and the trust level of a sensor node. We have assumed different values for the trust 
factors during our analysis. However, trust values can also be found in various other 
proposed solutions [157-159]. These factors are very important, for example, sensor 
nodes with low levels of trust should be avoided; and sensor node with fewer 
neighbouring sensor nodes should also be avoided. The position of the group leader is 
also very important as it can directly effect the energy consumption of the entire group 
(we explain this issue in detail in the next chapter). Similarly node energy plays an 
important role. 
One of the main advantages of our scheme is that we do not involve all sensor nodes in 
the group for selecting a new group leader sensor node. First only neighbouring sensor 
nodes of the old group leader will be checked for new group leader selection. 
Secure group leader selection/election is vital in case of a group leader failure due to a 
node capture attack, energy failure or other causes. Our proposed scheme can also 
be 
used for different applications with respect to different communication 
behaviour of the 
sensor nodes. For example, in some applications sensors might use 
different radio ranges 
with respect to distances between different sensor nodes. In this case we can measure 
the 
space between a source node and a group leader in order to establish a 
distance metric. 
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However in applications where a fixed radio range is used for communication between 
sensor nodes this may not be possible. In such cases we measure the space between a 
source sensor node and a group leader using a hop count. Figure 4-5 shows an example of 
this. In case I we have a fixed radio range meaning that every hop is considered to be the 
same distance, whereas in case 2 every sensor node has a different radio range, and 
different hops between sensor nodes can have different distances. The distinction is 
highlighted by the fact that in the diagram d] has four hops, d2 has three hops, but the 
distance d2 is greater then d]. Therefore in our proposed group leader selection process 
we have considered both of these cases. Furthermore our proposed secure group leader 
selection scheme can also be used in heterogeneous WSN applications where different 
types of sensor nodes are used. In the next chapter we will describe this process in detail 
using our proposed formula for group leader selection. 
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........... 
.......... 
Case 1. Fixed Radio Range 
Group Leader 
71 
2 
40 
3 
so u rce 
Case 
Case 2. Adjusted diffrent radio range- 
for diffrent nodes 
Group Leader 
--i 
41 
sourcel 
Case 2 
Figure 4-4: Distance or number of hops from a source to its group leader. 
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4.5.4 Layer 4: Key Management for MSNs 
There are many complicated research issues relating to MSNs, including localizations, 
routing, network management, topology maintenance, security and many more. As we 
have seen, WSNs have many applications all with different requirements and different 
levels of available resources. There can be many different scenarios in which MSNs are 
used. In some cases all sensor nodes may be mobile, whereas in other cases there may be 
some static sensors and some mobile. Furthermore there can be different types of 
roaming for mobile sensor nodes, including free roaming (e. g. applications like MSNs in 
water) and guided roaming (e. g. applications in which sensor nodes attached to reboots, 
human body and vehicle). These properties of MSNs increase the challenges compared to 
static WSNs. Furthermore if we consider scalability issues with MSNs, things become 
more complicated again. Secure communication is also an essential requirement of MSNs, 
in similarity with other wireless networks. We intend to propose a secure communication 
solution for NISNs, but to achieve this we must also consider non-security related issues 
(such as scalability) which have a significant influence on MSN security. 
In this section we describe our proposed key management solution for MSNs, according 
to network available resources and security requirements. This key management solution 
is based on our proposed protocol SADI-GKM (Structure And Density Independent 
Group-Based Key Management) Layer 1, Layer 2 and Layer 3. In this proposed key 
management solution the MSN uses SADI-GKM Layer I for basic key establishment, 
Layer 2 for secure data aggregation, Layer 3 for secure group leader selection and a key 
pool based key management process for mobile sensor node authentication within the 
host group. Furthermore we use the micro-mobility concept for our MSN key 
management scheme. We assume that every sensor node has stored its position and the 
boundary coordinates of the group. The boundary coordinates of the group can help the 
mobile sensor to establish when they enter a neighbouring or other group territory. We 
will describe this scheme in detail in chapter five and six. 
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4.6. Summary 
In this chapter we have presented design overview of our novel protocol SADI-GKM. 
This protocol combines four different layers with different schemes. All these layers are 
integrated with each other to provide better secure solutions for multiple proactive 
security issues. The first layer of this protocol provides basic key management to all 
sensor nodes. The second layer's responsibility is to provide secure data aggregation 
according to the need of target applications. The third layer provides facilities for the 
selection of a new aggregator or group leader sensor node. This layer deals with the tasks 
of how to initiate the selection process, how to gather information from member sensor 
node, and how to find the next suitable group leader sensor node. The fourth layer's 
main task is to provide key management services for mobile sensor nodes in a WSN. The 
reason for the inclusion of this layer is due to its inter-relationships with the issues 
addressed by the other layers. Ignoring any such issue can weaken the network security. 
We have also identified requirements, issues and challenges that are important when 
designing an effective key management protocol for large scale WSNs. 
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Chapter Five: SADI-GKM Protocol Components 
In the previous chapters we have described the basic functionalities of our protocol. In 
this chapter we explain the operation of all the protocol layers in detail. Before going into 
the protocol design details, we describe some interesting parts of our project development, 
including some key research investigations that have helped us to design an efficient 
protocol. These key analyses are described in Section 5.1. For example we have 
established three important parameters during our analysis of node capture attacks as to 
be explained in Section 5.1.1. Unless balanced carefully, these three parameters can help 
an adversary to compromise the communications of an entire WSN. Similarly we have 
also investigated how a group leader's position in a group can affect the performance of 
the entire group of sensor nodes, as will be described in section 5.1.2. 
We then continue our discussion with the key management and secure data aggregation 
layers, where we explain about different algorithms, and how we can perform the secure 
data aggregation and key management tasks together. This constitutes part of our novel 
SADI-GKM protocol. Next we explain our novel secure group leader selection scheme 
which comes under the third layer of our protocol. Finally, we discuss key management 
for MSNs which come under the fourth layer of our protocol. 
5.1 SADI-GKM Pre-design Investigations 
5.1.1 Node Capture Attacks 
Node capture attacks are one of the most important and distinct issues that catch the 
attention of many researchers. 'Iberefore a number of different key management schemes 
have been proposed as described in Chapter three. As a part of our investigation on node 
capture attacks we proposed a simple protocol called Dynamic 
Group-Based Key 
Establishment (DGKE) [118,33,163,71]. 
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In DGKE we assign a unique master key to each group of sensor nodes. These keys will 
be set up in each sensor node before deployment. Once deployed, sensor nodes in a group 
will generate new keys using the master key and a random number. The sender sensor 
node will encrypt a hello message using this newly generated key and send the resulting 
ciphertext to its neighbours along with the random number used to generate the key. The 
neighbouring sensor nodes will use the master key and the received random number to 
decrypt the ciphertext message. Once decryption is successfully completed that key will 
be used for ffirther communication. The sender and receiver sensor nodes will perform 
these steps once after deployment, after which the non-group leader nodes will no longer 
retain the master key. The group leader retains the master key for use when new nodes 
join or leave the network [33]. We can explain this process with an example. We assume 
Figure 5-1 (a) as a group of five sensor nodes: nI, n2, n3, n4 and n5. All these sensor 
nodes have a shared key K (the master key). 
ni n2 nl KI n2 
K2 X6 
n3 n3e Ks 
ns K3 
M 4 
n4 
(a) (b) 
n6 
Figure 5-1: (a) Nodes deployed. (b) Key establishment. 
After successful sensor nodes deployment, each pair of nodes generate a 
key using the 
master key & (shared between all the group member sensor nodes) and a random number 
r (generated by the initiator node and sent to the other node), 
i. e. &= hash (K, r) as 
shown in Figure 5-1 (b). Specifically, the generated 
keys are defined below: 
K, = hash (K, 5) 4 shared between nI and n2 
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K2= hash (K, 65) 4 shared between nI and n3 
K3= hash (K, 3 1) -iý shared between n2 and M 
K4= hash (K, 57) 4 shared between n4 and n5 
K5= hash (K, 52) 4 shared between n3 and n5 
K6= hash (K, 101) 4 shared between n2 and n3 
These keys will be generated once and only for the nodes within the group. 
(a) Analysis 
We have simulated DGKE against node capture attacks using various different topologies 
to find the core properties which can help an adversary to compromise the 
communication of an entire sensor network. Our main goal in discovering these 
characteristics is that they can be avoided during the design of further WSN protocols. In 
this section we describe the detailed process of how we design our simulation framework 
and how we conduct the simulations. 
The simulation process involves two parts: building an appropriate test topology, and 
measuring a sequence of sensor node compromises to establish the effects that they have 
on the security of the WSN. We describe each of these parts separately. In the first part 
we describe how the topology creation process is performed. In the second part we 
describe the process of node capture attacks on the WSN. Using these simulations we 
intend to find the probability of total communication compromise after a certain number 
of node capture attacks have taken place. This is achieved by randomly selecting a sensor 
node during the simulation and assuming that this node has been physically compromised, 
after which the affects on the network of this compromise are measured. 
We performed a number of tests for comparison, pseudo randomly compromising 100, 
200 and 300 sensor nodes of the entire WSN. Even though a large scale WSN might be 
expected to have many more sensor node performing the test in this way allows us to 
provide a suitable comparison to analyse the effect of node capture attack on different 
topology. In every simulation for tree, grid and random mesh topologies we count the 
total number of communication links in the entire WSN and count the compromised 
links 
after having launched the stated number of node capture attacks. These two values give 
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us the proportion of compromised communication for the entire WSN. We perforrned 
5000 runs of the simulation for every set of node capture attacks to determine the average 
proportion of compromised nodes for a particular value n of node compromises. This 
provides us with a probability for the likelihood of a communication link being 
compromised after a certain number of sensor nodes within the WSN have been 
compromised. For all of these simulations, we assume that if the group leader sensor 
node is compromised the communication for the entire group becomes compromised 
because the node holds the master key. In a Heterogonous WSN group leader might have 
different characteristics from member sensor nodes. However we assume the likelihood 
of compromising the group leader node will be the same as other member sensor nodes. 
Node capture attacks on tree topology 
As discussed earlier we organise the entire WSN into groups. Each group has 100 sensor 
nodes and is structured as a tree topology. Each sensor node is connected to its parent and 
between I and 5 child sensor nodes. The number of child sensor nodes for each parent 
sensor node is selected randomly. Figure 5-2 (a) shows 100 sensor nodes organised in 
such a tree topology. 
12; %tip 
(c (d) 
Figure 5-2: (a): 100 sensor nodes in random tree topology. (b): Compromised 
links 
after the first random node capture attack. (c): Compromised 
links after the second 
node capture attack. (d): Compromised links after the third node capture attack. 
93 
Chapterfive: SADI-GKM Protocol Components 
In the simu ation process we assume every child sensor node shares a key with its parent 
sensor node. We assume that all keys will be successfully established using the process 
described in Section 511. After successful establishment of the WSN in a tree topology 
formation, we launch several node capture attacks. For each attack we randomly select a 
node and assume that it has been physically compromised, namely, all its stored data are 
known to the attacker. Since the data include encryption keys, all the communication 
links of the compromised sensor node will also be compromised. Moreover if the 
compromised sensor node is a parent node, all data sent by its child sensor nodes to the 
sink must pass through it, and consequently the communications links of all of these child 
sensor nodes should also be considered compromised. Figures 5-2 (b), (c) and (d) show 
the effects of one, two and three node capture attacks at different positions within the 
group respectively. The crosses indicate the compromised sensor nodes and highlighted 
lines between sensor nodes indicate compromised communication links resulting from 
the compromise of these sensor nodes. 
(H) Node capture attacks on grid topology 
This process is used to organise the entire WSN in a grid topology formation. We follow 
a similar process to that of the tree topology, managing the entire WSN in groups of 100 
sensor nodes. In a grid of 100 sensor nodes every sensor node has a maximum of 4 and a 
minimum of 2 neighbouring nodes, as shown in Figure 5-3 (a). 
Once the entire WSN has been established we start the testing process. 
"is is achieved 
similarly to the process for the tree topology where we randomly capture nodes. 
Once a 
node is physically compromised, we assume that all the communication 
links with its 
neighbouring nodes are compromised as well. Figures 5-3 
(b) and (c) visualize the 
compromised communication links after the physical compromises of 
two and four 
sensor nodes respectively. Figure 5-3 (d) shows this effect after 
the compromise of the 
group leader sensor node. 
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la) (b) 
(C) 
Figure 5-3: (a): 100 sensor nodes in a grid topology. (b): Compromised links after 
two random nodes capture attacks. (c): Compromised links after four node capture 
attacks. (d): Compromised links after the compromise of the group leader node (top 
left sensor node). 
For a better understanding of the process Figure 5-4 presents a further depiction of the 
compromised and uncompromised keys after n node capture attacks. The numbers 
indicate a sensor node's complement of uncompromised keys and the highlighted zeros 
therefore indicate the location of the compromised sensor nodes. For example, in Figure 
5-4, after the first attack one sensor node at location (7,4) is compromised, resulting in 
the compromise of the four shared keys with the four neighbouring sensor nodes. The 
compromised node therefore holds no uncompromised keys, while the four neighbouring 
sensor nodes each hold three uncompromised keys. Note that all communication links of 
a compromised sensor node with its neighbouring sensor nodes are compromised. 
Therefore for each compromised neighbour we subtract by one the number of 
uncompromised links from neighbouring sensor nodes. For each simulation we count the 
total communication links compared against the compromised communication links to 
find the probability for certain number of attacks. 
95 
Chapterfive. - SADI-GKM Protocol Components 
(7,4) 
2333333332 
134444444431 
134444444431 
134444444431 
134444444431 
134444444431 
134443444431 
134430344431 
134443444431 
12333333332ý 
(7,8) 
2333333332 
134444444431 
134444444431 
134444444431 
134444444431 
134444444431 
134443444331 
134430343021 
134443444331 
123333333321 
(1,6) 
2333332332 
134444303431 
134444434431 
134444444431 
134444444431 
134444444431 
134443444331 
134430343021 
134443444331 
12 3333333321 
(4,9) 
2333332332 
134444303431 
134444434431 
134444444421 
134444444301 
134444444421 
134443444331 
134430343021 
134443444331 
12 3333333321 
attack 2 "d attack 3d attack 4'h attack 
Figure 5-4: Random four node capture attacks in a group. 
At every simulation step we count the total communication links and compromised 
communication links to find the probability of communication compromises given certain 
number of attacks. We ran this process 5000 times to get an averaged probability figure. 
(III) Node capture attacks on random mesh topology 
The setup of the random mesh topology is different from those of the tree and grid 
topologies. In a random mesh topology we select neighbouring sensor nodes on the basis 
of radio ranges between sensor nodes. Effectively, all sensor nodes coming within a 
sensor node's radio range will form its neighbours. Nodes in every group are randomly 
deployed and assigned geographical coordinates (x, y). We assume that the radio range of 
every sensor node is 40 meters. The geographical area of each group is 150x 150 meters, 
containing 100 sensor nodes. Every sensor node in a group will establish communication 
links with its neighbouring sensor nodes falling in the range of 40 meters. Figure 5-5 
(a) 
shows the random mesh topology in a group. 
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(a) N 1c) d 
Figure 5-5: (a): 100 sensor nodes in a random mesh topology. (b): Compromised 
links after two random node capture attacks. (c): Compromised links after three 
node capture attacks. (d): Compromised links after four node capture attacks. 
As explained in Section 5.1.1, using DGKE every sensor node will store the number of 
keys according to its local neighbourhood density. Consequently if a sensor node has 10 
neighbouring sensor nodes, it will store 10 different keys. In a random mesh topology we 
select the number of neighbouring sensor nodes on the basis of radio ranges and therefore 
the number of keys stored in each sensor node will vary, in contrast to the situation with 
the grid topology. 
The simulation process for the random mesh topology is similar to those of the tree and 
grid topologies. Figures 5-5 (b), (c) and (d) show two, three and four node capture attacks 
at different positions within the group respectively. As described earlier, the crosses show 
the positions of compromised nodes and the highlighted lines between sensor nodes show 
compromised links. To find the probability of the total communication compromised we 
count the total communication links and compromised ones, thereby establishing the 
effect of node capture attacks. 
Conclusions 
Figure 5-6 shows the effect of node capture attacks on the tree, grid and random mesh 
topologies using groups, based on the results obtained from the simulations 
described 
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above. According to our simulation results, a WSN using the random mesh topology 
shows better resilience against node capture attacks than the grid and tree topologies. 
It is clear that the node capture attacks are more dangerous for the tree topology than the 
mesh topology because the tree topology has only one route from a child to its parent. If 
the parent is compromised, all data passing through the node from its children 
downwards will also be compromised. The results show a high risk associated with the 
use of tree topologies as compared to other topologies in terrns of node capture attacks. 
New and improve security protocols for tree topology might improve security but with 
high cost which can be easily achieve using other topologies like grid and random mesh. 
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Figure 5-6: Node capture attack on DGKE using different topologies. 
On the basis of these simulation results we have established useful 
information 
concerning the nature of node capture attacks. Tberefore during the 
design of our SADI- 
GKM protocol we have attempted to avoid sharing 
keys which are used for encryption 
and decryption, chosen appropriate neighbouring node 
densities, and been careful to 
allow the selection of an appropriate topology. 
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5.1.2 Importance of Group Leader Positions 
In this section we propose a formula for new group leader selection. This formula 
considers four different selection parameters: the energy of a candidate sensor node, the 
number of its neighbouring sensor nodes, the trust level of the sensor node and the 
position of the sensor node. As sensor nodes' energy is limited and they will stop 
working after finishing their available energy, it is understandable why energy is an 
important parameter in the group leader selection. Similarly the fewer the neighbours a 
sensor node has, the less suitable the sensor node is to be selected as a new group leader 
Furthennore a sensor node with low trust should also be avoided. All these parameters 
are very important in the selection process of a new group leader. However to verify the 
importance of the fourth parameter "position of a new group leader", we found it 
necessary to undertake some investigative analysis. This analysis, which we outline 
below, has shown us the importance of sensor node positions in the selection of a new 
group leader. 
In this evaluation process we have assumed a simple scenario as shown in Figure 5-7. 
a 
- 1 
31 
41 
a 
4 
Figure 5-7: Group leader positions and communications towards the sink. 
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Figure 5-8: Energy consumptions of a group with different positions for the group 
leader. 
During this simulation we have selected a group of 25 sensor nodes in a grid topology as 
shown in Figure 5-7. Each sensor node has one joule of energy. The packet size is 48 bits. 
We have placed the group leader sensor node at all possible positions in the group. In this 
evaluation process all sensor nodes sense and route data towards the group leader using 
an adaptive routing algorithm [162]. The group leader receives data from 24 nodes and 
aggregates all the data before finally routing it towards the sink. This entire process is 
considered to be one cycle. We measure the energy consumption of every single node in 
Joules usingfirst radio model described in Section 6.2, phase 3, which calculates the cost 
of transmitting and receiving packet of size k bits. These energy outcome values might be 
different in real applications where different sensor nodes are used with different radio 
models. We have run 100 cycles for each group leader and then calculated the energy 
consumption of the entire group as shown in Figure 5-8. We have also run the same 
simulation for a group of 100 sensor nodes, providing us with a large amount of useful 
information. in particular the sensor at position (2,2) is the most efficient which consume 
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0.310 Joules in comparison to the least efficient sensor node at position (0,0) which 
consumes 0.504 Joules which means the sensor node at position (0,0) consumes 20% 
more energy as compared to position (2,2). As shown in Figure 5-7, the group leader 
position in the middle helps to save energy consumptions. For better understanding we 
take an example if the battery life of every sensor node in a group is 10 hours and we 
select every sensor node in the group as group leader for 100 cycles. The sensor node at 
position (0,0) consumes 7 hours of its battery life where as node at position consumes 
only 5 hours of its battery life. These results clearly indicate that the position of the group 
leader has a direct affect on the performance of the entire group. Based on this, during the 
new group leader selection process we should use the node positions as a selection 
parameter. Further details about our proposed solution for the new group leader selection 
will be described in Section 5.2.2. 
Conclusions 
The outcome and results from our experiments show the importance of the group leader's 
position and its effect on the WSN performance. This importance will increase further as 
the size of the group increases, or as the packet size increases. With large group or packet 
sizes, the inappropriate selection of a new group leader can result in a large energy 
overhead. 
5.2 SADI-GKM Protocol Components 
This section presents our main protocol (SADI-GKM). To apply the SADI-GKM 
technique to a WSN, a number of assumptions are necessary in order to provide a 
consistent framework within which to work. It will also be useful for us to consider the 
requirements of our design. These are outlined in the following subsections. 
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5.2.1 Key Management and Secure Data Aggregation (First and Second Layer of 
SADI-GKM) 
Generally WSNs are scalable networks, and it is not uncommon for them to incorporate 
thousands or even millions of sensor nodes. Researchers have proposed a number of 
different network management protocols and schemes for large scale WSNs. A common 
idea proposed for the management of large-scale networks is that of splitting them into 
regions or small groups of nodes (logically or physically) using clustering, geographical 
division, topology etc. To deal with the scalability issue we therefore organise large-scale 
WSNs into small groups of sensor nodes with unique IDs. 
As for deployment, a Gaussian distribution can be used to establish a random group 
deployment of sensor nodes in some outdoor applications [78]. For indoor applications 
sensor nodes can easily be deployed in groups. However, we do not intend to consider the 
issue of node deployment in detail at this stage. The notations to be used for the protocol 
presentation are summarised as follows: 
GI Group ID 
NI Node ID in group 
ID Node ID in network (concatenation of GI and NI) 
MkGI Symmetric master key shared between sink SI and group leader GI 
A Encrypted data of node IDj 
MGI Encrypted data of group leader node GI 
Ksj,, Di Symmetric key shared between node ID, and the sink 
ST This key is used for the 
encryption and decryption of data collected by ID, 
KGI,, Di Symmetric key shared between node M and its group leader node GI 
VGI Key/secret shared among all the sensor nodes in group GI 
Ua, b Key/secret shared only between neighbouring group 
leaders a and b 
TSIDj Time stamp for node ID, 
TSGI Time stamp for group leader node GI 
di Sensed data by node ID, 
xilyi Hash values calculated by sensor node/group 
leader node 
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(a) Key Pre-distribution Phase 
in the first phase of key pre-distribution the following steps are performed. This occurs 
before the deployment of the sensor nodes in groups: 
Assign a global unique ID to each sensor node. This global ID is comprised of a 
group ID, GI and an ID within the group, NI (see Figure 5-9). 
Assign a unique group master keyMkGIto every group leader in the WSN- 
Assign a unique value VGI to each group of sensor nodes, used for authentication 
inside the group. 
Assign a unique value Ua, b to every pair of neighbouring group leader sensor 
nodes. 
Generate and store a unique key &I, a using the corresponding group master key 
MkG1 and a sensor node ID for every group member sensor node. 
Assign a unique key Ksj,, Di to every sensor node ID, (note: this key need only be 
assigned if we require the aggregation of data in an encrypted form at group 
leader sensor nodes). 
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Figure 5-9: Organization of sensor groups. 
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In the example illustrated in Figure 5-9, a sensor node has a global ID of the form 
02000002, with the initial three digits representing GI (group ID) and the last five digits 
representing NI (local node ID in a group GI). Algorithm 5-1 shows the complete pre- 
distribution process. According to step 2 there will be no master key stored in any 
member sensor nodes. These steps should be performed by an administrator prior to 
deployment. It is important to emphasise that sensor nodes in all groups will use different 
keys KGjjD for encryption purposes in order to provide better confidentiality (as discussed 
in section 5.1.1). The reason for keeping the master key MkG, at the leader of each group 
GI is to allow it to decrypt the encrypted data received from the member sensor nodes in 
its group. In every single group data will be encrypted at source sensor nodes and is only 
decrypted at the group leader node for data aggregation purposes, as will be explained in 
later sections. 
- Pre deployment - 
Step 1: Node IDformation 
Concatenation of Group ID and Node IDforms a unique IDfor each node in 
the Network 
ID (-- join (GI, NI) 
Step 2: Group key generationfor node ID 
if ID =join (GI, 00) then //Check if the node is a group leader 
KGI, ID 
<-- Mk(;, //Assign a group leader master key Mk(;, to the node 
Else 
KGI, ID <- hash (MkG,, ID) //Assign a group member key to the node 
End if 
Step 3: Sink key generalionjor node ID only if secure data aggregation is required 
Ksj., D <- a key shared with the sink 
Step 4: Slore KGIID, VGi, Ksi. iD 
Algorithm 5-1: Pre-distribution phase. 
Data Transmission Phase 
We first discuss the functions of each non-group-leader sensor node, which are defined in 
Algorithm 5-2 as part of the proposed protocol. Suppose that after successful 
deployment 
of the sensor nodes, an event occurs. In the step I of the 
Send function in Algorithm 5-2, 
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an event source node with its identity IDj will collect and encrypt the event data d, with 
its key Ksj,, Di shared with the sink to produce Ci. To enable data freshness checking by the 
group leader of node M for the detection of a replication attack, we produce a value M, 
by re-encrypting Ci with a time stamp TSID, using the key KGI,, Di shared between node ID, 
and its group leader GI, where "C, I TSID, " in EKG, 
, ID, 
(Ci I TSID, ) signifies the concatenation 
of Ci and TSiDi. 
In step 2, node IDi produces an authentication code Xi by hashing Mi, the key/secret VG1 
shared among all the group members, ID, and TSjDj, for communication with 
neighbouring sensor nodes. After finding a correct neighbouring sensor node using its 
energy level and direction value, sensor node ID, sends out (X,, Mi, ID', TS, ). The value X, 
will be used by the receiver sensor node to authenticate the received information and 
TSjDj is used to avoid replay attacks. 
When the neighbouring sensor node receives the information, it produces an 
authentication code Xj by hashing the received items (M, M, TSID) with shared key VGI, 
and compares it against Xi for the purposes of authentication, as illustrated in the Receive 
function of Algorithm 5-2. If successful, the received data are forwarded to the next 
neighbour. In this way, we avoid encryption and decryption at every single hop to reduce 
the usage of limited recourses available to the nodes. 
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- Group member nodes - 
Send () IH Works inside a group 
Step 1: Collect, encrypt and assign sensed data to variable Mj 
di Sensed_data 
Cj EKsjIDj (dj) 
Mj EKG,, 
IdCi 
I TSIDi) 
Step 2: Send out encrypted data Mi, hash value Xj, source node ID, and time stamp TSIDi 
Xj <- hash (Mi, VGI, IDj, TSDj) 
Retum (Xi, Mi, IDj, TSDi) 
Receive (X., Mi, IDi, TSi) I 
Step 1: Authenticate the sender node 
X'j <- hash (Mj, VGI, IDj, TS) 
If X'i =X and TSj is fresh then 
Step 2: Forward received data to next neighbour towards group leader 
Return (Xi, Mi, ID, TSj) 
Else 
Abort and report to group leader GI 
Algorithm 5-2: Group member nodes. 
Second, each group leader sensor node has additional responsibilities, including secure 
data aggregation, integrity checking and authenticate communication with other group 
leaders. Algorithm 5-3 illustrates the functions performed by each group leader sensor 
node. 
As shown in the Receive function of Algorithm 5-3, when a group leader sensor node 
receives data, it will first check whether the data are from another group leader node or a 
U, b used member node, based on two calculated hashes 
XG, and Xj. Here, secrets VGI and ' 
for the calculation of the hashes are stored in the sensor node prior to its deployment. In 
the case where the data are from a member node (i. e. Xi = Yj), the 
leader sensor node 
applies its master key MkGj and received identity IDi to compute shared 
key &j, jDj for the 
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decryption of Mi to recover Ci and TSID, It saves Cj if TSiDi is fresh, and discards Ci 
otherwise. The successful decryption of A can also be used to authenticate source sensor 
node IDi and check data integrity. After the data from all expected group member sensor 
nodes have been received, the leader sensor node invokes the Send function of Algorithm 
5-3. 
If the data is from another group leader (i. e. XG, = Yj) and TSj is fresh, then the received 
data are forwarded to the next appropriate group leader on the route to the sink. 
We intend to apply SADI-GKM to different applications. Therefore for the secure 
communication between groups, we can establish key management according to the 
structure of applications. For example, we adopt the assumption used in LEACH [ 139], 
namely, each group leader node has a larger communication range than an ordinary one 
so that neighbouring group leader nodes can communicate with one another directly. This 
assumption can also be considered in order to allow non-group- leader sensor nodes to 
mediate communications between group leaders. 
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- Group Leader Nodes - 
Send () t 
Step 1: Compute aggregated data DGI ftom encrypted data, Cl, ..., C" received from group member nodes 
n 
DGi *- (EC) mod Z O<D<Z 
i=l 
Step 2: Encrypt DG, and TSGi to produce MG, 
MGI *- Em kGl (DGIý TSGI) 
Step 3: Send out encrypted data Mul, hash value YGI, group identity GI, and time stamp TSGI 
ftom group leader sensor node a in group GI to group leader b 
YGI '(- haSh (MGh Ua, bq GIi TSGI) 
Retum Mi, MG Gl, TSGI) 
Receive (Yi, Mi,, IDj, TS; ) I 
Step 1: Check ifthe data are comingfrom a member node or another group leader 
XGI, (- hash (MjqUa, bq mg Tsi) 
Xj (-- hash (Mi, VGI, ID, 7S, ) 
If Xj = Yj then H Data from a member node 
Step2: Decrypt Alfj using key KGI,, Di where KGI,, Di= hash(MkG,, lD, ), to recover Ci and TSID, 
(Cii 7SIDi) (-- E'KGj, lDi(Afý) 
if TSjDj is fresh then 
Save Ci 
If Cj is the last value received then 
Step 3: Send out aggregated data 
Send () 
Else 
Discard Cj and report to sink 
Else if Xc,, = Yi and 75ý is fresh then 
Step 4: Forward the data receivedftom a group leader to another group leader towards the sink 
Return (Yj, M, ID, M) 
Else 
Abort and report to sink 
Algorithm 5-3: Group leader nodes. 
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For the Send function of Algorithm 5-3, the encrypted data items (CI, ... ..., Cn) are first 
aggregated to produce DGI using homomorphic encryption as described in section 3.2. We 
note that the value of Z must be chosen large enough to prevent overfiow. As with 
Algorithm 5-2, it is necessary to encrypt DG, and a time stamp TSGI with the keyMkGl., 
shared with the sink, for the purposes of data authentication and freshness checking. The 
Send ftinction also uses the secret U,,, b, shared among a pair of neighbouring group leader 
sensor nodes a and b, and a time stamp TSGI to produce an authentication code YGI to 
deter replay attacks. Finally, the data items (YGI, MGI, GI, TSGI) are sent to the first 
neighbouring group leader sensor node on the route to the sink. 
Third, Algorithm 5-4 explains the decryption process performed by the sink. We assume 
the sink has all the keys Ua, bq MkGj and Ksj,, Di shared with the group leaders and sensor 
nodes. Once the data have been received at the sink it will go through a process to verify 
the source group leader (i. e. by checking that Yik = YGI and TSGI is fresh). However the 
YGI can be forged if a group leader node is compromised. Step 2 ensures that the time 
stamp and data have not been altered by a compromised group leader (i. e. E" MkGAMi) and 
TS'GI = TSGI) otherwise the sink should discard the received information and take 
appropriate actions. If step I and 2 are successful then step 3 will be performed to 
retrieve the aggregated data as shown in Algorithm 5-4. 
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- Sink Node - 
Receive (YGI, MGI, GI, TSGI) I 
Step]: Authenticate the sender group leader 
Y, j4, E- hash 
(MG1, U,,, b, GI, TSGI) 
If Yj4 = YGi and TSGI is fresh then 
Step2: Decrypt MG, using master key MkG, to recover DG, and TSGI. 
(DGjq TSGI) '(- ElMkGAMGI) 
If TSGj = TSGI then 
Step3: Get the aggregated data 
n 
(DGi- Ksi, iDi )) mod Z 
Else 
Abort and take actions 
Algorithm 54: Sink node. 
The sink can calculate the averageu asu = Sln. To calculate the variance 0-2 every sensor 
node needs to send the square of each sensed value to its group leader so the variance can 
be calculated as oý = Sln _ P2 where S, is the sum of the squared value of each sensor 
node. If the group leader node is interested to find the minimum or maximum values from 
received encrypted values, we can use the Order Preserving Encryption Scheme for 
Numeric Data (OPES) [164]. This scheme allows comparisons to be directly applied to 
encrypted data. Existing results have shown that homomorphic encryption is a cost 
effective so lution for secure data aggregation in sensor networks [ 165 ]. 
5.2.2 Secure Group Leader Selection (Layer three) 
In this section we propose a formula for new group leader selection. In this formula we 
consider four important factors in the selection process. These factors include available 
energy, trust level, number of neighbouring nodes and position of a new group leader 
node. During the selection process the available energy El and trust level T, need to be 
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greater than the thresholds 8 and a respectively, to become eligible for new group leader 
selection. 
This formula can be used for different applications with respect to different 
communication behaviours of sensor nodes. For example in some applications sensors 
might use different radio ranges with respect to distances between different sensor nodes 
as described in the previous chapter. In such applications we measure the space S, 
between source sensor nodes and the current group leader using distance dl. However in 
applications where a fixed radio range is used for communication between sensor nodes, 
we measure the space S, between source nodes and the current group leader using hops hi. 
Furthermore our proposed formula can also be used in heterogeneous WSNs where 
different sensor nodes have different energy requirements. However, existing solutions 
for group leader selection/election have only used energy or the number of neighbouring 
sensor nodes as their main election criteria [ 140,160,13 9,161 ]. 
We have used the following notation in our proposed formula: 
S, Space between source sensor node I and the group leader. 
d, Distance between sensor node 1 and the group leader. 
h, Number of hops between sensor node 1 and the group leader. 
6 Energy threshold level. 
a Trust threshold level. 
We Weighting factor for energy. 
WSI Weighting factor for the space between sensor node 
I and the group leader node, 
where ws, can be wdlor WhI. which are two different weighting 
factors for d, and 
h, respectively. 
Wt Weighting factor for trust. 
El Available energy of sensor node 1. 
T, Trust level of sensor node 1. 
N, Number of neighbouring sensor nodes. 
W, Selection value of sensor node 1 in the process of new group 
leader selection. 
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In the new group leader selection process, the current group leader will send a selection 
process packet to specific nodes that are to participate in the selection process. All 
participant nodes will calculate their selection value W1 using the formula shown below, 
and send it to the current group leader: 
Wi = (EI x w) + (T, x wt) + (NI x w) +(1+ wsl) si 
If El> 6 and T, >a and N, >0 and S, = d, or hl> 0, 
otherwise W, = 0. 
In this formula we multiply available energy El with weighting factor w,, trust T, with 
trust weighting factor wl, N1 with its weighting factor w,, and S1 with its weighting factor 
w,,, and then add them together to calculate W1, in order to help us during simulation to 
evaluate the affect of each parameter during the selection process. Any node with Wj=O 
will not be selected as a new group leader. In order to participate in the group leader 
selection, the current sensor node's available energy El, trust level T, and number of 
neighbouring sensor nodes N, need to be greater than the thresholds 6, Ct and zero 
respectively. We note that IISI gives a higher value when a sensor node is closer to the 
current group leader. 
The group leader sensor node will determine the highest value of W, in order to select a 
new group leader sensor node. The current group leader will then broadcast a message 
containing the new group leader ID to all its group member sensor nodes. Furthermore 
the current group leader will send the master key and any keys shared with other groups 
to the new group leader. For future communication all data should then be routed toward 
the new group leader sensor node. 
In the given formula we calculate the selection value W, using four 
different factors by 
adding the values of the energy factor, trust factor, number of neighbouring nodes 
factor 
and distance between group leader and node factor. If node I 
has the highest energy 
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above the threshold 6, more than one neighbouring nodes (NI > 0) and is close to the 
current group leader (SI) but the trust T, is less then the threshold a, then the node will 
have W, =0 and be automatically ruled out as a future group leader. Similarly the other 
factors will play roles in much the same way. 
According to the results described earlier in Section 5.1.2, we don't involve all group 
member sensor nodes in the selection process. As nodes closer to the current group leader 
are more ideal for performing the role of the new group leader as compared to sensor 
nodes that are further away. Therefore we only involve the limited number of sensor 
nodes around the current group leader in the selection process. This will help us to reduce 
the energy cost during the selection process. This is in contrast with existing proposed 
solutions, which involve all group members in their election or selection process, thereby 
consuming extra energy as a result. This is another advantage of our proposed scheme. 
The formula above can be coded into all group member nodes. Whenever a group leader 
requests a member node's selection value, the node will calculate it using this formula 
and send it to the group leader. We will describe in detail the implementation of this 
group leader selection process in Chapter 6. 
Moreover our current solution is also scalable. The number of participant nodes can be 
increased by sending participation packets to more nodes during the new group leader 
selection process. For example, the current group leader can only send participation 
packets to first hop neighbours or to first and second hops neighbours and so on. 
In our present solution we do not consider issues when member sensor nodes send out 
false information (e. g. using incorrect trust levels for selection value calculations) in 
order to be selected as a new group leader. This is an area of ongoing research which we 
hope to tackle in future work. 
5.2.3 Key Management for MSNs (Layer four) 
In the previous chapter we briefly described our proposed key management solution 
for 
MSNs. In this section we will explain in detail about the solutions. 
Before going into 
further details we first present the security policy that we apply to 
MSNs. 
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5.23.1 Security policyfor MSNs 
We can establish different security policies for mobile sensor nodes when they roam from 
one group to another. After successful authentication, a new incoming mobile sensor 
node can only access limited services in the host group, for example to communicate with 
only a single host group member sensor node. Moreover the guest mobile sensor node 
might have many neighbouring sensor nodes within its communication range but 
according to the security policy, a guest sensor node is only entitled to communicate with 
one host sensor node. Furthermore the new mobile sensor node will not be involved in 
any internal operations of the group such as data aggregation, group leader selection, etc. 
The initial service available to the guest mobile sensor node will be routing. 
The host group will establish future relations (similar to granting a membership) with the 
guest mobile sensor node on the basis of its past performance and behaviour history 
inside the group. Once the guest mobile sensor node achieves a membership of the group, 
it can then establish communication links with more than one sensor node, and participate 
in sensing and new group leader selection operations. These policies can be defined 
according to the target application nature and its security requirements. 
The future stay of mobile guest sensor nodes in the host group will be monitored on the 
basis of a trust point system. If a guest sensor node performs a malicious activity it will 
be marked down with a negative trust point. The host group will make a decision based 
on these trust points as to whether to refuse or extend a ftirther stay of the guest sensor 
node within the group. 
In summary a group leader sensor node will allow a guest mobile sensor node to establish 
a secure communication link (through the sharing of a session key) with only a single 
sensor node, i. e. a new incoming sensor node will have only one neighbouring sensor 
node. The new sensor node can then only communicate through this one sensor node. We 
enforce such restrictions according to the threat level of the target application. 
Furthermore a group leader will grant more rights to incoming sensor nodes to establish 
secure communication links according to their trust levels. 
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5. Z3.2 Keypool based authentication for MSNs 
In this solution we extend SADI-GKM for key establishment with the addition of a 
probabilistic key based idea for mobile sensor node authentication. This extended SADI- 
GKM pre-distribution phase includes the following activities: 
1. Assign a unique ID to each sensor node, which is a combination of its group ID, 
GI, and its own ID, NT 
2. Assign a unique master keyMkGI tOthe leader of group GI and its member sensor 
nodes. 
3. Pre-load k (key ring) keys from key pool S, which the mobile and static sensor 
nodes use for intra and inter group authentication. 
4. Assign a unique valueUa, b to every pair of neighbouring group leader sensor 
nodes a and b. 
5. Generate and store a unique key KGI, a using the master key MkG, and node ID of 
each sensor node. 
6. Assign a unique key Ksjja to every sensor node ID, (note: this key need only be 
assigned if we require the aggregation of data in an encrypted form at group 
leader nodes). 
As Ksl,, Di is a unique encryption key for each sensor node in the WSN, therefore 
it will 
not change even after the mobile sensor node roams from one group to another. However 
we do need to update the authentication keys which will be tackled later in this section. 
Note that we assume the initial group IDs for the nodes are known in advance, 
however 
once deployed the protocol allows nodes to move between groups unrestricted. 
We have amended the step 4 of the original SADI-GKM pre-distribution phase as shown 
above. According to the amended step 4, the k keys will be preloaded 
from the key pool S 
into every sensor node before deployment, whereas 
in the original SADI-GKM ever. \ 
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sensor node in each group G1 is preloaded with a value VGI for authentication inside the 
group and every group Gli has a different VGjj. 
We are interested to find the probability of key sharing when a mobile sensor node moves 
from one group to another. We need to use a probabilistic key establishment idea in the 
case when a mobile sensor node moves from one group to another. What will be the 
probability that it can establish at least one link with any member of the new group? 
When a mobile sensor node moves from one place to another, we calculate the 
probability P of any specific node within the group being within radio range. We need to 
find the probability that the mobile sensor node can establish at least one link with one of 
its neighbouring sensor nodes. We do this by assuming the sensor nodes lie on a plane 
and that the radio coverage of a sensor node is circular with radius r. The area of radio 
coverage for the sensor node is therefore the area of a circle ir x rý. If the overall area of 
the group is represented by A then the proportion of the group within the radio range of a 
single node can therefore be represented by D where 
ir xr2 
A 
Here r is the radio range of the mobile sensor node in metres, A is the area of the new 
group, measured in rn 2 and the constant ;r represents the ratio of the circumference of a 
circle to its diameter. 
Having established D we need to find the probability that this sensor node shares a key 
with one of its neighbours. Furthermore we have already described in our security policy 
that initially a guest sensor node will be allowed to communicate with only one sensor 
node, depending on the given security requirements. 
Given D as above, group size N and probability P that two given nodes 
do not share a key, 
the probability that the mobile sensor node does not share a 
key with any of its 
neighbours can be calculated as follows. 
Pr ý::::: KI - D) + (D x P)l 
N-0 
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The formula (1) includes the chance of a given node falling outside the radio range of the 
mobile node is (I - D). The chance that it is within the radio range but shares no key ýk ith 
the mobile node is (D x P). The chance that it is not possible to communicate with the 
node for either reason is therefore the sum of these two probabilities. Finally the 
probability P, for N nodes is therefore this probability powered to the N-th degree. 
Work on existing probabilistic key management solutions (key pool based ideas) has 
attempted to find the probability of establishing a secure link between a pair of sensor 
nodes. For example, according to the Basic Probabilistic scheme [72], if the size of the 
key pool S is 10,000 and 75 keys (k = 75, key ring) are preloaded in every sensor node, 
then the probability of sharing at least one key between a pair of nodes is 0.5. They 
formulated the probability that two sensor nodes do not share any keys as: 
((S - k) 
! )2 
p=-. (2) 
(S - 2k)! S! 
By simplifying the expression of equation (2) we get: 
k) 
)2(S-k+l) 2 
. 2k (S-2k+ 
I) 
s)2 
By substituting equation (3) into equation (1) we get: 
k)1)2(S-k+ -I) 
(0 2 
P,, D) + (D x- 
S 
2k ) (s 
2k+ 
s 
117 
Chapterfive: SADI-GKM Protocol Components 
The probability of the mobile sensor node being able to establish one link out of the D 
N neighbouring sensors is 
Pr. 
Substituting the values from equation (4) we get 
. 
k) 
1) 
2(S-k+ -I) 
s2 
(5) 
2k (S-2k+') 
s)i 
Equation (5) will give the probability for the mobile sensor node to establish at least one 
link (enabling it to authenticate itself), given that we know the group area A and size N, 
mobile node radio range r, key pool size S and key ring size k. 
The main purpose of finding the probability for a mobile node to share a key in the host 
group is authentication. Therefore the probability needs to be sufficiently high for the 
mobile node to authenticate itself to the new group. This formula also helps to find the 
probabilities of mobile sensor node authentication at different positions in the host group 
which we will revisit in section 6.3.9. 
5.3 Summary 
In this chapter we have described in detail all layers of our protocol stack. We began by 
describing our pre-design investigations. These investigations are important part of our 
research, which resulted in the identification of some core information needed to help us 
towards the development of an efficient protocol. In the detailed design section we 
described each of the four layers. For the first and second layers, key management and 
secure data aggregation, we described the basic key management and secure data 
algorithms together. Then we explained the third layer, secure group leader selection, 
where we have presented our novel formula for new secure group leader selection. 
In the 
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fourth layer we presented a key management solution for MSNs and an authentication 
model for mobile sensor nodes. 
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Chapter Six: SADI-GKM Implementation and 
Evaluation 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter described the model of our novel SADI-GKM protocol for WSNs. 
In this chapter we present the evaluation and implementation of our work. As our work is 
divided into four different layers, we have therefore evaluated the performance of each of 
these layers separately and compared them with existing proposed schemes from the 
literature. We describe the performance evaluation process and discuss the different 
simulation scenarios used to show the performance of each layer of our protocol. To 
begin, we have implemented the first layer of SADI-GKM and tested its resilience 
against node capture attacks using different topologies (tree, grid and random mesh). The 
purpose of this is to determine the level of topology independence by simulating node 
capture attack using various topologies. We also aim to show that it is more resilient 
against node capture and replication attacks than existing schemes by simulating node 
captures and detecting the fraction of total communication comprised for different 
schemes in WSN. Further we have implemented the second layer (secure data 
aggregation) to establish the impact on energy use of various encryption schemes during 
secure data aggregation. We simulate each encryption technique and run them over a 
number of cycles to compare energy use. For the third layer (secure group leader 
selection) we aim to show the group leader selection scheme is efficient by simulating the 
process with a variety of factors to establish optimum values such as selection frequency. 
Finally the fourth layer (key management for MSNs) of our proposed protocol extends 
the protocol for MSNs- We test the applicability of key management in mobile 
environment. 
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6.2 Implementation Phases and Simulation Framework 
We have written our simulation framework and undertaken our project implementation in 
Java (JDK. 1.6). As described earlier our protocol contains four different layers, each 
performing a different function. Each layer has been implemented as a distinct program 
with links to the programs of the other layers. The first step of our implementation was 
topology creation, since we needed to test our proposed solution on different topologies. 
For this we have implemented tree, grid and random mesh topologies. Furthermore we 
have implemented an adaptive routing algorithm on the top of these topologies. The 
advantage of using Java is that it has its own built-in security packages for encryption and 
decryption. We will explain in detail about the topology, routing and security packages in 
later sub-sections. 
Phase 1: Topology Creation 
(a) Tree Topology Setup 
As discussed in section 5.2.1, we organise the entire WSN into groups of sensor nodes. 
Each group has 100 sensor nodes and is structured as a tree topology. Each sensor node is 
connected to its parent and between one and five child sensor nodes. The number of child 
sensor nodes for each sensor node is selected randomly. Figure 6-1 shows 100 sensor 
nodes organised in such a tree topology. Algorithm 6-1 describes the tree construction 
process. In the first step we select the total number of sensor nodes. In the second step the 
tree construction process selects a single node as the parent node for the entire group; 
then a random function will select the number of its child sensor nodes (between a 
minimum of one and a maximum of five). Further every child node will be selected as a 
parent node to select its child nodes. This process runs repeatedly until all sensor nodes 
have been assigned children. Moreover for the simulation process we assume every child 
node shares a key with its parent node. 
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Figure 6-1: 100 sensor nodes in a random tree topology. 
int u=O; 
for(int i=O; i<tn; i++) I // tn is number of total nodes in group 
if (totalnodes>O) f // if all nodes are assigned as child nodes 
n[il. parent=p; // assigning parent node 
r=no. nextInt(max)+l; 
n[i]. left=node 
- 
c+l; assigning left most child 
for(int j=O; j<r; j++) assigning child nodes 
//child assign 
if(tp<total_n) Change if you want to change number of Childs 
tp=++node_c; tp is temp, variable 
n[i] child(u]=tp; 
if(r==j+l) //Assign Slib of every node 
n(i] slib[u]=O; 
else 
n(i] slib[u]=tp+l; 
u++; 
n[ij. right=node_c; // assigning right most child 
totalnodes-=r; 
U=O; 
P++; 
Algorithm 6-1: Random tree topology construction with maximum five child nodes. 
(b) Grid Topology Setup 
This process is used to organise the entire WSN in a grid topology 
formation. We follow 
a similar process to that of the tree topology, managing the entire 
WSN in groups of 100 
sensor nodes. In a grid of 100 sensor nodes every sensor node 
has a maximum of four and 
a minimum of two neighbouring sensor nodes, as shown 
in Figure 6-2. The java code for 
constructing this grid topology and assigning keys to relative sensor nodes are presented 
in Algorithm 6-2. 
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Figure 6-2: 100 sensor nodes in a grid topology. 
Random n=new Randomo; 
for(int u=C; u<100; u++) simulation run times 
for(r=O; r<Max; r++) 
for(c=O; c<Max; c++) 
if ((r==Min && c==Min) 11 (r==Min && c==Max-1) 
11 (r==Max-1 && c==Max-1) 
a[rlfcl=2; check=1; 
I 
else if ((r<max-1 && (c==Min 11 c==Max-1)) 
11 (c<max-I && (r==Min 11 r==Max-1))) 
a[rl[cl=3; check=2; 
else 
a [r] (c]=4; check=3; 
11 (r==Max-1 && c==Min) 
Algorithm 6-2: Grid topology construction with maximum four and minimum two 
neighbouring nodes. 
, (-I Random Mesh Topology Setup IV 
The setup of the random mesh topology is different from those of the tree and grid 
topologies. In a random mesh topology we select neighbouring sensor nodes on the basis 
of radio ranges between sensor nodes. Effectively, all sensor nodes coming within the 
radio range of a sensor node will form its neighbours. Sensor nodes in every group are 
randomly deployed and assigned geographical coordinates (x, y) as shown in Algorithm 
6-3. We assume that the radio range of every sensor node is 40 m. The geographical area 
of each group is 150x 150 m2 containing 100 sensor nodes. Every sensor node in a group 
will establish communication links with its neighbouring sensor nodes failing 
in the range 
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of 40 m. Figure 6-3 shows the random mesh topology in a group. The pseudo code for 
constructing this random mesh topology is presented in Algorithm 6-3. 
Figure 6-3: 100 sensor nodes in a random mesh topology. 
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for (int i=O; i<Max; i++) Initializing sensor nodes 
ne[i]=new Nodeo 
Random n=new Randomo; 
int x=O, y=O, check=O, ct=0; 
for(int i=O; i<Max*2; i++) // Deploy nodes randomly: 
x=n. nextInt(Field); // Position of sensor nodes 
y=n. nextInt(Field); 
for(int j=O; j<Max; j++) 
if (row[jl==x && col[jl==y) I 
check=l; j+=100; // Break this loop 
I 
if (check==O) 
if(ct<Max) 
row[ctl=x; col[ctl=y; ct++; 
else i+=Max*3; 
else check=O; 
assign random coordinates 
I 
for(int i=O; i<Max; i++) tempr[il=row(i]; tempc[i]=col(i]; 
for(int s=O; s<500; s++) // Simulations runs 
//Reassign the nodes to same positions 
for(int i=O; i<Max; i++) I 
row[i]=tempr[i]; col[i]=tempc[i); 
Establishing the links with neighbouring nodes 
for(int i=O; i<Max; i++) ( 
rr=row[i]; cc=col[i]; 
for(int j=O; j<Max; j++) 
r=row[j]; c=col[j]; 
if (! (r==rr && c==cc)) 
if ((r>=rr-range && c>=cc) && (r>=rr-range && c<=cc+range) 
&& (r<rr && c>cc) && (r<=rr && c<=cc+range)) 
count++; ne[i1. r(j1=row[j1; ne(i]. c[j)=col[j]; 
else if ( (r>=rr-range && c<=cc) && (r>=rr-range && c>=cc-range) 
(r<=rr && c>=cc-range) && (r<=rr && c<=cc) 
count++; ne [i] r [j I=row(j I; ne [i] c[jl=col[j I 
else if ( (r>=rr && c>=cc-range) && (r<=rr+range && c<=cc) 
&& (r<=rr+range && C<=cc) && (r>rr && c<=Cc) 
count++; ne[i] r [j] =row[j I; ne[i] c[jl=col [j] ; 
else if ( (r>=rr && c>cc) && (r<=rr+range && c>=cc) && (r<=rr+range 
&& c<=cc+range) && (r<=rr+range && c<=cc+range)) 
count++; ne [i] r[j I=row[j I; ne[i] c[i I=col [i I; 
) // closing if used to stop duplication 
//closing loop 
node[i]=count; count=O; 
//closing for loop 
//closing for loop 
Algorithm 6-3: Random mesh topology construction. 
Phase 2: Routing Algorithms 
We have used the adaptive routing given in (166,162] 
during our implementation. This 
routing algorithm will find a suitable neighbour, which will 
help to route data towards the 
sink. 
125 
Chapter six: SADI-GKM Implementation and Evaluation 
We have chosen this adaptive routing algorithm due to ever changing traffic in our 
simulated networks. We have assigned a Directional Value (DV) to each sensor node. 
This Directional Value helps to route data towards the sink or a group leader sensor node, 
and helps the sink or group leader to find the location of a source sensor node. In all cases 
the final destination will be the sink or a group leader sensor node, so each sensor node 
knows in which direction to send its packets. Using our routing algorithm a sensor node 
can compute a suitable direction towards the sink or its group leader sensor node. The 
best route depends on the minimum Directional Value and the maximum energy available. 
As global routing has a huge amount of overhead and cannot be practically applied to 
WSNs [166], it is appropriate to use a local routing. The method to be presented below 
makes use of local information for routing data, including the remaining power of a 
sensor node, the number of its neighbours, the number of hops between the source and 
destination nodes9 and the sum of the remaining power of the next neighbours. 
The routing algorithm given below routes the data from different directions towards the 
sink or a group leader sensor node: 
So, Source row 
So, Source column 
Der Destination row 
Dec Destination column 
Sir Sink row 
sic Sink column 
If De, = Si, AND De, = Si, then 
This is the Sink or Group leader 
Else 
If ISo, -Si, l > IDe, -Si, l OR ISo,, -Si, l > 
IDe, -Si, l then 
Send data in this direction 
Else 
Stop data in this direction 
End if 
End if 
t 
Figure 64: All of the possible directions the algorithm can use to route 
data. 
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We have tested the above algorithm with the settings shown in Figures 6-5. It should be 
noted that in the algorithm, a destination node refers to a source node neighbour, which 
may not be the sink or group leader sensor node. We use Figure 6-5 as an example to 
explain how the algorithm works. In this example, we use the notation (group leader ID, 
source node x, source node y) to represent a position of a sensor node in the topology. 
Suppose that sensor node (1,1,1) wants to send data to group leader (1,3,3). Now the 
source sensor node (1,1,1) can either select sensor node (1,1,2) or (1,2,1) as a destination 
node because both nodes can forward the data to the group leader. If node (1,1,2) is 
selected,, it will receive the data from (1,1,1) and then become a source sensor node to 
forward the received data to another node. Node (1,1,2) has three neighbouring sensor 
nodes but can only select node (1,1,3) or (1,2,2) for sending the data forward because 
these two neighbouring sensor nodes are leading towards or closer to the group leader 
sensor node. Suppose that (1,1,3) is selected as a destination. When (1,1,3) receives the 
data, it will then act as a source. Similarly (1,1,3) has three neighbours but only two of 
them, (1,1,4) and (1,2,3), could lead towards the group leader. At this point the algorithm 
will select node (1,2,3) as a destination instead of (1,1,4), because (1,2,3) is closer to the 
group leader than (1,1,4). Similarly node (1,2,3) becomes a source and will send the 
received data to node(1,3,3) which in this case is the group leader sensor node. 
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26 Nodes on Floor including sink 
Figure 6-5: 25 nodes arranged in a grid including a group 
leader [1621. 
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Phase 3: Radio Model 
We use the same radio model as LEACH [3-28], which is widely used by many 
researchers [167 - 171]. Currently, there is a great deal of research in the area Of low- 
energy radios. Different assumptions about radio characteristics, including energy 
dissipation in transmit and receive modes, will change the advantages of different 
protocols. In our work, we assume a simple model where the radio dissipates E,,,, = 50 
nJ/bit to run the transmitter or receiver circuitry and c "MP = 100 pJ/b it/m 
2 for the transmit 
amplifier to achieve an acceptable EbIN,, (see Figure 6-6 and Table 6-1). We also assume 
a d2 energy loss due to channel transmission (where d is the distance of transmission). 
Thus, to transmit a k-bit message with a distance d, the radio would expend the following 
energy based on this radio model [139,167 - 171]: 
ET, (k, d) = ET,,,,, (k) + ET,,. p (k, d) 
In other words, the energy required is the sum of the energy needed to run the transmitter 
circuitry for k bits and the energy needed for the transmit amplifier to allow the k-bit 
message to be sent a distance d. Since the transmitter circuitry requirements remain 
constant per bit, and the amplifier requirements are proportional to the square of the 
distance to be transmitted, we can see that this is equivalent to the following energy 
requirements. 
ET, (k, a) ý (EelecXk)+(Campxkxcf) (1) 
To receive this message, the radio expends the following: 
ER,, ER., -elec 
In this case the energy requirements are just those of the receiver circuitry, which remain 
constant per bit received. Hence we can see that this is equivalent to the 
following energy 
requirements. 
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ER, (k) == Eele, xk (2) 
--- 
ET 
ecrr: ),, Li 
k 
Figure 6-6: First order radio model [1391. 
ET, (k, d) is required in order to calculate the cost of transmitting the packets over 
distanced and ER, (k) value is important in order to get the receiving cost of a packet. 
Operation Energy Dissipated 
Transmitter Electronics (ETx-elec) 
Receiver Electronics (ER,, jec) 50 nJ/bit 
(ETx-elec= ERx-elec =Eelec) 
Transmit Amplifier 100 pJ/bit/m 
2 
Table 6-1: Radio characteristics [1391. 
Phase 4: Security Implementation Library 
We have used the java security library for our key management protocol implementation. 
During implementation the important functionalities needed were to generate keys, and to 
encrypt and decrypt data using these keys. We have generated the 
keys using hash. 
Furthermore we used two different methods for data encryption and 
decryption: blowfish 
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and homomorphic cryptography. The process for homomorphic encryption was explained 
earlier in chapter three. Every sensor node in the network has three main cryptography- 
related functions along with their other capabilities: generate_key () to produce a new 
key, encrypt () for data encryption and decrypt () for data decryption. 
Phase 5: Sensor Node and Packet Definitions 
During the implementation we have defined a Node class which contains various methods 
and attributes. These implemented methods include: 
* Sense () : Used by every node for sensing its environment. 
9 Neighbours (): Finds and stores information about its neighbouring sensor 
nodes. 
*S end (): Sends data packets to a destination node. 
9 Receive () : Receives data packets from a sender node. 
9 Find_route () : Finds an energy efficient route, which implements our 
routing algorithm. 
9 Aggregate () : Used by group leader nodes to aggregate collected data. 
o Generate_key () : Used by sensor nodes to produce new keys. 
oEncr yp t Used for data encryption. 
o De cr yp t Used for data decryption. 
Along with these fitrictions there are a number of attributes, including energy, trust, 
number ofhopsftom group leader node, and number ofneighbouring nodes. 
Furthermore we have also defined a Packet class. Each instance of the Packet class 
contains data and its destination address. The packet size can be different for different 
applications according to the nature and size of the sensed data- For example 
in an 
application where sensor nodes need to sense the temperature of the environment, aI 
byte (8 bit) data may be enough. However this one byte represents the 
data in its 
unencrypted form. Therefore after encryption the 
data packet size may increase. In our 
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case, every packet contains encrypted data, a hash value (of the encrypted data, 
authentication value, and sender node ID and time stamp), the sender sensor node ID and 
its time stamp. The size of the encrypted data depends on the encryption algorithm used, 
such as blowfish or DES. 
Phase 6: Network and Security Assumptions 
We assume a static and synchronized WSN initially. The sink, acting as a key server 
knowing all the groups' master keys, is assumed to be a PC, laptop or computer with 
indefinite power capabilities. Each group leader sensor node acts as an aggregator and 
router sensor node for communication with other groups. Sensor nodes can be deployed 
via aerial scattering in outdoor applications. However in indoor applications sensor nodes 
can be installed manually and their immediate neighbouring sensor nodes will be known 
in advance according to the application requirements. 
We assume an adversary can eavesdrop on all traffic, inject packets, or replay older 
messages. If a sensor node is physically compromised, all the information it holds will be 
known to the attacker. However, the base station or sink cannot be compromised. 
6.3 Performance Evaluation and Simulation 
In this section, we analyze our proposed scheme in detail. For analysis, we adopt similar 
methods to those described in Du et al. [78]. We evaluate our proposed scheme against 
the following criteria that represent desirable characteristics in a key distribution scheme 
for WSNs: stronger resilience against node capture, forward and backward secrecy, 
resilience against replication attacks, secure data aggregation, memory overhead, 
communication overhead and connectivity. 
We have considered the energy consumption of data processing (encryption, 
decryption 
and aggregation), and that of sending and receiving packets. Further 
detail was given in 
section 6.2. 
In the next section we focus mainly on node capture attacks and secure 
data aggregation, 
providing detailed information about our proposed protocol's resilience. 
In the evaluation 
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we make no assumptions about the topology used for communication inside a group, as 
our proposed solution is structure and density independent. As part of the comparison, we 
have simulated the SADI-GKM protocol using three different topologies: tree, grid, and 
random mesh. 
63.1 Node Capture Attacks 
In this section we check the performance of our SADI-GKM protocol against node 
capture attacks. DGKE has shown different resilience to node capture attacks for 
different topologies, highlighting its topology dependence [ 163]. However, in contrast to 
this we are able to show that our SADI-GKM Protocol generates similar results with 
different topologies to prove it is topology independent. This is because in SADI-GKM 
every sensor node uses a single key for encryption and does not share keys with any 
neighbouring node, therefore compromise of any single node in a network will not help 
an adversary to compromise the communication of other sensor nodes. SADI-GKM key 
sharing method does not depend on the structure of the topology. However in DGKE 
every sensor node used multiple keys for encryption according to the number of its 
neighbouring sensor nodes as described in section 5.1.1. Consequently DGKE behaves 
differently when used in different topologies. A summary of these results is shown in 
Figure 6-7, illustrating the relative structure independence of the protocol. 
As a further performance analysis against node capture attacks we implemented our 
protocol using grid and mesh topologies and compare it against existing grid and mesh- 
based schemes in the following sections. Finally we present the performance of our 
proposed protocol in various different scenarios. 
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Figure 6-7: Effect of node capture attacks on DGKE and SADI-GKM for different 
topologies. 
(a) SADI-GKM Protocol Performance Using Grid Topology 
To evaluate the performance of our scheme using grid topologies, we compare our results 
with PIKE 2D [76] and DGKE grid-based key management protocols. We consider PIKE 
2D since it is a well established and widely known protocol that uses a unit distance 
bidirectional communication model. Consequently, we were able to use the same 
simulation and WSN settings for our SADI-GKM protocol, PIKE 2D and DGKE. PIKE 
and DGKE were simulated on a flat, square deployment field. Although we note that 
there are other functional differences between the various protocols, our focus of concern 
is primarily on that of security and our objective is therefore to compare the protocols 
based on this metric (resilience against node capture attacks), rather than other aspects of 
their functionality. 
We have used the following configuration during the simulations. The WSN is based on 
5000 sensor nodes. The link density at each sensor node is two to four sensor nodes. We 
take the top right, top left, bottom right and bottom left edge sensor nodes to be group 
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leaders for different groups. During the simulation, if a group leader is compromised, we 
assume that the entire group communication is compromised as the group leader node 
holds a master key. Note that we didn't consider the second, third and fourth layers of our 
protocol at this stage. The simulations involved 50 groups of sensor nodes, with each 
group comprised of 100 sensor nodes. The results are based on averaged runs of 500 
simulations. A detailed explanation of the simulation with code is given in [6] 
The results illustrated in Figure 6-8 show that our SADI-GKM protocol provides better 
resilience against node capture attacks. Through a comparison of the three algorithms, we 
can see that this improved performance is primarily as a result of fewer keys being shared 
on average between sensor nodes in our proposed protocol as compared to DGKE and 
PIKE 2D. This reinforces the first observation of DGKE that sharing keys with 
neighbouring sensor nodes for data encryption and decryption helps node capture attacks 
to compromise the entire WSN. 
For these results, the proportion of compromised communications is based on the number 
of compromised links as a fraction of the total links in the simulation. 
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Figure 6-8: Comparison of probability of total communication compromise in grid 
topology. 
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(b) SADI-GKM Protocol Performance Using Random Mesh Topology 
For the performance evaluation of the SADI-GKM protocol using a random topology 
(random mesh), we compared our results with the group-based key management protocol 
Group-based EG [74] and DGKE random mesh. We chose the Group-based EG scheme 
since the scheme organises the WSN into groups with each group being organised using 
the random mesh topology. The Group-based EG scheme assumes a key pool size of 
10,000, which is divided into 200 smaller, equal-sized key pools with 500 keys for each 
smaller key pool. In order to ensure comparable results, we have used similar simulation 
and network settings for DGKE and our proposed protocol as were available for Group- 
based EG. 
The simulation settings are different from the PIKE 2D and DGKE grid, as the Group- 
based EG scheme uses a 10,000 sensor nodes WSN for the simulation and the link 
density of every sensor node is random. 
To compare our approach with Group-based EG and DGKE we have used a similar 
configuration. We assume that there are a total of 10,000 sensor nodes deployed in a 
IOOOXIOOO m2 area. These sensor nodes are divided into 100 deployment groups with 
100 sensor nodes in each group. The internal communication structure of every group 
will be distinct from other groups. We assume a radio range of R= 40m. Every sensor 
node will find its neighbouring sensor nodes within a 40 metre radio range, thereby 
dictating the link density. The results are based on averaged runs of 500 simulations. 
Figure 6-9 shows that the SADI-GKM protocol clearly has better resilience against node 
capture attacks in mesh topologies. 
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Figure 6-9: Comparison of probability of total communication compromise in 
random mesh topology. 
Again, this is partly a result of the way keys are distributed between sensor nodes. As we 
have already noted, the Group-based EG scheme utilises a key pool in order to allow keys 
to be shared between sensor nodes. This has certain advantages in terms of memory 
usage, where a sensor node is unable to hold a unique key for every other sensor node in 
the WSN. It also marginally increases security during the WSN deployment stage, 
avoiding the need to use a master key for all sensor nodes in a group. However, the 
memory benefits for group-based systems are less pronounced, and the consequence of 
using a key pool is greater key sharing across multiple sensor nodes. This compares 
against our own scheme where key sharing is restricted to pairs of sensor nodes, 
providing the increased resilience shown by the simulation results. 
We can see in Figure 6-8 that after compromising 250 sensor nodes 10% of 
communication is compromised in the network size of 5000 sensor nodes using grid 
topology. Furthermore in Figure 6-9 after compromising 250 sensor nodes 5% of 
communication is compromised in the network size of 10,000 senor nodes using random 
mesh topology. These results also prove SADI-GKM topology independency. The 
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difference in fraction of communication compromise in both figures is because of 
different network size. 
Finally we compare the SADI-GKM protocol random mesh results with other similar 
existing schemes Random Key Pool (RKP Du et al. ) [78] and State-Based Key 
Management [172]. The State-Based Key Management scheme improves on the results of 
others as shown in Figure 6-10. 
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Figure 6-10: Comparison of probability of total communication compromise with 
other existing scheme. 
Although our proposed solution is a group based solution, we have only considered peer 
to peer communication inside the groups. In contrast to our solution, the other schemes 
compared against provide the added functionality of secure peer to peer communication 
for the entire sensor network. However as we shall see in the following section this 
comes at a cost in terms of scalability, memory overhead and processing. In situations 
where such ftinctionality is not needed, our solution therefore provides important benefits. 
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(c) Resilience Against Node Capture Attacks With or Without Using Groups 
In this section we have undertaken an analysis as to whether WSNs are more robust 
against node capture attacks either with or without using groups. We have implemented 
the SAD]-GKM protocol in both group-based and non-group-based WSNs using a 
random mesh topology. Figure 6-11 presents the effect of node capture attacks on WSNs 
both with and without groups using SADI-GKM, and the probabilities of group leader 
compromise using different topologies are shown in Figure 6-12. 
We can see from Figure 6-12 that the probabilities of group leader compromise are 
similar across the different topologies. The effect of grouping therefore remains the same 
using different topologies in the case of the physical compromise of the group leader 
sensor nodes. 
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Figure 6-11: Node capture attacks in group and non-group SADI-GKM. 
The results for the non-group based solution are better than those 
for the group-based 
solution. An important reason for using groups is that of scalability. 
Otherwise our 
proposed protocol produces better results without using groups. 
Therefore in small-scale 
WSNs we can use our proposed protocol with greater efficiency. 
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Figure 6-12: Probability of compromising group leader in different topologies. 
In summary, our solution can easily be used in small and large-scale WSNs with high 
resilience against node capture attacks, compared to the other solutions that we have 
tested against. Our simulations show the influence of these three parameters, which were 
highlighted initially by DGKE: 
The structure (topology) of the WSN 
The density of the sensor nodes 
Sharing keys with neighbouring sensor nodes used for encryption and decryption. 
In our proposed protocol we have avoided the influence of these three parameters, 
thereby obtaining significantly improved results in terms of resilience against node 
capture attacks, memory overhead, processing and connectivity. 
6.3.2 Replication Attacks 
To prevent replication attacks we have used time stamps at two steps 
in our algorithms. 
First, each source sensor node encrypts a time stamp with the collected sensed 
data, to 
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prevent replication attacks between the source sensor node and destination (the group 
leader sensor node or sink). Second, a sender sensor node sends a time stamp TSID, with 
the value Xi, so that the receiver sensor node can authenticate the sender node, protecting 
against replication attacks at each hop. 
We will explain this process using an example. Suppose sensor node B is an enemy 
sensor node and acts as if it is a normal group member. Now sensor node A sends 
information to sensor node B. At the first step A encrypts its sensed data along with a 
time stamp using the unique key KGI,, Di. At the second step the encrypted data Mi together 
with the values VGI and JDj as well as time stamp TSjDj are hashed together and assigned 
to Xj. As we know, VGI is shared between all member sensor nodes, and KGjjDj is different 
for every sensor node in the group. Finally A sends Xj, Mi, M and TS, to B (the enemy 
sensor node). To launch a replication attack, B will act as A, using A's ID. In other words, 
B starts forwarding the same encrypted data Mi using ID, fi-om A but using a new time 
stamp. We assume that B has value VG, and A's Mi. Although this is sufficient to 
convince intermediate sensor nodes, the group leader can finally detect this attack by 
checking the data freshness, since B is unable to produce a fresh Mi without knowing A's 
encryption key shared only between A and its group leader. 
Unfortunately there is an energy overhead that may result from the forwarding of 
replicated packets by intermediate sensor nodes that may allow the potential for a denial 
of service attack. Our intention has been to safeguard data confidentiality and integrity, 
while minimising the overhead of having to store multiple keys at each node. In 
particular, providing stronger authentication at each individual node would incur 
additional overheads without totally removing the potential for denial of service attacks. 
Nonetheless, while we don't consider it further here, we do acknowledge that providing 
stronger authentication at each step can reduce the impact and potential for such attacks. 
Furthermore our proposed protocol has the capability to add more layers and integrate 
with the existing four layers. The new layers can have different functional ities, for 
example prevention of denial of service attacks. 
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6.3.3 Secure Data Aggregation and Communication Overhead 
in this section we present the energy consumption during the implementation of SADI- 
GKM with adaptive routing for WSNs. The simulations involved groups of 100 sensor 
nodes using a grid topology with one group leader sensor node. The initial energy of all 
sensor nodes is set to I Joule. We assume that all sensor nodes in the group will 
continually sense and send information to the group leader and that the group leader will 
aggregate this data and send it toward the sink. Once all sensor nodes have successfully 
sent information to the group leader it will have completed one cycle (100 events). Our 
simulation results are based on 20 to 700 cycles in a group of sensor nodes. Note that 
during this analysis we have not considered the authentication cost at every hop. 
However we present results with authentication costs in the next section. 
During evaluation we have considered a number of different cases in order to establish 
the energy requirements for various levels of security functionality. As defined by the 
SADI-GKM protocol, the general structure of the WSN for these various cases is shown 
in Figure 6-13. 
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(; roujlj 1. Decqvptionand aggregation 
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Nodes 2. Encryption 
Figure 6-13: Overview of aggregation functionality provided in various cases 
by 
nodes in the SADI-GKM protocol. 
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SADI-GKM provides two different levels of confidentiality services (cases) at the group 
leader node according to the available resources and confidentiality requirements of 
different applications: 
Case 1: Data can only be decrypted at the group leader sensor node, aggregated and re- 
encrypted using a master key before being sent to the sink. 
Case 2: Data can be aggregated in an encrypted form without decryption and 
subsequently sent to the sink. 
We have implemented Case I in three different forms. In the first form (No-Security) we 
remove all security features in order to establish the exact cost of SADI-GKM during 
communication. Therefore the cost of "No-Security" is only the cost of routing and 
aggregation at the group leader sensor node, as shown in Figure 6-14. The packet size in 
this first form for each event is 24 bits (e. g. 8 bits for sensed temperature data and 16 bits 
for source node IDi). 
In the second form every sensor node in the group encrypts its sensed data using the key 
KGI,, Di as described in Section 5.2. Furthermore the group leader sensor node will decrypt 
all received data and calculate the final aggregated result. The aggregated result will then 
be re-encrypted using the master key MkGj and sent to the sink. In this second form we 
use the Blowfish algorithm for encryption and decryption which increases the size of the 
packet to 208 bits (192 bits of encrypted data and 16 bits of source node ID, ). The third 
form is similar to the second form but in this case we have used homomorphic encryption 
(as discussed in Chapter 3) instead of Blowfish for encrypting and decrypting the data. 
The simulation results for all these forms are shown in Figure 6-14. We can clearly see 
that using Blowfish encryption (since it takes a variable-length key, from 32 bits to 448 
bits, making it ideal for a variety of uses), the group leader sensor node suffers complete 
energy loss after 440 cycles. 
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Figure 6-14: Cost of SADI-GKM using a group of 100 nodes in a grid formation. 
Figure 6-14 clearly shows how the load on the group leader sensor node increases as we 
apply increased security (confidentiality) measures. 
In Case 2 every sensor node ID, has two keys: KGI,, Di shared with the group leader sensor 
node and Ksl,, Di shared with the sink. In the first step a sensor node encrypts its data using 
key Ksj,, Di. In addition the encrypted data is re-encrypted along with a time stamp using 
KGI,, Di. Consequently encryption occurs twice at the source sensor node. This additional 
encryption is used to provide resilience against replication attacks. Once the group leader 
sensor node receives a packet it will decrypt it using the master key MkGj and the source 
node ID,. Subsequently, the group leader aggregates the encrypted data, encrypts the 
aggregated result using master key MkGj, and sends it to the sink. 
We have also implemented Case 2 using the homomorphic and Blowfish encryption 
algorithms. However as described earlier, encryption happens twice at a source sensor 
node using the keys shared with the sink (Ksjja) and group leader (KGjjDj). In the first 
form we use Blowfish twice for encryption with keys Ksl,, D, and KGjjDj. In the second 
form we use homomorphic (using KsjjDj) and Blowfish (using & ,, D, 
) algorithms together. 
Blowfish is used for the second encryption, since it is necessary to encrypt the time stamp 
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with the encrypted data at the source sensor node in order to ensure resilience against 
replication attacks. The packet sizes used for the two forrns are 208 bits (192 bits of 
double encrypted data and 16 bits of source node ID, ) and 400 bits (384 bits of double 
encrypted data and 16 bits of source node ID, ) respectively. The packet sizes for these 
two forms are different because in the latter we have applied Blowfish twice. As we are 
using a 160 bit key length, the Blowfish encrypted data size will always be a multiple of 
192 bits. Adding the timestamp to the initially encrypted Blowfish data in the latter case 
therefore extends the size of the encrypted data to 384 bits in length. The results for this 
are shown in Figure 6-15. 
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Figure 6-15: Cost of secure data aggregation using Blowfish and Homomorphic 
encryptions. 
Figure 6-16 shows the energy consumptions of the group leader in Cases I and 
2 for 
SADI-GKM with increased group sizes. In all cases the result is established 
for a 100 
cycle run. We can see from this how the load on the group 
leader increases as the group 
size increases. This is a clear consequence of the increased 
data that must be aggregated 
as the group size increases. However, it also highlights 
how the prevention of replication 
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attacks in Case 2 affects the level of the energy used by the group leader sensor node, in 
comparison to that of Case 1. 
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Figure 6-16: Cost of SADI-GKM using different group sizes (100 cycles for each 
group size). 
6.3.4 Costs of Authentication and Data Freshness 
In the previous section we have described the implementation of the second layer along 
with the first layer of our protocol. Since we assumed all sensor nodes are trusted, we 
therefore didn't make use of authentication and didn't include the cost of authentication 
in our analysis. In this section we will add the extra cost of authentication and checking 
of data freshness. In Figure 6-17 we have presented the costs of homomorphic encryption 
with and without authentication, where the first case is more costly than the second. The 
reason for the cost increase in the first case is due to the increase in the packet size as a 
result of adding hash value Xi and time stamp TS, The value X, is produced using the hash 
of encypted data M, value VGI (the authentication value shared by all member sensor 
nodes), ID, and the time stamp TS, (used for data freshness and to prevent a replication 
attack) as shown in Algorithm 6-2. In this experiment, the group size is 100 sensor nodes, 
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and the packet size 34 bytes (24 bytes of encrypted data, 2 bytes of ID, 4 bytes for the 
time stamp and 4 bytes for the authentication value X). 
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Figure 6-17: Energy consumption of the entire group with and without 
authentication using Homomorp ic encryption. 
The net cost of authentication for the entire group of sensor nodes after running n cycles 
is shown in the Figure 6-18 below. 
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Figure 6-18: Costs of authentication for the entire group of sensor nodes after 
running n number cycles. 
6.3.5 Forward and Backward Secrecy 
Our proposed key management protocol is able to provide forward and backward secrecy 
due to the fact that every sensor node in each group has a different key for data 
encryption. We can justify this as follows. 
Joining a Group: When a sensor node intends to join a group GI, it will follow a similar 
process to that of "Pre-deployment " as explained in Section 4.1. The new sensor node 
will be supplied with a fresh key &jjDj for encryption, the value VGI for authentication 
and a node Mi. The new node must be deployed within the target group according to the 
position of the group in the WSN- Once the sensor node has been successfully deployed 
within the group it will be allowed to communicate with member sensor nodes in that 
group. Additionally, backward secrecy is achieved since all sensor nodes in the group 
have distinct encryption keys from the new sensor node's key. Consequently all nodes in 
the group are independent in terms of data secrecY/confidentiality. The 
data can only be 
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encrypted at each source sensor node using its unique key and cannot thereafter be 
decrypted by any other member sensor nodes except the group leader. 
Leaving a Group: Suppose a sensor node dies due to power loss or enemy capture. This 
action will have no affect on the other sensor nodes in the group in terms of data 
secrecy/confidentiality. Suppose the enemy has captured the sensor node and has 
successfully retrieved the keys &,,, Di, VGI, and the sensor node's M. Although the enemy 
sensor node is able to launch a replication attack using VGI, it has no access to the data 
from other sensor nodes during communication, and forward secrecy is therefore 
achieved. 
6.3.6 Memory Overhead 
In this section we compare our proposed SADI-GKM protocol with the Group-based EG 
[741, PIKE [76] and DGKE [163] in terms of memory overhead. The memory overhead 
for PIKE-213 is + where n is the total number of sensor nodes, and DGKE requires 
only nk:! S d keys where nk is the number of keys and d is the density of sensor nodes. The 
SADI-GKM protocol is more flexible in terms of memory overhead since every sensor 
node in the WSN has two keys: one for encryption and another for authentication. The 
group size doesn't affect memory overhead in our scheme, whereas the number of keys 
stored in each sensor node by PIKE and Group-based EG increases as the size or number 
of groups increases. Group-based EG stores 50 keys on average in every sensor node in a 
group on the basis of a 40m radio range. In DGKE the number of keys depends only on 
the number of neighbours a sensor node has, but our proposed SADI-GKM protocol is 
density independent, namely, the number of neighbouring sensor nodes has no effect on 
memory use. 
6.3.7 Connectivity 
A particular advantage of our scheme is that we are able to achieve absolute 
unconditional connectivity in any size of group. Li et al. 
[80] also achieve 100% 
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connectivity [135] but their 100% connectivity is conditional. As stated in their paper 
[80], their scheme achieves full connectivity only when 55 keys are assigned in each 
group. Additionally, the size of group doesn't affect the performance of our scheme 
either, unlike those solutions such as the static key pool based idea and other group-based 
schemes. However the keys used for communication links are different in the key pool 
based idea as compared to other schemes. We note that the impact of performance of the 
key pool based idea is reduced for authentication in mobile sensor networks because a 
mobile sensor node can roam and authenticate itself by checking keys with different host 
nodes within a group. 
6.3.8 Secure Group Leader Selection 
We have implemented and undertaken performance evaluations of our group leader 
selection scheme. We have also performed a comparison of the scheme with other 
proposed schemes. We have implemented our group leader selection scheme on a grid 
topology. The packet size used during our implementation is 31 bytes, which include 24 
bytes of encrypted data (using homomorphic and Blowfish encryption), 2 bytes for a 
node ID, 4 byes for a time stamp and I byte for an authentication value. We have used 
the same routing algorithm as described in section 6.2. 
As defined in the previous chapter, we have used four different parameters in our group 
leader selection formula: energy, number of neighbouring sensor nodes, distance ftom 
the current group leader and trust. Although we include trust in the calculation, we are 
not proposing any scheme in this project to calculate a trust value for every sensor node. 
Therefore during the evaluation we have used constant trust values for every sensor node 
and assumed all nodes are trusted. Any proposed solution for 
finding the trust values of 
sensor nodes can be easily integrated into the formula. 
For the group leader selection formula we evaluated various cases, 
including: 
Case 1: In this case we have considered a group of 25 sensor nodes. 
The topology we 
have used is a grid topology with a fixed 
distance of 20 meters between sensor nodes. 
The initial energy of all sensor nodes is set to one 
Joule. Consequently the total initial 
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energy of a group is 25 Joules. As described in Chapter five, in our group leader selection 
scheme we only involve the neighbouring sensor nodes of the current (outgoing) group 
leader in the selection process. In contrast, existing proposed schemes consider the entire 
group in the selection process. To make an appropriate comparison, we have also 
considered a similar process within our SADI-GKM third layer, allowing us to test the 
case of involving all sensor nodes in the selection process as well as the case of just 
involving neighbouring sensor nodes. During this experiment the group leader selection 
process will take place ten times, each of which happens after a fixed number of cycles. 
One cycle constitutes all sensor nodes in a group sending one packet to the group leader. 
When one cycle completes the group leader will have received 24 packets from all 
member sensor nodes plus one packet from the group leader sensor node itself and send it 
toward the sink. Among other group leader selection/election schemes, LEACH [ 139] 
only considers energy as a factor during group leader or cluster head selection, whereas 
Wen et al. [140] considers both energy and the number of neighbouring sensor nodes in 
the selection process. We consider LEACH and Wen et al. 's since both are well 
established and widely known protocols for group leader selection in WSNs. In Figure 6- 
19 we have presented results for LEACH, Wen et al. 's scheme, the SADI-GKM All 
scheme (meaning that all sensor nodes participated in the selection process) and the 
standard SADI-GKM scheme (for which only neighbouring sensor nodes participated in 
the selection process). 
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Figure 6-19: Group energy consumptions with 25 sensor nodes for n cycles. 
In the first set of experiments we have evaluated all the four methods for group leader 
selection using 50 cycles. After every 50 cycles a new group leader is selected and this 
process will be done ten times. In other words, once the group leader receives 1250 
packets (25x5O) it will initiate the new group leader selection process. Furthermore, ten 
times group leader selection process will run where each selection starts after fifty cycles. 
In the second set of experiments we have considered 100 cycles. In this case the new 
group leader selection process will start after 100 cycles (100x25 = 2500 packets 
received by the current group leader). Furthermore the group leader selection process wi II 
run ten times, where each selection is initiated after 100 cycles of the simulation. During 
all these experiments we have considered the energy cost of group leader selection. There 
are certain numbers of communication steps that happen during the group leader selection 
process, as described below: 
* The group Leader sends a selection process packet to all/neighbouring sensor 
nodes. 
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All/neighbouring sensor nodes receive the selection process messages. 
All/neighbouring sensor nodes send their weighting factors to the current group 
leader. 
The group leader receives all weighting factors from all/neighbouring sensor 
nodes. 
* The group leader sends the selected new group leader ID to all member sensor 
nodes sensor nodes. 
The current group leader will send information (the master key and keys shared 
with other groups) to the new group leader. 
e All sensor nodes receive the new group leader ID. 
All these steps will remain the same for the rest of the cases. 
In Figure 6-20 we can see that SADI-GKM has consumed less energy as compared to all 
the other schemes to prolong group life time. Results in Figure 6-20 demonstrate that 
using LEACH and Wen et al, entire group energy runs out after 10 cycles (I Ox 100 = 
10,000 packets) and using SADI-GKM entire group energy finish after 25 cycles 
(25xI00 = 25,000 packet). It means SADI-GKM shows 60% better performance to 
prolong group and WSN life as compare to existing schemes. One of the main reasons for 
SADI-GKM reduced energy consumption is due to the fact that fewer sensor nodes need 
to participate in the selection process. As pointed out in Chapter five, packet and group 
sizes have a direct impact on the energy consumption for the group leader selection 
process. This can be further supported by the next case where we have increased the 
group size. 
Case 2: In this case we have considered a group of 100 sensor nodes. As with Case 1, we 
have used a grid topology with a fixed distance of 20 meters between nodes. The initial 
energy of each sensor node is one Joule. Consequently the total 
initial energy of the 
group is 100 Joules. During the experiments of Case 2 the group 
leader selection process 
will take place 50 times after a fixed number of cycles. 
In this case one cycle means all 
sensor nodes in the group will send one packet to the group 
leader sensor node. When 
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one cycle completes the group leader will have received 99 packets from its member 
sensor nodes plus one packet from the group leader itself for data aggregation. 
In the first set of experiments we have evaluated the four methods for group leader 
selection using 5 cycles. This means that after every 5 cycles a new group leader sensor 
node will be selected. Once the group leader sensor node has received 500 packets 
(100x5) it will initiate the new group leader selection process. In the second set of 
experiments we have considered 10 cycles, so that the new group leader selection process 
starts after every 10 cycles (I Ox 100 = 1000 packets received by the current group leader). 
This experiment was run until 50 rounds of new group leader selection had occurred. 
In Figure 6-20 we can clearly see the effect of the larger group on the group leader 
selection. Using SADI-GKM All, LEACH and Wen et al. 's method, the entire group 
energy was consumed after just 15 cycles. The reason for this higher energy consumption 
is that 50 rounds of new group leader selection are applied, in addition to the larger group 
size. Most of the energy was consumed during the selection processes. Therefore we 
must be particularly careful about how to operate the selection process for large groups. 
From Figure 6-20, it is clear that our SADI-GKM is more energy-efficient. 
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Figure 6-20: Group energy consumption with 100 sensor nodes using different 
schemes. 
Another finding from the experiments is that we need to find a careful balance between 
the numbers of group leader selection rounds and cycles. It would be unwise to start a 
new group leader selection process after just a few cycles, as the group leader selection 
process costs significantly in terms of energy. Therefore we should find optimum values, 
which will be different for different group sizes. In Case 3 below we have run 60 
different experiments in an attempt to establish different energy consumption figures. 
Case 3: In this case, the group size is 100 sensor nodes, the total initial energy of the 
group is 100 Joules, and the packet size is 31 bytes. For each experiment we run m cycles 
for each selection process, with the selection process occurring n times in total, written as 
(m, n) where m=61-n. In this experiment we have started m= 60 and n=1. Furthermore 
we reduce m by one and increase n by one in each experiment. For example in the first 
experiment (60,1) we have run 60 cycles for each selection process, with the selection 
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process occurring one time in total. In the second experiment (59,2) we have run 59 
cycles for each group leader selection process, with the selection process occurring two 
times in total. Similarly in the third experiment (58,3) three selection processes have 
taken place after each 58 cycles. This continues until (1,60), which means we have run I 
cycle for each selection process, with the selection process occurring 60 times in total. In 
this experiment we have only used SADI-GKM, i. e., only the neighbouring sensor nodes 
of the current group leader participate in the selection process. The experiment results are 
shown in Figure 6-21. 
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Figure 6-21: Energy consumption for numbers of group leader selections versus 
numbers of cycles. 
Using this experiment we can establish the optimum values 
for the number of group 
leader selections versus the number of cycles to reduce energy overhead 
for any group 
size. To understand the results in Figure 6-21, we use 
both Figure 6-21 and Figure 6-22 
for explanation. From these we can identify the optimum values of group 
leader selection 
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and cycles for a group of 100 sensor nodes. The main aim is to select optimum values 
which can provide a longer overall group lifespan, or maximum output from the group in 
terms of the amount of data sent. In Figure 6-22 we can see the number of data packets 
sent to the group leader. However these cumulative packets do not include the packets 
sent out during the selection process. In Figure 6-21, for the result for (1,60) where after 
each cycle (I cycle is equivalent to 100 packets sent) a group leader selection process 
runs and this process will run 60 times, the final group energy was 93.8 Joules (the total 
energy consumed in the process of (1,60) is 6.13 Joules) and a total of 6094 packets were 
sent to the group leader. However for (60,1) where the group leader selection process 
runs one time after sixty cycles, the final group energy was 98.7 (the total energy 
consumed in the process of (60,1) is 1.23 Joules) and a total of 11404 packets were sent 
to the group leader. We can see clearly that in the latter case less energy was consumed 
due to running a single group leader process. In the former case (1,60) more energy was 
consumed due to running extra selection processes where each selection process costs 
extra energy. Therefore we need to find optimum values of group leader selection and 
cycles for a group of a given size to balance energy consumption and prolong group life. 
In contrast, after running (31,30) and (26,35), the final group energy remaining was 
38.75 Joules and 38.92 Joules respectively, and the total packets sent were 95704 and 
94154 respectively. From this we can establish that the highest performance value for a 
100 sensor node group is with 31 rounds/30 cycles. 
The reason we want to balance the cycles with the number of group leader selections is to 
increase the overall availability of the group. This is because running many cycles on a 
group leader node can increase the chances of it dieing and encouraging such action can 
cause more sensor nodes to die, which will lead the entire group to the point where sensor 
nodes will be unable to communicate with the rest of the sensor network even though 
there will still be some active sensor nodes. Therefore we need to create a balanced 
energy consumption across all of the sensor nodes to increase the overall group life. This 
was a major motivation behind our proposed solution. In other words even though 
selecting a new group leader costs energy it is still better as compare to single sensor 
node to be a group leader for longer period which misbalances the energy consumption of 
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entire group and results in more energy lost. This argument is discussed with help of 
Figure 6-22. 
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Figure 6-22: Number of data packets sent after n number of group leader selection 
process. 
The experiments presented so far are for the energy consumptions of one large group. We 
have also conducted another set of experiments for a comparison of energy consumptions 
between a single group and multiple sub-groups. This shows a significant difference as 
indicated in Figure 6-23. During the first experiment we have used one group of 36 nodes 
and in the second experiment, 4 subgroups with 9 sensor nodes for each. In the first 
experiment data aggregation takes place at a single group leader sensor node, whereas in 
the second experiment all the four subgroups aggregate data locally and send them to the 
main group leader sensor node which further aggregates the data from the four subgroup 
leaders. The main reason for the reduction of energy consumptions in the second 
experiment is due to the reduction in the number of transmissions towards the main group 
leader sensor node. This set of experiments has been run using different cycles (every 
single sensor node senses an event and sends it towards the group/subgroup leader). 
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Figure 6-23: Energy consumptions for data aggregation using a single group and 
multiple subgroups respectively. 
6.3.9 Key Management for MSNs 
In Chapter five we proposed a key management scheme for NISNs based on SADI-GKM. 
According to SADI-GKM, nodes in a group are unable to communicate directly with 
those in other groups, in order to contain the spread of potential damage caused by 
attacks. This raises the question of how a mobile node in NISNs can authenticate itself 
when it roams from one group to another. Therefore Layer 4 incorporates additional 
functions which include key configuration to allow mobile sensor nodes to authenticate 
themselves. 
In this section we need to find the probability of key sharing in the host group when a 
guest mobile sensor node roams into it. It is likely that the mobile node will have more 
than one sensor node within its range in the host group. Whether the mobile node is 
allowed to communicate with only one or more neighbouring sensor nodes depends on 
the security policy in place. In the previous chapter we presented a formula to find the 
probability that a mobile sensor node will share a secure communication link with at least 
one sensor node, given a sensor node density of d. To validate the 
formula, we have 
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carried out experiments for the following cases: 
Case 1: Increasing the Number of Nodes in a Host Group 
In this case we have found the probability of establishing a secure link between a mobile 
sensor node and a member sensor node in its host group. As described in section 5.2.3.2, 
every sensor node is assigned 75 keys from the key pool for authentication and separate 
keys for encryption. In this experiment we have assumed that the geographical area of the 
host group is 200x2OO m2 and the radio range of each node is 20 meters. Figure 6-24 
shows the different probabilities of establishing links for different group sizes. Increasing 
the number of nodes in the host group will increase the probability of key sharing for the 
guest mobile node. 
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Figure 6-24: Probabilities of establishing links for a mobile sensor node in different 
host group sizes. 
Case 2: Probability of a Mobile Node in a Host Group during Roaming 
In this case we need to find the probability for a mobile sensor node to roam 
from one 
side to another side of its host group. In this experiment the radio range of each sensor 
node is 20 meters, the geographical area of the 
host group is 200x2OO m2, there is a total 
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of 100 nodes in the host group, and the speed of the mobile node is I meter/second. As 
the mobile node moves to the centre of the group the density (number of neighbouring 
nodes) of the mobile sensor node increases,, which also increases the probability of key 
establishment being possible. During this simulation we have deployed 100 sensor nodes 
randomly into the 200x2OO rn 2 group area, and then checked the probability that the 
mobile sensor node at its current position is able to share at least one key out of density D 
(neighbouring sensor nodes). For every position of the mobile sensor node (moving in 
from one comer of the group and moving out from the opposite comer) we have run the 
simulation 10,, 000,000 times, each time we have also changed all sensor node positions in 
the group to find an accurate probability. Figure 6-25 shows the results from these 
experiments, where we can see that if the mobile sensor node is close to a boundary edge 
(e. g. when the mobile sensor node roams into the group) it has the probability 0.3. 
Furthermore after roaming 35 meters inside the group the probability of key 
establishment increases to 0.75. Similarly when the mobile sensor node roams towards 
the opposite boundary of the group the probability of key establishment again reduces. 
Furthermore the energy cost of the host group will increase when more guest mobile 
nodes arrive into the host group. 
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Figure 6-25: Mobile sensor node probabilities of key sharing with host group 
member nodes during roaming. 
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6.4 Discussion 
As we know WSNs is scalable and a type of ad hoc networks where nodes will frequently 
join or leave due to energy depletion or mobile nature. This brings frequent changes in 
topology which affect the security of entire WSN. Our simulations suggest that SADI- 
GKM is topology and density independent and changes in topology will therefore has 
less effect as compare to other schemes. In particular, the structure and density 
independence helps to reduce computation costs in maintaining the network topology 
when new nodes join or leave a group/network for example in mobile sensor networks 
In considering security we focus especially on node capture attack due to its unique 
nature and its strong post-attack effects on the entire WSN. In such an attack the 
adversary may be interested to discover more information from the WSN by physically 
compromising a sensor node, reprogramming the sensor node and placing it back in the 
WSN as a genuine sensor node. This presents a high risk for data confidentiality and 
integrity. Due the nature of node capture attack it is very hard to provide a perfect 
solution. However its consequences can be minimized. We have studied and analysed 
node capture attack behaviour in different scenarios which makes us able to establish 
some precautions, as mentioned in section 5.1, to provide better resilience. We believe in 
such attacks the user will always prefer to protect their data's confidentiality at any cost 
even if the node is physically compromised. SADI-GKM has successfully achieved better 
resilience against node capture attacks by keeping data confidentiality at a high priority 
as shown in section 6.3.1. However it is impossible in a scalable application to keep and 
process all of the data in its encrypted form to achieve high confidentiality. Data 
aggregation is required in order to reduce the communication overhead. To reduce the 
risk that data can be comprised during the aggregation process SADI-GKM provides a 
secure data aggregation scheme using homomorphic encryption as mentioned 
in section 
5.2.1 and its performance is shown in section 6.3.3. In homomorphic encryption 
data is 
aggregated in encrypted form which helps to maintain data confidentially and 
integrity. 
However malicious nodes can send false encrypted values to 
disarray the aggregated 
results. It remains an open challenge as to how to authenticate or check 
data in its 
encrypted form. 
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Similarly if an aggregator node is comprised or stops functioning due to depleted energy, 
there should be a mechanism to select or elect a new aggregator node to keep the group 
connected with the rest of the WSN. The selection process needs to be energy efficient 
and secure. In case an adversary node is selected as an aggregator or group leader it will 
not only compromise the communication of this entire group but also try to disorder the 
rest of the network. SADI-GKM provides an efficient group leader selection scheme as 
compared to existing schemes as shown in section 6.3.8. However in MSNs if a group 
leader is mobile it will increase communication overheads and also make the selection 
process difficult. Consequently security challenges in MSNs are more difficult to handle. 
Therefore we have extended SADI-GKM toward MSNs. However security in MSNs has 
many important unexplored challenges and many open research issues. 
6.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we have presented the implementation phases, simulation framework, 
analysis, results and performance evaluation of our protocol. First we have explained the 
implementation phases including topology implementations, routing algorithms and 
security. Subsequently we have evaluated the SADI-GKM performance against node 
capture attacks using various topologies, both with and without the use of groups. We 
have also described our implementation of secure data aggregation using homomorphic 
encryption, secure group leader selection and finally key management for MSNs. We 
have demonstrated through simulations that our proposed protocol has good resilience 
against node capture and replication attacks compared to other existing schemes, and that 
our novel group leader selection scheme shows better performance than existing group 
leader selection schemes. 
162 
Chapter seven: Conclusion and Future Work 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion and Future Work 
This thesis has presented a new key management protocol, SADI-GKM, to fulfil the 
proactive security needs of WSNs. This protocol is an integration of different novel 
layers (basic key management, secure data aggregation, secure group leader selection and 
key management) that we have developed during our research. The aim of the protocol is 
to provide structure and density independent key management for large scale WSNs, 
which can provide secure communication between source and destination nodes, 
resilience against node capture and replication attacks, secure data aggregation, secure 
group leader selection and key management for MSNs. 
This chapter provides a summary and conclusion of our work together with future 
research in the subject area. It is organised as follows. First we present a summary of the 
thesis in Section 7.1. A summary of the SADI-GKM protocol and our main contributions 
are presented in Section 7.2. The comparison of SADI-GKM with existing approaches is 
discussed in Section 7.3. Future work is investigated and proposed in Section 7.4, and 
finally our concluding remarks are provided in Section 7.5. 
7.1 Thesis Summary 
WSN development is an exciting research area due to the constraints involved. The 
reason for the popularity of WSNs is due in part to the small sizes and 
low costs of 
sensors, their operations and networking behaviours, which enable 
them to provide 
significant advantages for many applications that would not 
have been possible in the 
past. Battlefield surveillance, forest fire detection, smart environments and 
environmental 
control in office buildings are well known examples of their applications. 
A WSN is composed of a large number of sensor nodes 
that are densely deployed either 
inside the phenomenon or very close to 
it. The positions of sensor nodes need not be 
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engineered or predetermined. This allows random deployments in inaccessible terrains or 
during disaster relief operations. On the other hand this also means that WSN protocols 
and algorithms must possess self-organizing capabilities. Another unique feature of 
WSNs involves the cooperative efforts of sensor nodes. Sensor nodes are fitted with on 
board processors and they can use their processing abilities to locally carry out simple 
computations and transmit only required and partially processed data. In the future WSNs 
will form an integral part of our environment and lives. 
There are two main components in a WSN: sensor nodes and the sink. Sensor nodes can 
be categorized as electronic sensors, electron ic-portable or low cost sensors and 
mechanical sensors. All these types of sensor nodes have different sensing capabilities 
The sink in a WSN can be a computer, laptop or a sensor node which gathers infon-nation 
or data from the other sensor nodes and provides this to users or forwards it to other 
networks, such as a local ad hoc network or the Internet. In other words the functionality 
of the sink in a WSN is similar to that of a server in a traditional network. In almost all 
WSNs data are routed toward the sink and the hops close to that sink become heavily 
involved in packet forwarding and thus their batteries get depleted rather quickly. 
WSNs are different from traditional networks and present a new set of properties. 
Typically the structure of a traditional network will remain the same in all its applications 
while a WSN's structure will change according to its application. 
Secure communication between network components is always an issue. Researchers are 
continuously inventing new methods to provide more and more secure forms of 
communication. Many key management protocols have been developed in the past for 
traditional wired and wireless networks. Transfer of networking technology from wired to 
wireless increases potential security threats, ranging from passive eavesdropping to active 
impersonation, message replay and distortion. In WSNs we have the same challenges, but 
in addition the limited resources of sensor nodes pose the biggest challenge. As a result, 
we are unable to directly use traditional networking techniques 
for WSNs. For example, 
asymmetric cryptography may need to be avoided wherever possible 
due to its demands 
on processor resources. 
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Our work focuses on the design of a structure and density independent key management 
protocol stack (SADI-GKM) for large scale WSNs. This protocol can be used as a 
proactive security solution for WSNs, which consists of different layers for different 
security services. All these layers are integrated with each other to provide better secure 
communication between source and destination nodes. SADI-GKM provides better 
resilience against node capture and replication attacks, secure data aggregation, secure 
leader selection and key management for MSNs using fewer resources. 
In this thesis we have presented our work on developing and evaluating the SADI-GKM 
protocol, and justifying the above capabilities. In order to achieve this we included the 
following materials: 
Our introduction to the area in Chapter I discussed the wider context and outlined the 
problem of secure communication in large scale WSNs. It includes the definition of 
WSNs, their main applications and current WSN projects. It also describes the 
communication architecture and components of sensor nodes. We also briefly describe 
the importance of security in WSNs. Chapter I also highlights the consequences of node 
capture attacks, other interlink attacks and security vulnerabilities. 
In Chapter 2 we have given a general overview of challenges in WSNs, including: fault 
tolerance, sensor network topology, routing, mobility and scalability. Furthermore we 
have specifically describes the challenges and possible attacks in WSNs which include: 
data confidentially, data integrity, authentication, key establishment, availability, privacy, 
secure routing, secure group management, intrusion detection and secure data 
aggregation. At the end of chapter we have given an overview of security in MSNs. 
In Chapter 3, we have surveyed the literature and related works relating to key 
management, secure data aggregation, group leader election/selection and key 
management for MSNs. We have presented and discussed the existing solutions of key 
management for static WSNs. These solutions were classified into five different types 
includes: key pool based key management, session based key management, hierarchical 
based key management, key management for heterogeneous sensor networks and group 
based key management. All these solutions place emphasis on the important issue of 
providing high resilience against node capture attacks and providing 
better secure 
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communication between source and destination. This chapter has pointed out the main 
drawbacks of existing key management solutions. We found that all these solutions are 
structure dependent and any change in the structure directly affects the security of the 
WSN. Furthermore in key pool based key management a few compromised sensor nodes 
could lead to the compromise of the entire WSN. Hierarchical based key management 
solutions are more prone to node capture attacks, and session based key management 
solutions are not scalable. 
Later in the chapter we have described related works concerning secure data aggregation 
and its importance. Secure data aggregation is vital in applications where very sensitive 
data are communicated through sensor nodes. The compromise of an aggregator node can 
be a significant risk to data confidentiality. Therefore data aggregation should be 
performed on encrypted data without decryption to improve data confidentiality. 
Furthermore we have presented related works about secure group leader selection and 
also the work on key management for MSNs. 
Chapter 4 presents the design of our protocol SADI-GKM including its four layers. First 
it describes the background of the protocol design to highlight necessary requirements. 
Subsequently it presents our research objectives that form a comprehensive set of 
schemes. We have also identified issues and challenges that are important when 
designing an effective key management protocol for large scale WSNs. This chapter 
highlights the importance of providing an integrated proactive security solution and 
explains how our four protocol layers are integrated with each other in order to achieve 
this. 
In Chapter 5 the different layers of our protocol stack have been fully described in detail. 
We began by describing our pre-design investigations. This section provides a detailed 
analysis for identifying some core information needed to help us toward the 
development 
of an efficient and improved protocol design. In the detailed 
design section we described 
each layer of our protocol. We began by looking at the 
first and second layers, key 
management and secure data aggregation, where we 
described the basic key 
management and secure data algorithms together. 
Then we explained the third layer, 
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secure group leader selection, where we have presented our novel formula for new group 
leader selection. In the fourth layer we presented a key management solution for MSNs. 
Chapter 6 presents the implementation phases, simulation framework, analysis. results 
and performance evaluation of our protocol. First we explained the implementation 
phases including topology implementations, routing algorithms and securit-ý'- 
Subsequently we evaluated the SADI-GKM performance against node capture attacks 
using various topologies, both with and without the use of groups. We then described our 
implementation of secure data aggregation using homomorphic encryption, secure group 
leader selection and key management for MSNs. 
Finally, suggestions for future work and conclusions are presented in this chapter. 
7.2 Comparison with Existing Approaches 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the main objective of our proposed protocol SADI-GKM is 
to provide structure independent proactive security solutions for WSNs. The four layers 
of SADI-GKM offer high resilience against node capture and replay attacks, better data 
confidentiality, more efficient secure group leader selection and key management for 
MSNs. SADI-GKM is a component based protocol and easily extendable through the 
addition of more layers. Its current four layers are integrated with each other as a chain, 
making it more effective overall. In contrast, current solutions are more focused on single 
problems. 
The most notable key management solutions for WSNs are probabilistic key management 
solutions [72][75][76][78][125][126][128] and group key management solutions 
[77][130][145]. All of them have taken node capture attacks as a high priority. In these 
solutions the physical compromise of a few sensor nodes can help an adversary to 
compromise the communication of the entire WSN. In contrast, SADI-GKM provides 
better resilience by avoiding key sharing (used for encrypting and 
decrypting data) with 
neighbouring sensor nodes. We have compared the resilience of 
SADI-GKM against 
node capture attacks with probabilistic and group key management results. 
SADI-GKM 
167 
Chapter seven: Conclusion and Future Work 
has shown better performance against these existing schemes, while using fewer 
resources. 
In addition we have improved the performance of SADI-GKM by applying secure data 
aggregation. We have implemented secure data aggregation using Blowfish and 
homomorphic encryption. Furthermore we have implemented the third layer of our 
protocol for secure group leader selection. For this we have used four selection 
parameters: energy, number of neighbouring sensor nodes, position of a node in a group 
and trust, whereas existing schemes only consider energy and/or the number of 
neighbouring sensor nodes. Our comparison through simulation shows that our SADI- 
GKM group leader selection scheme is more balanced and uses fewer resources as 
compared to other schemes. Finally we have presented simulation results for key 
management in MSNs. 
7.3 Thesis Contributions 
In this section we have organised our contributions in two parts. First we present those 
contributions which were achieved during the pre-design analysis of current WSN 
security issues. In the second part we describe our remaining contributions. This thesis 
contributes primarily to the field of security and key management in WSNs. 
Contributions -A 
This part includes two main novel contributions: 
e The first is the finding that the topology of a WSN, the density of sensor nodes 
and the level of key sharing among neighbouring sensor nodes used for 
encryption and decryption have a direct relationship with the security of the WSN- 
For example, a tree topology is less secure as compared to a grid or random mesh 
topology when it is subject to node capture attacks. Additionally, current 
key 
management schemes are structure dependent and any change 
in the structure of 
the WSN directly impacts on the security. Furthermore sharing 
keys for 
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encryption and decryption with neighbouring sensor nodes can put data 
confidentiality at risk, especially if there is a high threat of node capture attacks in 
a specific application where an adversary can compromise sensor nodes 
physically. Careful selection of these three parameters before proposing any, 
security scheme can reduce the risk of large-scale damage that might result from 
node capture attacks [33]. The results may be of significant benefit to the future 
development of WSN security technologies. 
The second contribution is the finding that the position of a group leader has a 
direct effect on the performance of the sensor group and can increase the 
communication overhead dramatically. Therefore it is important that we should be 
careful and consider group leader positions during the selection of a new group 
leader. We have presented related experimental results in Chapter five. 
Contributions -B 
We have proposed a novel key management protocol stack consisting of different layers 
which are integrated with each other. This protocol provides proactive security solutions 
to different threats in WSNs. Specifically our novel contributions include: 
The first layer of our protocol represents an important contribution to the subject 
are. This layer has responsibility to pre-establish keys between sensor nodes and 
provides basic rules and regulations which are further integrated with all the other 
layers. This key management layer further operates in two phases: a key pre- 
establishment phase and a data transmission phase. These two phases are 
described in detail in Chapters four and five. Furthermore this layer is topology 
independent, i. e., it can work with various topologies. This has been evaluated, 
without integration with the other layers, using different topologies both with and 
without group structures, and compared against existing 
key management 
schemes. The comparison results show a significant 
improvement in resilience 
against node capture attacks, memory overhead and connectivity. 
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As described in earlier chapters, WSNs are highly scalable networks, deployed 
with potentially thousands or even greater numbers of sensor nodes. Consequently, 
a potentially huge amount of communication may happen during any operational 
task. Therefore data aggregation is vital in order to reduce the communication 
overhead. However aggregator nodes can be a high risk to data confidentiality. 
To address the above challenge, the second layer of our protocol provides secure 
data aggregation by aggregating encrypted data without decryption at group 
leader nodes using homomorphic encryption. In our proposed solution we have 
provided different aggregation solutions according to the requirements of data 
confidentiality [62][117]. In our first solution data are decrypted at group leader 
nodes, aggregated, re-encrypted and sent towards the sink. The advantage in this 
scheme is that the group leaders can check the freshness and accuracy of the data 
received from their member sensor nodes before aggregating them. However in 
the event that a group leader or an aggregator node becomes compromised, this 
can compromise the data confidentiality of all member sensor nodes in the group. 
Therefore we have proposed the second method that allows data to be aggregated 
in an encrypted form to provide better data confidentiality. The requirement of 
secure data aggregation in any application depends upon its nature and data 
sensitivity. As we have described earlier our intention is to propose an integrated 
proactive security solution. Therefore the first and second layers are integrated 
with each other, allowing the two layers to provide better resilience against 
multiple threats. Furthermore we have tested the first and second layers together. 
* In the third layer of our protocol we have proposed a novel secure group leader 
selection method which is part of our key management protocol. In our proposed 
method an old group leader sensor node will select a new group leader sensor 
node from its neighbouring sensor nodes based on a number of weighting 
factors. 
These weighting factors are calculated using the available energy at each 
candidate sensor node, its level of trust, its distance from the current group 
leader 
and the number of its neighbours. The sensor node with the 
highest calculated 
value will be selected as the new group leader sensor node. 
Unlike other group 
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leader selection schemes we do not involve all group member sensor nodes in the 
selection process, which significantly reduces the level of communication 
overhead. The energy cost of the selection process increases as the number of 
participant sensor nodes in the selection process increases. 
In the fourth layer of our protocol we have proposed a key management scheme 
for MSNs based on all the previous layers. As described earlier, mobility in 
WSNs brings additional strong security challenges. We have also defined a 
security policy for MSNs which has basic rules for mobile sensor nodes when 
roaming from one group to another. In this solution we have blended our solution 
with a probabilistic key management technique. We have used probabilistic key 
distribution only for mobile sensor node authentication when a sensor node roams 
from one group to another. The host group treats the guest mobile sensor node 
according to a given security policy. For our proposed protocol, all the layers are 
integrated with each other so as to provide a better proactive solution for static 
and mobile WSNs. 
7.4 Future Work 
So far in this chapter we have recapped the project aims, main findings and results, and 
considered the novel contributions of our work. For future research our current work can 
be extended in several directions. More functionality can be incorporated into the current 
layers, and also completely new layers with new security solutions could be added. As we 
have described earlier our protocol offers proactive security solutions. Therefore in the 
future work these solutions could be integrated with detective and reactive security 
solutions. The outcome of such integration will be a more effective security protocol 
for 
WSNs, where more layers can be added and removed according to the security 
requirements of different applications. 
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7.4.1 Secure Data Aggregation 
Secure data aggregation is handled by the second layer of our protocol. We provide two 
different types of aggregation scheme, one with encrypted data and the other without. In 
the scheme where data are decrypted before aggregation at aggregator sensor nodes, it is 
possible to establish whether any junk data have been sent by a malicious sensor node. 
This scheme provides a benefit in this case, but as a consequence data confidentiality 
could be weakened in case an aggregator node becomes compromised. However, the 
scheme where data aggregation takes place without decryption provides a benefit in 
maintaining better data confidentiality, but the injection of random encrypted data by a 
malicious node can lead to incorrect aggregated results. Therefore in the future work the 
secure data aggregation scheme needs to be extended by adding functionality able to 
check the authenticity of data in its encrypted form. This will reduce the risk of incorrect 
results where a malicious sensor node exists in the WSN. However, increasing the 
security will inevitably increase resource consumptions. Therefore it is an important issue 
for the future work to investigate in order to balance these two concerns. 
Furthermore in the future work it is important to investigate how effective the integration 
of our proactive solutions with reactive security solutions is in terms of tackling security 
attacks where malicious nodes authenticate themselves to a WSN and inject invalid data. 
Finally it is also interesting to consider the use of mobile aggregator nodes for secure data 
aggregation. 
7.4.2 Group Leader Selection 
In our current work we have proposed a new group leader selection scheme which 
forms 
part of the third layer of our protocol. For the future work, 
ftirther investigatory research 
relating to certain parameters is required. The first parameter to 
be investigated is the 
position of a group leader. In our current work we 
have only considered static WSNs and 
given high priorities to those sensor nodes which are closer 
to the existing (outgoing) 
group leader sensor node, in the selection process. 
However suppose that a selected group 
leader is a mobile sensor node able to roam within the group. 
This action can seriousl,, 
172 
Chapter seven: Conclusion and Future Work 
affect the performance of the group, especially in the case of a free roaming sensor node. 
Therefore a different method needs to be devised for the management of mobile sensor 
nodes acting as group leaders. 
It will be very useful to investigate current proposed schemes for node trust values, which 
are an important parameter of our group leader selection scheme, to find whether current 
proposed schemes work efficiently with the SADI-GKM scheme, they do have any 
impacts on performance on SADI-GKM, or a new trust evaluation scheme should be 
proposed. Furthermore the future work needs to propose a solution to find that the values 
sent by member sensor nodes for group leader selection are accurate or not. For example 
an adversary or any selfish node may want to become a group leader so it can send false 
information to the current group leader. 
Additionally in the future work it will be interesting to establish the performance of the 
current scheme in different types of WSNs and using different topologies. 
7.4.3 Key Management for MSNs 
An important challenge for the security of MSNs is how to make use of their limited 
resources to achieve scalability and anywhere security in a cost-effective manner. As 
described in Chapter 3, mobile sensor nodes may have different types of roaming 
behaviour. In the future research it will be interesting to investigate the relationships 
between different types of sensor node roaming and various security requirements. This 
research will help to identify important parameters needed for developing new security 
solutions for MSNs. 
7.4.4 Future Security Models for WSNs 
In the future work, more layers can be added into our protocol to provide security 
countermeasures against other security threats such as 
Black Hole, Sybil and many other 
routing attacks. Furthermore to create a best security model 
for WSNs in the future, it is 
important to integrate SADI-GKM with detective and reactive security solutions. 
During 
the development of security model, it is better to analysis the performance of current 
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reactive security schemes with SADI-GKM protocol together before integrating these 
components. There is a chance that current reactive solutions might not show good 
performance when combined with a proactive security scheme. This might happen in the 
case where a solution has been designed specifically for one problem space or application. 
in addition there should be a detective mechanism working along with the proactive part 
of the protocol. Whenever a threat is detected, the reactive security mechanism should 
become active. We believe such a self organised security model for WSNs will provide 
better security. However the research in this area is immature and there are difficult 
challenges remaining. We believe our current novel research contributions will help in 
the future development of secure WSNs. 
7.5 Concluding Remarks 
Recent advances in micro, electro and mechanical systems technologies, wireless 
communication and digital electronics have enabled the development of low cost, low 
power and multifunctional sensor nodes that are small in size and communicate over 
short distances. These tiny sensor nodes, which consist of data sensing, processing and 
communication components, leverage the idea of WSNs. The reason for WSN's 
popularity is due in part to the small sizes and low costs of sensors, their operations and 
the networking behaviours, which enable them to provide significant advantages for 
many applications that would not have been possible in the past. 
Alongside energy efficient communication protocols we require a balanced security 
solution guarding against possible security threats in WSNs. It's interesting to note that 
WSNs face not only the same security challenges as traditional networks (LAN, WAN, 
MAN and etc. ) but also additional difficulties in the limited resources of sensor nodes. As 
a result, we are unable to use traditional techniques for WSNs. A challenging and 
distinct 
security problem in WSNs is node capture attacks, where an adversary gains 
full control 
over a sensor node through direct physical access to it. This can 
lead to a compromise in 
the communication of the entire WSN. The compromised sensor node can 
be an 
aggregator node, a cluster head node or a normal sensor node. 
Therefore we should 
consider such threats as a high risk to communication and 
data confidential ity/security. 
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Furthermore in case a group leader sensor node suffers complete resource depletion, or is 
compromised, the selection of a new group leader in a secure way is vital. 
In contrast to all existing work, we have proposed a novel protocol SADI-GKM for 
structure and density independent group based key management for large-scale WSNs- 
This protocol is designed to provide multiple security services such as improved secure 
communication in static and mobile WSNs, secure data aggregation, data confidentiality, 
secure group leader selection, resilience against node capture and replication attacks, and 
protection against malicious nodes from sending random encrypted data in an aggregated 
form. SADI-GKM provides these services using reduced memory and processing 
overheads as well as high connectivity as compared to existing schemes. In particular, the 
structure and density independence helps to reduce computation costs in maintaining the 
network topology when new nodes join or leave a group. 
We have analysed and evaluated the proposed protocol using simulation techniques. Our 
evaluation was focused on resilience against node capture and replay attacks, power 
consumption reduction through the use of secure data aggregation, energy cost reduction 
for secure group leader selection, and energy cost reduction for the key management of 
MSNs. By comparing our results to those of other solutions available in the literature, our 
work provides better resilience against node capture attacks, replication attack, efficient 
secure data aggregation for data confidentiality, energy efficient and group leader 
selection scheme. The experiments have shown that our protocol is scalable and structure 
independent. 
SADI-GKM can be immediately and efficiently used in indoor applications for example 
monitoring building and factories for fire, pipe leakage and hidden moisture and also in 
health sector. In out door applications, it can be used in traffic monitoring and monitoring 
entire city for better fire rescue systems. In future application its can 
be used in 
application to monitor forest and large group areas but efficient 
deployment mechanism 
is required before implementation. 
Research in WSNs, especially in the WSN security, is still immature. There are still many 
research challenges to be addressed in order to 
implement WSNs realistically in our dailý' 
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life. We believe that our novel protocol SADI-GKM and investigatory research findings 
will help toward the future secure development of WSNs. 
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